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Six years after the Euromaidan, Ukraine has taken significant steps in order to reform its civilian 
security provision, namely the rule of law and law enforcement, to become more aligned with the 
standards demanded by the Euromaidan demonstrators. What the civilian security sector (CSS) should 
look like, and who should participate in the design and the controlling of it, are topical issues in 
Ukraine today, both local and international interest indicating the relevance of the topic for the society. 
This research explores whether a popular resilience theory could help to understand why reform is so 
extensively pursued in the CSS and what meanings are attached to the role of the CSS in the Ukrainian 
society. The research seeks to answer what could resilience be in the particular security context of 
Ukraine, and what role should the CSS take in constructing that resilience. Basing on expert interviews 
and a literature review, this research provides analysis on how particular practices, processes and 
structures in the CSS are believed to construct resilience in Ukraine: how the rule of law and law 
enforcement are found to contribute to the recovery of the society from disturbances, how they 
construct the capacity of the society to adapt to future risks, and how they support coping with shocks 
today. The research also aims to make a contribution to the theoretical resilience literature by 
exploring the applicability of the resilience concept to a study of security provision in a local context, 
namely the Ukrainian security framework.   
The research finds that the Ukrainian civilian security sector has demonstrated notable 
capability of building societal resilience, as it has reformed and developed its functions more 
acceptable to the society, despite the ongoing armed conflict on the Ukrainian territory. Developments 
such as increasing the inclusion of civil society in the processes of security design and the opening up 
of the security institutions to public monitoring are found outstanding in the turbulent circumstances 
in Ukraine today. The reform of the CSS is perceived to represent both recovery and adaptive 
capability of the society. Furthermore, the CSS reform is believed to have made the society more 
resilient against risks that await in the future. At the same time, however, the study finds that the 
prevailing corruption and impunity inside the CSS structures are feared to risk the positive 
developments and to undermine the role of rule of law and law enforcement institutions as 
constructors of resilience in the society. With regard to the theoretical resilience framework, the 
research concludes that resilience thinking seems to well capture meanings attached to the CSS reform 
in Ukraine: the framework seems helpful in conceptualizing why the CSS is demanded to start to 
prioritize the protection of citizens (vs. the protection of the state) and the adaptation and recovery of 
the whole society instead of protecting the ruling elites. However, also difficulties in the application 
of the framework are identified: some risks, such as those related to the armed conflict, appear to 
entail elements that are difficult to address using resilience thinking, other security paradigms 
appearing more useful.  
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Introduction 
In recent times, it has been a central goal of EU policy to create a resilient Ukraine.1 This is pursued, 
among other means, by reforming the civilian security sector (CSS), namely the law enforcement and 
the rule of law in Ukraine.2 Concentrating on the role of the CSS and asking whether Ukraine could, 
in fact, be described resilient as is, this research provides analysis on how the practical processes and 
dynamics in the CSS construct everyday resilience in Ukraine. Furthermore, it discusses the 
applicability of the resilience approach to the Ukrainian security framework. 
 
Learning from resilience thinking, the research presumes that "individuals, communities, nations and 
regions have some level of resilience to perturbations that can be capitalised on" (Manyena and 
Gordon 2015, p. 49). The objective is to discover, what resilience is or could be in the specific context 
of Ukraine and how the CSS participates in the construction of that resilience. Basing itself on expert 
interviews and a literature review, the research seeks to understand how the rule of law and law 
enforcement are found to contribute to the recovery of the society from disturbances, to construct the 
capacity of the society to adapt to future risks, and to support the coping with shocks today. 
 
A number of scholarly works has already explored how an international intervention can build on the 
resilience approach (e. g. de Coning 2016; Chandler 2014). This research, instead, joins a small group 
of studies aiming to identify and understand resilience that already exists in a particular context. For 
example Manyena and Gordon (2015) and Ryan (2015) have referred to the lack of such local 
approach in resilience literature. This research explores resilience in Ukraine not as a tactic of 
international peacebuilding but as a capability of the Ukrainian society and its CSS. The possibility 
of external interventions, such as EU projects, to positively affect the CSS’s role in creating resilience 
is not denied, but the focus is primarily on the local context for the emerging of resilience.  
 
Furthermore, learning from the examples of Ryan (2015) and Heath-Kelly (2015), the research is not 
restricted to where resilience has been purposely pursued, and is not interested in describing the 
strategic application of the resilience approach in Ukraine. Instead, the study utilizes the theoretical 
                                                     
1 Increasing resilience of Eastern neighborhood, including Ukraine, is a central goal of EU policy, indicated in documents 
such as the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2015), the EU Global Strategy (2016) and the Strategic 
Approach to Resilience in External Action (2017) (Cenusa̦ 2019, 1). 
2 The objective of European Union Advisory Mission to Ukraine is to “support Ukraine in developing sustainable, 
accountable and efficient security services that strengthen the rule of law […] to restore the trust of the Ukrainian 
people in their civilian security services.” (Council of the EU.) 
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framework in order to understand meanings given to the CSS in Ukraine. The understanding what 
constitutes resilience in the specific circumstances is co-produced by the researcher and the 
interviewees, the latter being experts of the Ukrainian context and the dynamics of the CSS. Learning 
from Dunn Cavelty and others (2015, p. 8) the research recognizes that resilience is not “one” but of 
many kinds and is interested in discovering the types of it. Basing on a suggestion of Manyena and 
Gordon (2015, p. 50), connections to other security discourses are constantly looked for, for example 
the representations of stability, defence and neoliberal frameworks being sought. Also the suitability 
of the resilience framework to the research of the CSS in Ukraine is discussed. 
 
Ukraine provides an extremely dynamic and intricate context for studying the civilian security 
provision. Representing the group of post-Soviet states that after gaining independence from the 
USSR have moved towards modern policing and Western ideas of security, Ukraine has been found 
to stand out in that group by its pendulum-like development. (Beck 2005; Pervyi & Kolisnyk 2012; 
Marat 2018.) Furthermore, taking into account the 2013–2014 events of the Euromaidan in which 
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated against the means of policing of the Yanukovych 
regime, hundreds or thousands being victimized by police violence in those circumstances, the 
context appears topical for a research interested in the meanings of the CSS in societies. Indeed, what 
the Ukrainian CSS should look like, and who should participate in the design and monitoring of it, 
are topical issues in Ukraine today, both local and international interest indicating the relevance of 
the topic for the society. As the literature review will demonstrate, many have found studying policing 
in the post-Soviet space relevant (Marat 2018; Light 2019). As research on post-Soviet policing 
already exists, this research aims to make a contribution by adding the perspective of resilience.  
 
Selecting “resilience” as the main theoretical framework is justified by the increased interest in the 
concept in the international arena. Indeed, “resilience” has recently become popular in the strategies 
and the policy papers of international actors in the fields of peacebuilding and state-building, crisis 
management, development and humanitarian aid, while simultaneously gaining prominence in 
national security policies (Juncos 2018, p. 559; Chandler & Reid 2016, p. 1; de Coning 2016, p. 167; 
Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 1; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39; Corry 2014, pp. 256–257; Pospisil & 
Besancenot 2014, p. 614). Also academic research has showed growing interest in theorizing 
resilience, this scholarly interest yet increasing slower that the political use of the concept (Dunn 
Cavelty et al., p. 4; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 617). Learning from the calls of previous research 
to further study resilience in different contexts (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 8) and to explore 
resilience as a local tactic existing independent from an international intervention (Manyena & 
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Gordon 2015; Ryan 2015), the contribution of this research is to discover the applicability of the 
framework in the study of the civilian security provision in the context of post-Soviet Ukraine. 
 
Finally, why to concentrate on the civilian security sector in the first place? Many scholars have 
theorized on implications of resilience for security (e. g. Bourbeau 2013, Chandler & Reid 2016, 
Corry 2014, Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, Prior & Hagmann 2014). However, few (if any) anglophone 
publications concentrate on the role of law enforcement and the rule of law in constructing societal 
resilience. There exists psychological literature about resilience of police personnel in hostile 
situations, and for example Lauchs and others (2012) have studied the resilience of corrupt police 
networks, but what the police can add to the resilience of a society, appears a topic yet undiscovered 
in the academia. The gap could be explained by the fundamental tendency of the resilience approach 
to direct the focus away from state institutions towards new actors and bottom-up processes. 
However, the centralized CSS institutions appearing powerful security actors in most societies, and 
especially in post-Soviet societies (Marat 2018), it is reasonable to open the discussion about 
meanings given to rule of law and law enforcement in local contexts of resilience construction.  
 
Also the broad international and local interest in the reform of the CSS in Ukraine guides to look for 
the origins of the emphasis. As already noted, international actors, such as the EU, have taken the 
reform of the CSS in Ukraine as their major objective (see e. g. EUAM Ukraine). Today, also a great 
number of Ukrainian organizations work directly or indirectly on the reform of the CSS in Ukraine3. 
This research explores, whether and how the popular resilience theory could help to understand why 
the CSS reform is so extensively pursued in Ukraine. 
 
Research on resilience answers questions such as what a specific community has done, is doing and 
could do in order to “bounce forward”, adapt to and cope with a shock (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 
49). These questions also guide the design of this study: the interviewees of the research reflect on, 
based on their experience as experts working in the field, what role the CSS has taken, takes and 
should take in building the resilience of Ukraine. According to Manyena and Gordon (2015), a study 
on resilience should not concentrate on an after-shock situation only, but also explore the resilience 
of the particular society before the shock, identifying roles of formal and informal institutions, for 
example. The purpose is to reveal resilience factors of the particular society. (P. 49.) This research 
                                                     
3 See, for example, the Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors On Law Enforcement (UMDPL), the Right to 
protection, the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, the Centre for 
Democracy and Rule of Law, the DEJURE Foundation, and the Anti-Corruption Action Center. 
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namely seeks to understand the role of the CSS institutions in building resilience in Ukraine. Due to 
the temporality of resilience, namely that resilience, even when existing in the present, is 
fundamentally oriented towards the past and the future (Bourbeau 2013; Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015; 
Heath-Kelly 2015), the analysis is not limited to any certain period of time. Thus, aiming to provide 
a cross-section of the CSS producing resilience in Ukraine as of today, the study also refers to events 
that the interviewees find relevant in the past and the future. Furthermore, learning from Foster (2007, 
p. 13) and Dunn Cavelty and others (2015, p. 9) this research is not only interested in shocks with 
immediate powerful effects, like the Euromaidan, but it also studies chronic, slow-burn disturbances 
that require recovery, adaptation and anticipation from the society. What the shocks, disturbances or 
risks are in the specific context of Ukraine, is defined by the interviewees. 
 
The resilience concept is used to describe entities of various sizes, resilience of cells and individuals 
being studied roughly in the same sense as resilience of organizations, cities, societies and states 
(Prior & Hagmann 2014, p. 2). Resilience at the individual level has been researched also in 
international relations and related to peace and security; for example Chandler and Reid (2016) 
theorize resilience focusing on an individual subject. The level of analysis in this research is, on the 
one hand, the society: that is the subject whose resilience is in our interest. On the other hand, it is a 
sub-unit of a state, namely the civilian security sector of the state of Ukraine, whose ability to produce 
resilience is analyzed. The study relies on North’s and others’ (1963) conceptualization of the state 
as a system that is “a boundary-maintaining set of inter-dependent particles or sub-units” that also 
acts in the larger international system (p. 5). By interdependence North and others mean that 
experiences of a single component of a system have implications on the balance and the relationships 
of the larger system (Ibid. p. 5). The state of Ukraine could represent the main system in this research, 
the CSS being one of its sub-units or components. However, the underlying interest of this study is 
in the relevancy of that sub-unit or component to the whole Ukrainian society that also operates as a 
part of the larger international system. 
 
Finally, focusing on the role of the CSS in constructing societal resilience in Ukraine today, this 
research discusses questions that are central in, but not limited to the field of peace and conflict 
studies. The role and relevancy of the CSS in resilience could be studied also in the fields of political 
science, administrative science or law studies, for example, but despite the common areas of interest, 
the perspective of this research is different. Utilizing the methodology and theory originating from 
social science, the approach of this research is characterized by the pursuit of finding out how the 
role of the CSS is interpreted and what meanings are given to it in the light of resilience thinking. 
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The research also takes a perspective different from that of the international relations, “resilience” 
being approached not as a political objective of international actors, such as the EU, but as a product 
of inherently local solutions to locally experienced problems.  
 
Furthermore, the research is not interested in any interpretations or meanings given to the CSS, but it 
particularly studies expertise-based interpretations, namely meanings given to the CSS by 
transnational experts that work in Ukraine. An expert in this research is understood as a person that 
has acquired specific type of knowledge because of their active involvement in tasks related to the 
CSS and its reform in Ukraine. Such tasks include drafting initiatives and legislation related to the 
CSS, carrying out training and other projects to support CSS staff, monitoring of law enforcement 
and rule of law, collecting information on human rights violations, reporting to national and 
international audiences, and meeting the CSS institutions, their heads and staff. The research 
presumes that professional involvement of the interviewees to such activities has attached them 
expertise by which they are in a good position to interpret and assess the role of the CSS in the 
Ukrainian society. In practice, the research interviews nine experts, of Ukrainian and other 
nationalities, that work in varying expert positions in six different intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations in Ukraine. The research studies how the experts interpret the role of the 
CSS in constructing resilience in Ukraine, based on their experiences.  
 
In specific, the following research questions are set to be answered, based on the expert interviews 
and the literature review: What meanings are given to the Ukrainian Civilian Security Sector from a 
resilience perspective? In particular, how is the CSS perceived to contribute to resilience in Ukraine, 
learning from the expert interviews and the literature review? In addition, what can be learnt about 
the theoretical resilience approach by applying it to the Ukrainian security framework?  
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Theoretical framework: Resilience  
Have you heard? There is a new superhero in town! Her name is Resilience and she has quickly made herself 
indispensable to the Security Empire. Resilience materializes in crisis situations and fights against Complete 
Breakdown by granting the vulnerable means and responsibility to help themselves. Her nemeses are 
Contingency and Uncertainty – yet, they also give her reason to exist. At a certain point, she was reported 
to be in a league with Risk and Preparedness, but that is unconfirmed. Others are in a clearly ambiguous 
relationship with Resilience. (Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann & Kristensen 2015, p. 3–4.) 
 
When new concepts are adopted to policy papers of international organizations and scientific 
publications, their essence becomes defined by terminology that already exists in that field. This 
chapter delves into how the concept of resilience was positioned when it was born in the “Security 
Empire” and what purposes it has served thereafter. Noting that it was, indeed, the international arena 
where resilience grew into a popular, full-sized security paradigm, the chapter will conclude that the 
international roots of the concept do not prevent applying it in local contexts of security. Instead, the 
concept is designed to capture the processes and dynamics that grow from below. This chapter shortly 
introduces some of the preceding and alternative terminology to resilience, and thus aims to justify 
why it is namely the resilience concept that is utilized in this research. Theoretical literature on 
resilience appearing extensive, the chapter only manages to review some of the various attempts to 
define resilience. However, because the resilience theory and the conceptual space around it 
constitute the thread of this study, a robust understanding on what resilience is and how it functions 
is pursued. 
 
Before resilience 
Roots of the resilience framework lie in the international arena of state- and peacebuilding (Manyena 
& Gordon 2015; Pospisil & Kühn 2016). This section shortly reviews the concepts that “resilience” 
came to replace, and explores what was the window of opportunity for the resilience concept to arise. 
Pospisil and Kühn (2016) identify four generations of state-building, originating from development–
security nexus, within which also “resilience” emerged (p. 5). “Conflict resolution”, the first 
generation, bloomed in the late 90s. The second generation, the “failed states” approach, was 
developed in particular in the USA and had its breakthrough after the 9/11. The failed states approach 
turned upside down the causes and consequences of conflict resolution: it was no more conflicts 
causing problems to states, but failed states causing violence. The failed states approach had close 
links to good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights promotion as tools of 
intervention. Peace was often associated with stability, and stabilization became an important part of 
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the state- and peacebuilding interventions. When the third generation of state-building, the “fragile 
states” approach, was founded in the US soon after, also in the early 2000s, first references to 
“resilience” in state-building were made. However, “resilience” only gained popularity later, within 
the fourth generation of “fragility and resilience” that shifted the focus from fragile states to fragility, 
emphasis on state–society relations, inclusive political settlements and adaptive capacity 
characterizing the core of these approaches. (Pospisil & Kühn 2016, pp. 4–7.)  
 
Thus, it was the discourse about fragile states inside which the resilience approach was born, and it 
was largely based on the theorization on fragility (Pospisil & Kühn 2016). Relevance of that 
theorization still remaining in the resilience discourse of today, a closer look into that framework 
should be taken. The fragile states concept that grew popular in the 90’s (Manyena and Gordon 2015, 
p. 42) or early 2000’s (Pospisil & Kühn 2016, pp. 4–7) has been assessed as one of the most important 
concepts to emerge in the post Cold War period (Manyena and Gordon 2015, p. 38). As typical, the 
concept first entered politics, important international actors referring to it in their publications, and 
only thereafter it gained foothold in research and academic publications. The concept gradually 
changed from “fragile states” to “fragile situations” and further into “fragility”. The concept became 
used similar to “failing”, “weak”, “quasi” or “crisis” state as well as to “illiberal”, “developing” or 
“democratizing” state, however still entailing specific characteristics, especially in relation to the 
failed states concept that it replaced in state-building. Whereas failed states had been previously 
understood as simply needing stabilization, the idea of fragility entailed more subtle considerations 
for state-builders. (de Coning 2016, p. 166; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 2–4, 7; Manyena & Gordon 
2015, pp. 38– 42; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014 p. 617.)  
 
Two criteria are often used to determine state fragility (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 42): legitimacy, 
namely the government’s “will and capacity to provide core services and basic security", and its 
effectiveness “in providing services and security" (Newbrander et al. 2011 p. 640). De Coning (2016) 
defines fragility as a “complexity deficit”, a fragile state being “a system that has insufficient or 
limited capacity to self-organise” (p. 173). He argues that the social institutions of fragile states, 
including those governing security and justice, lack resilience (De Coning 2016, p. 173). According 
to the OECD/DAC (2007) fragile state structures lack political will and are not capable of providing 
basic functions of poverty reduction, development or securing of populations and their human rights 
(p. 2). Manyena and Gordon (2015) argue that "fragile states are often in conflict, at risk of conflict 
and instability or they are newly emerging from conflicts” (p. 42). 
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Many critiques have been directed at the fragile states approach, for example the “fragile states” 
finding the approach stigmatizing (Juncos 2018, p. 566, citing Grimm 2014, p. 258). However, why 
the fragile states approach has lost its prominence and the resilience approach gained more popularity, 
is related to a larger set of challenges that Chandler (2014, 2016) calls the “paradox of liberal peace” 
discussed later. However, despite the fading out of the fragile states approach, “fragility” remained. 
Today it forms a reference point in the resilience literature, primarily because “fragility” is understood 
to be located at the other end of the continuum to resilience. Indeed, several scholars (e. g. Manyena 
and Gordon 2015 and Pospisil and Kühn 2016) portray fragility as the opposite of resilience, fragility 
meaning the "absence or lack of resilience" and resilience "the absence of or benign effects of 
fragility" (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 43). The OECD (2008) phrased the relationship of the 
concepts as follows: “(w)e presume the opposite of fragility not to be stability, though this has often 
been the goal of external actors, but rather resilience – or the ability to cope with changes in capacity, 
effectiveness, or legitimacy” (p. 12). Pospisil and Besancenot (2014) note that the adoption of the 
resilience concept in the field of state-building actually changed the definition of “fragile” or “fragile 
state” in the field: the focus in fragility shifted from the dysfunction of institutions towards “the 
abilities of the state to unfold integrative capabilities and to manage and mediate societal 
expectations” (p. 619). 
 
According to Manyena and Gordon (2015), alongside with state fragility, “stabilization” was another 
one of the most important concepts that gained popularity in the debates of the donor community in 
the post Cold War period (p. 38), remaining omnipresent yet today in the international responses to 
conflict and fragility (p. 44). In addition to UN operations, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and 
several European states have emphasized stabilization in their conflict prevention, conflict mitigation 
and recovery programmes. Having varied from conflict prevention to conflict management, the 
stabilization interventions have typically included elements of peacemaking, peacebuilding, state-
building, counter-radicalism, counter-terrorism and early recovery. Both short and narrow projects, 
targeting specific conflict drivers, as well as broad long-term projects have been carried out under the 
stabilization label. Critique has arrived from various directions: the stabilization projects have been 
argued to lack theoretical reflection, to utilize same technologies in every context, and to focus too 
much on the formal state institutions, disregarding the people and communities. (Manyena & Gordon 
2015, pp. 44–47.) Typically, stabilization policies have pushed “the traditional, hierarchical control 
model of governing”, the emphasis being on state-society relations rather than on the horizontal 
society-society relationship (ibid., p. 45). 
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The fundamental problematic behind both the fragile states and stabilization approaches opens up 
through the critique of liberal peace. Liberal peace stands for the international peacebuilding 
interventions that took place in the Global South all long the 90’s and 2000’s, operating in the fields 
of state-building, institution-building and the building of conditions for democracy and the free 
market, namely the democratization and the marketization, equaling to the “liberalization” of the 
economic and political spheres of states recovering from war. (Juncos 2018, p. 560; Chandler 2014; 
Paris 2004, pp. 1–5.) The interventions often aimed at conflict resolution through linear problem-
solving logic, “objective” experts analyzing the roots-causes of the conflict, the identified problems 
being then addressed through international intervention by the UN or another international 
organization (de Coning 2016, p. 166; Ramalingam 2013, pp. 12, 16), the solutions typically 
including the illiberal states adopting liberal or neoliberal state practices, such as rule of law and 
democracy (de Coning 2016, p. 166). Liberal peace interventions traditionally covered areas such as 
good governance, institution building and the security sector reform in the target countries (Manyena 
& Gordon 2015, p. 38). Chandler (2014) identifies two phases of liberal peace interventions: the first 
phase aimed to make peace through changing the formal state institutions, and the second phase 
recognized that it is the “hearts and minds”, namely culture, norms and values of the local people, 
that need to be changed first in order for liberal institutions to more easily root in those societies (pp. 
30–36).  
 
According to many scholars, though not all, the universalist and externally imposed projects of liberal 
peace failed or at least turned out problematic. For example, the operations in the Balkans, Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been found to represent the found problems. (Juncos 2018, p. 560; de Coning 2016, 
p. 166–167; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014; p. 617; Paris 2004, pp. 1, 6.) The strategy of liberalization, 
aimed at consolidating peace, appeared to increase rather than decrease the likeliness of renewed 
violence to emerge (Paris 2004, p. 6). The idea of the promotion of a free market, liberal democracy 
and the rule of law in non-liberal societies started to be viewed as problematic, many finding the 
liberal peace interventions neocolonialist and patronizing. (Chandler 2014, pp. 28, 33, 37.) Some 
started to question the implicit assumption that international actors, like the UN, possess knowledge 
or agency with which peace or a state could be “built”. Starting from the 2000s, the traditional 
understanding of peacebuilding started to collapse. (de Coning 2016, pp. 166–167, 173.) Reasons for 
the failure of liberal peace have been sought in the poor implementation, in errors made in the cause-
effect presumptions, in the top-down approach, and in complexity (Juncos 2018; de Coning 2016; 
Chandler 2014; Richmond 2011). Indeed, following the failure of liberal peace, ideas of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and complexity gained more popularity in peacebuilding and became to mark the birth of 
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the resilience approach in the field (Juncos 2018, pp. 559, 560, 564). New emphasis on complexity 
and the recognition of “the difficulty of predicting and calculating risk” led to a conclusion that the 
focus of international efforts should turn to prevention (Juncos 2018, p. 560). 
 
Thus, new policy options were started to be sought. According to Chandler (2014), critics were long 
unable to provide alternatives to the liberal peace that they criticized, to overcome the “paradox of 
liberal peace”. Suggestions arising from the academia included, for example, Richmond’s (2011) idea 
on post-liberal peace, based on the mutual exchange of ideas between the intervener and the “local”. 
Finally “sustaining peace” and “resilience” emerged as the two major new approaches (de Coning 
2016, pp. 166–167). To a some degree, resilience (and according to de Coning, sustaining peace) was 
found to overcome the “for-or-against liberal peacebuilding debate” (ibid., p. 167), namely to provide 
a possible resolution to the paradox of liberal peace (Chandler 2014, p. 28).  
 
Resilience 
Initially referring to the systems of ecology and biology (Juncos 2018, p. 561; Corry 2014, p. 257; 
Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 615), the concept of resilience entered international studies, political 
science and security studies relatively late, after being first found by psychologists, criminologists, 
social workers and political geographists (Bourbeau 2013, pp. 3, 4). Its roots as a scientific concept 
date back to the 1970s, when it was first discovered to describe complex adaptive ecosystems 
(Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 616). The concept’s way to popularity was a shared project of 
international organizations and the academia, similarly to the failed state concept (Pospisil & Kühn 
2016, pp. 2–3). Outside the academia, the resilience concept is today commonly used in 
peacebuilding, state-building, conflict prevention, security policy, crisis management, and in projects 
responding to disasters, climate change and financial instability, by major international organizations 
and also by bilateral actors (Juncos 2018, p. 561; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 7; Prior & Hagmann 2014, 
p. 3; Pospisil and Besancenot 2014, pp. 614, 618; Corry 2014, p. 257). In 2018 Juncos estimated that 
"most international organizations, including the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the UN, and the World Bank, have adopted resilience as the main solution to 
past intervention failures" (p. 564). In the academia, the increased interest in the resilience concept 
has been demonstrated for example by Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) who showed how the number 
of publications on resilience in the Web of Science increased fivefold from 2003 to 2013, from 500 
to 3 000 pieces. In the social science section of that database, publications covering “resilience” and 
“security” at the same time increased from two to 85. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 4.) 
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Despite the increasing popularity, there is confusion and obscurity around the resilience concept 
(Juncos 2018, p. 566; Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 2; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39). A number of 
typologies have been provided by scholars, the outcome, however, being a rather fragmented set of 
different understandings on resilience (Dunn Cavelty at al. 2015, p. 6; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 
39). Thus, it must be noted that despite referring to the “resilience approach”, the “resilience 
framework”, “resilience thinking” or even to the “resilience theory” in this research, this “approach” 
hardly forms a coherent or unanimous entity but rather appears as a tangled web of typical ideas and 
arguments. Indeed, this study does not rely on one understanding of resilience, but utilizes a loose set 
of definitions, typologies and characterizations of resilience. The research of Dunn Cavelty and others 
(2015) supports this approach: they argue resilience to be a security rationale that is not “one”, but of 
many different types, and therefore should be studied in its different forms and contexts (p. 8). 
Carpenter (2011), instead, notes that resilience has developed from a metaphor into a theoretical 
framework (p. 3). This study indeed utilizes resilience in the sense of a theoretical framework that 
entails a network of assumptions and traditions of how the concept is used. 
 
The etymology of the English word "resilience" lies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the 
English verb "resile" which derives from the Latin verb "resilire" meaning “jumping back” or “recoil” 
(Prior & Hagmann 2014, p. 2; Bourbeau 2013, p. 6), the “re” meaning back (Dunn Cavelty et al. 
2015, p. 8). Representing one of the older conceptualizations, Holling (1973) defined resilience as "a 
measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables and 
parameters, and still persist" (p. 17). According to Manyena and Gordon (2015) the resilience concept 
commonly refers to “the ability of an individual or community to cope positively with rapid onset 
shocks or significant and protracted sources of stress” (p. 40) and to “how various open and complex 
systems respond to dynamic and unpredictable external variables and, potentially, produce "positive" 
outcomes" (p. 39). Chandler (2012), whose research is quoted broadly in resilience literature, defines 
resilience as "the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats" (p. 17. 
This definition is used e. g. by Ryan 2015, p. 301 and by Bourbeau 2013, p. 6.). Alternatively, though 
not in contrast, resilience has been defined as the “the capacity of an individual, community or system 
to absorb and adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure, and identity under 
stress” (Dahlberg 2015, p. 545). Other interesting characterizations include resilience as the process 
of “coping” (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 7) and resilience as the “systematic self-help” of local 
communities (Milliken 2013, p. 1) 
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Resilience has been defined to not to be the "goal" but the "approach". Thus the concept differs from 
objectives such as preventing violent conflict, as resilience indicates “a way of operating” (Juncos 
2018, p. 569). In other words, resilience has been defined not to be an end-state that could be 
permanently achieved, but rather a continuing process. This appears different to the stability concept 
and the applications of the stabilization approach that in the first place pursue a stable end–state. 
(Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, pp. 618–619.) To which degree resilience is understood as resisting 
change, and on the other hand, as admitting to change, has changed over time for the favor of the 
latter: later definitions recognize resilience as “systems responding to perturbations by changing, 
within limits, while retaining their essential functions, structures and “identity”” (Cork 2010, p. 4). 
Aligned with that, Milliken (2013) notes that today resilience is more often understood as 
“adaptation” than as “bouncing back” (p. 2).  
 
What constitutes resilience and what are the factors and indicators of it, is not comprehensively 
resolved in the previous research on resilience (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 618). Yet some 
characterizations have been made. Ryan (2015) identifies adaptivity, flexibility and the capability to 
foster enduring relationships as the key traits of resilience (p. 302, citing several sources). Manyena 
and Gordon (2015), instead, name the core elements of resilience to include material resources, 
"financial, social, human and nature capital" (p. 41), information, trust, cooperation, agreement, local 
and informal forms of governance, the capability to live with uncertainty, as well as "people's ability 
to collaborate when it counts" (p. 45)(Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 45–47, partly citing Zolli & Healy 
2012). Furthermore they note that laws, regulations, knowledge, values, traditions and cultural 
systems embedded in institutions can be resilience factors (p. 49). Referring to the OECD (2008) 
Manyena and Gordon argue that resilience derives from a "combination of capacity and resources, 
effective institutions and legitimacy" (p. 43). De Coning (2016) perceives social complexity to 
characterize resilience: it is the internal complexity of social institutions that makes them resilient (p. 
173). Resilient subjects, instead, have been characterized as follows: they are fair but dangerous, 
trustful but suspicious, rather fearless but prepared for the future, optimistic, flexible and efficient, 
capable of turning traumas into positive resources, and self-responsibly capable of coping with 
random forces. The contradictions in these characteristics show how plural and unstable resilience 
can be. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 10–11, reflecting previous literature.) A resilient state, on the 
other hand, has been defined to have the capability of “absorbing shocks and transforming and 
channeling radical change or challenges while maintaining political stability and preventing violence” 
(OECD 2011, p. 21).  
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Resilience literature offers multiple answers to who or what is the subject that should become 
resilient. In security policy, peacebuilding and state-building literature it is often either a state, a 
community, a society or an institution whose resilience is addressed. However, also alternative 
interpretations have been suggested, including the idea of state–society relations or the social contract 
having to be resilient (OECD/DAC 2008). Several scholars have also written about individual citizens 
as the subjects that need to become resilient against security risks. (See e. g. Pospisil and Kühn 2016; 
Pospisil and Besancenot 2014; Chandler 2014.) What is important for this study is that most of the 
resilience literature does not reduce the subjects of resilience into mere objects of external influences 
but emphasize their capacity for agency: in resilience thinking, communities possess agency to 
recreate and transform systems, and this is namely what constitutes their adaptive capacity. (Manyena 
& Gordon 2015, p. 40–41.)  
 
Indeed, Juncos (2018) argues that resilience “operates a turn from the international to the local”, the 
shift marking a handover of responsibility of managing risks to local governments, societies, 
organizations and individuals (p. 562). The importance of local agency in recovering from a conflict 
has belonged to the peacebuilding discourse already for a long time, but the concept of resilience is 
considered to have offered new opportunities for empowering the local communities and embracing 
their agency (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39). According to Manyena and Gordon (2015), it is one 
of the key assumptions of resilience theory that "collective community action can mitigate risk by 
enhancing adaptive capacity" (p. 47). Furthermore, the resilience approach suggests giving space for 
new agents to step into peacebuilding processes, including informal institutions. It entails an idea that 
these new actors, people and communities for example, can be crucial in filling in the void if formal 
institutions collapse. (Ibid. p. 39–41.) Finally, deriving from this changing understanding on agency, 
the adoption of the resilience concept has marked a shift from focusing on external threats towards 
focusing on the resilient subjects that are (or are not) capable of coping with the particular threats or 
risks. Namely, resilience thinking conveys an assumption that the insecurity and security of subjects, 
either individuals or societies, lays upon those subjects, in their capability to be resilient. In other 
words, risks or threats are not seen as the primary sources of insecurity, instead, it is the capability of 
the subjects to respond to the risks or threats that determines the level of security. (Dunn Cavelty et 
al. 2015, p. 4; Chandler & Reid 2016.) This idea relates to neoliberalism, whose links to resilience 
are debated in the next section. 
 
Following the logic of emphasizing local agency, the resilience approach has been hoped to serve as 
a corrective to state-centrism typical for the liberal peace interventions. The resilience framework 
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suggests that stabilization efforts should not only concentrate on strengthening the traditional, state-
centric institutions but instead build polycentric institutions that are more capable of addressing root 
causes of conflicts and better in serving sustainable development. (Manyena & Gordon 2015, pp. 39, 
47.) Building of resilience should be a “bottom-up” project (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 621). In 
practice, resilience thinking insists on self-sufficiency and the de-centralization of control and 
resources, and challenges central planning (Corry 2014, pp. 263–264). The insistence on de-
centralization goes back to the notion of the complexity of systems. Abel, Cumming and Anderies 
(2006) argue that the complexity of systems make central governance challenging, and therefore 
"(t)he capacity to self-organize is the foundation of resilience" (p. 21). As another justification for de-
centralization and bottom-up approach, Pospisil and Besancenot (2014) note that informal 
institutional structures are often, to a significant degree, more influential than formal state structures: 
if societal change is pursued, the informal structures need to gain power (p. 621).  
 
However, changing existing political settlements into more decentralized form, even when found to 
increase resilience, has been found likely to face resistance (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 46). This 
difficulty is linked to the concept of social capital, also relevant for resilience thinking. Some 
scholarly works have highlighted the positive effects of interpersonal networks and trust for societies 
(ibid., p. 46, citing Casson and Giusta 2007). On the other hand, previous research has also pointed 
to possibility of negative impacts resulting from tight societal networks, problematic aspects 
including the "replication and reinforcement of patterns of advantage" (Manyena and Gordon 2015, 
p. 46) as well as exclusion, rejection, denial of membership and other forms of othering (Carpenter 
2011, pp. 12–13; Manyena and Gordon 2015, p. 46). In other words, social capital may make 
delivering change difficult. Existing institutions, that are a part of social capital, represent and 
preserve the interests of dominant elites, and for those, change appears conflictual. Consequently, 
dominant groups may aim to preserve existing institutions even when that decreases the adaptive 
capability of the whole society. (Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 46–47.) 
 
It must also be noted that despite the trend of emphasizing de-centralization and bottom-up 
approaches to resilience, literature also acknowledges the existence of a top-down and centralized 
version of resilience. For example, some versions of “community resilience” represent this approach, 
when community resilience is perceived as "aiding state security", supplementing centrally led 
responses to crisis or "geared toward cooperating under state power to defeat threats identified by the 
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state" (Corry 2014, pp. 262–263).4 Furthermore, professional communities have varying emphases 
with this regard: humanitarian and development actors preferring the bottom-up version of resilience, 
papers on foreign and security policies have promoted more of state-level resilience (Juncos 2018, p. 
568). Pospisil and Besancenot (2014) note that, in international state-building, there actually prevails 
a contradiction in how resilience could be developed in a less state-centric way: more role and 
responsibility is agreed to have to be given to the “fragile states” – not to external interveners. But to 
whom can this handover be done, if not to the formal institutions of these states, and whose resilience 
is improved, if not of those institutions? (P. 625.)  
 
What partly explains the emphasis on the agency of local actors and the de-centralization of 
responsibilities in resilience thinking, is the notion of complexity that plays a central role in resilience 
thinking (de Coning 2016, p. 167). The recognition of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity has led 
to a conclusion that prediction of crises is impossible, and due to that, efforts should be concentrated 
on investing in “local, bottom-up adaptive capacities to cope with and adapt to external disturbances 
and shocks" (Juncos 2018, p. 559). Resilience approach was thus adopted believing that it could serve 
as a response to the rapidly changing and complex world full of unexpected events (Dunn Cavelty et 
al. 2015, p. 4; see also Chandler 2013). Resilience seemed to provide solutions to the difficulty of 
foreseeing, identifying and addressing risks or threats in complex contexts (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, 
p. 5). Recognition of complexity led to a stance that sustainable peace can be achieved when resilient 
societies are built from below, from the local contexts, the role of international actors being 
minimized into mere assistance (de Coning 2016, p. 167). On the other hand, Juncos (2018) argues 
that the complexity that in the first place justified the adoption of the resilience approach also 
undermines its implementation (p. 569). 
 
The notion of complexity guides to adopt a particular understanding of societies and systems whose 
resilience is at stake. De Coning (2016) suggests defining a complex system as “a particular type of 
system that has the ability to adapt, and that demonstrates emergent properties, including self-
organizing behavior” (p. 168). De Coning identifies three key characteristics of complex systems: 
firstly, holism, namely that systems need to be understood as a whole, secondly, non-linearity, 
indicating that causalities in complex systems are non-linear, impossible to simplify and entail 
asymmetry and unpredictability, and third, self-organization, which refers to the systems’ capability 
                                                     
4 On the other hand, some other descriptions of community resilience in contrast emphasize the "ability of 
communities or settlements to decouple from both the state and the global market economy" (Corry 2014, p. 263). 
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to organize, regulate and maintain functions without managing or controlling, and entails emergence 
(de Coning 2016, pp. 168–171). Manyena and Gordon (2015), instead, suggest understanding local 
level socio-political-economic systems to exist "within a series of nested adaptive cycles that operate 
simultaneously on multiple temporal and spatial scales" (p. 48). They insist that reverse and 
intertwined developments can take place simultaneously within larger systems, the idea being in 
contrast to the perception of change as linear. According to Carpenter (2011) some fragile or 
vulnerable states are stuck in collapsing, some slowly progress towards reorganization, and some 
oscillate between collapsing and reorganization (p. 11). Manyena and Gordon (2015) note that 
smaller entities, such as parts of districts or provinces can be located at different stages of the loop, 
some at a state of equilibrium, others experiencing re-organization or collapse (p. 41).  
 
Another characteristic of resilience thinking, connected to complexity, is the idea of global 
connectedness. States and societies are found to be increasingly dependent on each other, on 
international networks and systems, such as those of communication, information sharing, energy 
and trading. This perceived interdependency has led to a notion that losing vital networks and support 
of international systems could have severe and broad consequences for the local communities. 
Consequently, it has become a priority for these local systems to maintain their connections to 
supporting networks and systems. Risks of disruptions of the global system appearing complex and 
unforeseen, resilience is perceived to offer an answer to mitigating those risks and producing security. 
(Prior & Hagmann 2014, pp. 1–2.)  
 
Deriving from the identified complexity, the concept of risk similarly plays a central role in resilience 
thinking (Juncos 2018, p. 561; Corry 2014, p. 256). According to Juncos (2018) the emergence of the 
resilience framework could be located where "the focus of peacebuilding practice shifted to 
incorporate the management of systemic risks" (p. 561), where the “world of enemies“ shifted into a 
“world of risks” (ibid.; see also Clapton and Hameiri 2012, p. 61). This indicates that the resilience 
approach entails an idea of continuous preparation for ambiguous, systemic risks (Juncos 2018; Reid 
2016b), and suggests “living with” rather than eliminating uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity 
(Juncos 2018, citing Reid and Evans 2014). The resilience approach suggests that risks can be reduced 
by developing resilience (de Coning 2016, p. 173). But for what kind of risks, shocks or disturbances 
was resilience designed for? According to Prior and Hagmann (2014) the essence of resilience varies 
according to the past or potential events it is directed at (p. 14). According to Manyena and Gordon 
(2015), the shocks and sources of stress are "externally imposed debilitating factors”, such as conflict, 
poverty, corruption, natural and man-made disasters and resource scarcity (p. 40). According to Corry 
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(2014), the shocks in resilience thinking typically come from "non-actors […] such as the nature of 
the system itself […] or "externalities" of other systems" (p. 269).  
 
Finally, several scholars have paid attention to the temporal features of the resilience approach, 
namely that resilience can appear as retrospective, concurrent or prospective: it can be about 
"navigating through" past or current adversities or about the likelihood of being successful in such 
navigation in the future (Bourbeau 2013, p. 10). According to Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) 
resilience “combines the present with the future” simultaneously dealing with “insecurities of the 
past” (p. 5). Resilience can be understood as a reaction to past events, indicated by the Latin syllable 
“re” meaning “back”. On the other hand, resilience is future-oriented in that, even when oriented 
backwards to past shocks, it encourages learning, in order to build better resilience for the future. 
Both the orientations towards the future and the past shape actions today: past and potential shocks 
determine what action is taken today in order to secure the future. Dunn Cavelty and others note the 
temporal aspect of resilience to lack from many other approaches that focus on prevention or the 
preparation to the future. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, pp. 5, 7–9). Heath-Kelly (2015) instead argues 
that despite the “re” in resilience indicating a return to the past, resilience projects “return” towards 
the future. However, the past is also an important source for resilience, as the past provides 
experiences from which the resilient subject can learn from. (Heath-Kelly 2015, p. 76.)  
 
This section having provided a rather consistent picture of literature on resilience, the framework 
turns out more complex when complemented with the differing, possibly contrasting theoretical 
views and assumptions on resilience. The next section touches upon some of those differences. 
 
Negotiating resilience 
Many researchers refer to the ambiguity around the concept of resilience (Juncos 2018, p. 566; 
Pospisil & Kühn 2016, p. 2; Manyena & Gordon 2015, p. 39), at least some of that ambiguity being 
found to derive from the roots of the concept lying around in several scientific disciplines (Dunn 
Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 6): Bourbeau (2013) has identified three different schools of theorizing 
resilience that preceded the entrance of resilience thinking in the international relations, all three 
approaches pushing the use of the concept in different directions. Whereas engineering resilience 
focuses on how far a system can be displaced from its equilibrium so that it still returns to that 
equilibrium, ecological resilience instead emphasizes the capacity of systems to maintain functions 
in the event of disturbance. Socio-ecological resilience, instead, emphasized opportunities emerging 
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in disturbances, based on less linear understanding of social and ecological systems. (Bourbeau 2013, 
p. 8.) The ambiguity around the resilience concept has been feared to lead to challenges in the 
implementation of the resilience approach, and to the exploitation of the ambiguity for particular aims 
or political purposes (Juncos 2018 p. 567). The concept has been noted to be also highly political, 
and therefore for example Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) have criticized the “normalcy” in the use 
of the concept and called for the contestation and questioning of it (p. 6). 
 
The application of the resilience concept has been wide, possibly due to the multiple possibilities 
embedded in the ambiguity. In 2013 Bourbeau listed that, only within the rise of resilience in the field 
of IR, resilience had been connected to global governance, globalization, labor market reforms, public 
service reforms, erosion of sovereignty, NATO's future, Indonesia's national security doctrine, 
authoritarian regimes, nationalism, terrorism and international intervention (Bourbeau 2013, p. 5). 
Scholars from varying academic fields have attached countless perspectives to the research of 
resilience. Scholars associating resilience with biopolitics have perceived resilience as "a strategy for 
reconciling liberty and security", whereas some others, studying the aid-industry, have interpreted 
resilience as "a postmodernist technology that internalises emergency within society and focuses 
upon the adaptation of the individual" (ibid., p. 6). Criminologists and social workers have promoted 
the "de-individualisation" of resilience, moving away from understanding resilience as "a set of 
predetermined qualities that an individual possesses" and instead emphasizing resilience as a 
"temporally and contextually informed process" (ibid., pp. 3, 7). 
 
One of the most significant debates around the resilience approach relates to its link with 
neoliberalism. Many have found neoliberalism as the key to resilience thinking (Chandler and Reid 
2016), while others have aimed to decouple resilience from the neoliberalist frameworks (e. g. 
Chandler 2014; Corry 2014). Neoliberalism can be defined as a “theory of political economic 
practices proposing that human well-being can be advanced by the development of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual 
liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” or as a theory of subjectivity, as argued by Chandler 
and Reid (Chandler & Reid 2016, p. 2, citing almost ten authors). Neoliberalist solutions to the 
organization of responsibilities of states and societies gained prominence in the 1970s, the key 
elements of such strategies including the emphasis on human freedom, dignity and independence, 
and the shift from state-centric to society-centric thinking. Also the shift of responsibility over welfare 
and security from the state to society was in the core of the new neoliberalist frameworks. (Chandler 
2016a, pp. 9–11.) According to Chandler (2016a) neoliberalism concentrates on “change” where 
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liberalism was about “progress”. However, neoliberalist “change” does not occur under the control 
of a government but emerges from human interaction and agency, communities having no other 
option than to adapt. (Chandler 2016a, p. 14.) Resilience is one of the key concepts of neoliberalism, 
vulnerability and adaptability also playing a central role (Chandler & Reid 2016, p. 1). According to 
Ryan (2015), resilience has turned out as a new way of conceptualizing neoliberalism, which is 
revealed by the tendency of resilience to emphasize the individuals’ responsibility over their own fate 
(p. 302). 
 
What is interesting for this study focusing on the security governance in post-Soviet Ukraine, is the 
abandonee of state-centrality in neoliberalism. According to Chandler, in neoliberalism, governance 
no more functions through top–down interventions or regulation. Instead, neoliberalism signifies 
governance as “capacity-building” or ”empowering” of the citizens, who are expected to take over 
responsibility for their society. (Chandler 2016a, p. 11.) Neoliberal governance thus seeks to govern 
without governing, through citizens that are active and accountable “experts of themselves” (Miller 
& Rose 2008, pp. 215–216). Miller and Rose (2008) suggest that the “ethical a priori of active 
citizenship” is namely the fundamental characteristic of neoliberal governing (or of governing 
“advanced liberal democracies”) (p. 215). Chandler argues that problems related to security, welfare, 
crime or conflict transform into issues of societal agency, the state taking a stance that insecurity is 
an outcome of the citizens’ incapacity. The role of the state still remains active and “interventionist”. 
(Chandler 2016a, pp. 11, 14.)  
 
Aligned with Chandler, Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) note that resilience as a governmental 
philosophy creates subjects, namely active subjects, that are responsible for security. By subjects they 
do not only mean individual persons but also for example societies. (P. 10.) They argue that 
distributing responsibilities, resilience also shifts the possibilities of blame, from “government to 
municipalities, from national to local, from security authorities to the citizen” (p. 7). In other words, 
the subjects who are directly affected by shocks and who possess the knowledge of the local context, 
are expected to self-organize when a crisis breaks out. The subjects are no longer viewed to need 
protection but to need to be active and responsible in providing security to themselves (p. 10). Dunn 
Cavelty and others note that some perceive this responsibilization as empowerment. Critical 
approach, instead, notes that the practice portrays resilient subjects desirable and non-resilient 
subjects undesirable and in the need of intervention by the state. (Dunn Cavelty et al., pp. 7, 10.) 
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Moreover, neoliberalism conveys a specific understanding of risks, different from the liberal era. 
Instead of referring to risks as external, neoliberalism perceives risks as internally manufactured. 
Setbacks and damage appear as “a consequence of the decisions we take ourselves”. (Chandler 2016b, 
p. 44.) In other words, a risk is something that is constructed by the individual, not by the external 
factor, uncertainties and insecurities being considered as human products (ibid., p. 40). Consequently, 
also societal security becomes an issue that is addressed at the level of capacities and the inner life of 
individuals, in contrast to the material level (ibid., p. 44). Following this logic, Reid (2016b) 
concludes that, in the neoliberalist framework, a resilient subject is expected to continuously 
accommodate itself to uncontrollable externalities. Following neoliberalist thinking, the resilient 
subject abandons any efforts to change the world, accepts that it is dangerous, and changes itself 
according to the identified risks. (Reid 2016b, p. 53). In the framework of neoliberalism, resilience 
thus inherently conveys a meaning of “internal attribute [of an individual or a collective] of being 
able to positively adapt to change” (Chandler 2016a, p. 14): a resilient individual or a collective 
understands that change is necessary, does not resist it and acts active in front of it. While it is 
impossible to be fully resilient, some individuals and communities are more resilient than others, 
having more of adaptive capability. (Ibid., pp. 14–15.) 
 
More specifically, the current use of the resilience concept in the framework of security has been 
tightly connected to Michel Foucault's work on the concept of "governmentality" (Corry 2014, p. 
257). Neoliberal governance, or "governmentality"5, stands for "a form of government that takes 
populations as its main target, political economy as its main form of knowledge and apparatuses of 
security as the main technical means as its disposal" (Foucault 2007, p. 108 cited in Juncos 2018, p. 
562). It authorizes "particular regimes of knowledge", reinforces "market institutions", creates 
"compliant subjects" and spreads "market logics" (Foucault 2002a, b, 2008 cited in  Corry 2014, p. 
258). The role of resilience in governmentality is to serve as a technology of the neoliberal power 
(Corry 2014, p. 261). Especially the critical literature on resilience has perceived resilience as a new 
form of neoliberal governance (Juncos 2018, p. 560), "including associated strategies of political 
control" (Corry 2014, p. 257). As Corry (2014, 256) puts it, resilience has been viewed as "a vehicle 
and multiplier of neo-liberal governmentality". Juncos (2018) even argues that it is the "fit" 
(interoperability) of neoliberal governmentality and resilience that explains the spread of the 
resilience concept (p. 562, see also Walker and Cooper 2011, p. 144). 
                                                     
5 Some use also the concept of "global governmentality" as a synonym for neoliberal governmentality (Corry 
2014, 260). 
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However, several scholars argue strongly against understanding resilience as tied to neoliberalist 
frameworks, resilience appearing capable of operating according to fundamentally opposite logics. 
As one of the most important opposers of the connection, Chandler (2014) has suggested that when 
philosophical pragmatism is attached to resilience, resilience appears to not follow the logic of 
neoliberalism: instead, it portrays the world constituted in everyday practices and from below, in 
contrast to institutional power. (Chandler 2014, pp. 27–30, 40.) Ryan (2015) argues that it is actually 
problematic how the current resilience literature associates resilience so closely with neoliberalism: 
resilience should be studied also from an angle apart from international interventions (pp. 301, 299). 
Similarly, agreeing that "resilience does form part of a neo-liberal security regime", Corry (2014) 
argues that the concept of resilience should not be interpreted as inherently "tied to a meta-narrative 
of neoliberalism", as such perspective fails to recognize the potential of the resilience concept to 
function under "other logics of governing" (pp. 256–257). Even if perceived as a governmental 
technique, resilience should not be seen as necessarily linked to neoliberalism (ibid., p. 261). Corry 
argues that "even in societies under neo-liberal rule, resilience may escape its logics and function 
disruptively rather than in concert with hegemonic neo-liberalism" (p. 262). This diversity, however, 
has been neglected in much of resilience discourse (ibid., p. 258). Corry notes that "the need for 
resilience" can also serve as “critiques of neo-liberal decentralization" (2014, p. 264).  
 
Juncos (2018) believes that the governmentality approach to resilience tends to “create a dichotomy 
between those governing and the subjects of governance”, little room being left for contestation and 
agency to emerge (pp. 563, 560). Indeed, it appears that it is the notion of “resistance” that is often 
missing in neoliberalist resilience discourses: several authors (e.g. Juncos 2018, p. 560; Ryan 2015, 
p. 300; Corry 2014, p. 260) recognize the failure of literature to recognize resistance as a practice 
closely linked to resilience. According to Juncos (2018) uncertainty, ambiguity and complex settings 
lead to many applications of resilience, including resistance (p. 560). Condemning the failure of 
resilience literature to recognize forms of resistance, Corry (2014) notes that the idea of 
governmentality "goes against the grain of Foucault's insistence that resistance always follows power" 
(pp. 260, 262). Juncos (2018) argues that resilience could sometimes be about assisting resistance (p. 
563). Ryan (2015) provides a similar perspective in her study that concludes that not only can 
resistance be resilient in nature, but also, resilience can be used as a tactic of resistance: if resilience 
entails concerted efforts to adapt and challenges the prevailing conditions, it should be interpreted as 
resistance. Furthermore, in some cases, resilience could be interpreted as resistance at neoliberalism: 
Corry (2014) notes that resilience approach can show "ecological and social limits to neo-liberalism" 
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and be used to "regulate and set parameters to economic activity based on ecosystem limits rather 
than a neo-liberal logic" (p. 265). 
 
However, comparing resilience to neoliberalism is just one option for defining its boundaries: 
resilience has an interesting relationship also to other concepts, such as defence, which Corry (2014) 
portrays as a predecessor of resilience. According to Corry, defence experienced a long and 
hegemonic history in state-centric security practices before giving way to resilience thinking. Corry 
argues that defence turned out unsuitable for addressing security concerns that are based on 
“uncertainty, are located in the future, and often lack clear adversaries", and therefore resilience 
moved into this void (p. 256). (Corry 2014, partly citing Corry 2012.) The shift from defence to 
resilience marks a shift from threats to uncertainty and risks: a risk and resilience now constitute a 
pair similar to that of threat and defence (Corry 2014, p. 256, citing Corry 2012). In defence, "the 
locus of danger is external (in others)" (p. 270), whereas resilience thinking perceives shocks to come 
from “non-actors” or the system’s incapabilities (Corry 2014, pp. 269–270). Compared to defence, 
resilience also is more "geared toward long-term policymaking rather than short-term contingency": 
presupposing "systems with dynamic or multiple equilibria” (ibid., p. 268). Compared to the "inbuilt 
conservatism" of defence, that did not emphasize self-development but rather “"defending" that 
which already exists", resilience emphasizes learning, progress and the change of systems, entailing 
self-examination and improvement of even “the basic function and identity of the system" (ibid., p. 
268). Furthermore, Corry perceives resilience to have critical potential in relation to defence-oriented 
security: resilience could avoid the us–them and friend–enemy logics and the short-termism of 
defence-thinking, and work against the “othering” typical for the defence approach (ibid., pp. 256, 
257, 269). 
 
Moreover, as already noted, resilience concept evolved in a close relationship with the concept of 
sustainability. The close relationship of the two has been explained by that the resilience concept has 
its roots in ecology and biology, thus also growing tight links to “sustainable development” and 
“sustaining peace” concepts. (Pospisil & Besancenot 2014, p. 616.) Deriving from the sustainability 
concept, "sustaining peace" is specific peacebuilding or post-peacebuilding terminology that gained 
prominence amongst the international and donor community in 2010s, the UN being one of the actors 
adopting the new concept into use after recognition of failures of peacebuilding operations of the 90’s 
and 2000’s (de Coning 2016, pp. 166–167). The sustaining peace agenda of the UN emphasizes local 
resilience and bases on the idea of increasing uncertainty (de Coning 2018, pp. 304, 309, 313; Juncos 
2018, p. 564). Sustaining peace has been defined as “all actions undertaken by the international 
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community and local actors that work towards consolidating and maintaining the peace in a given 
social system” (de Coning 2016, p. 172).  
 
The sustaining peace agenda has a lot in common with the resilience approach. Not only were they 
both born in response to the failure of liberal peace interventions that aimed at conflict resolution, but 
they also consist of similar elements, especially (but not only) when resilience is studied as something 
pursued by an international intervention: indicating the enhancing of capabilities of social institutions 
to prevent, cope with and recover from conflicts, the definitions appear similar. Both approaches 
mark a shift from conflict resolution towards the management of the impacts of a conflict, as well as 
from top-down towards bottom-up approaches, agency of the local gaining more importance. (de 
Coning 2016, p. 167, partly referring to Chandler 2016.) Furthermore the two concepts have a 
practical link: according to de Coning (2016), sustaining peace can be achieved through resilient 
social institutions being built from local cultures and contexts (p. 167). The two approaches also seem 
to have the same objective: sustaining peace also aims at increasing the capacities of societies to self-
organize, so that the societies can absorb shocks and adapt to stress, “to the degree necessary to sustain 
peace” (de Coning 2016, p. 173). 
 
Finally, there exists an “ism”, called “resiliencism”, founded by Bourbeau (2013) as a "conceptual 
framework for understanding how continuity and transformation take place" (p. 10). Bourbeau's 
model starts from two key assumptions: sources of change can be both endogenous and exogenous, 
and the outcome of change is not necessarily a return to equilibrium. Third key assumption of 
Bourbeau is that both the disturbances and adaptive reactions can be experienced and interpreted in 
various ways, dependent on context, culture, time and individual. (Bourbeau 2013, p. 10.) Bourbeau’s 
ideas being already covered earlier in this chapter, this study will not dig deeper into this specific 
framework but takes a note of its existence. 
 
Critically reviewing the resilience approach 
This far mostly positive assessments about the resilience approach have been presented. Therefore 
some of the critical literature on resilience need to be reviewed. Most of the critique does not appear 
surprising but concern aspects of resilience that have already been discussed. Firstly, much of the 
critical literature focuses on the links of resilience to the liberal notions of security (Dunn Cavelty et 
al. 2015, p. 6) and neoliberalism, as discussed above. Though the adoption of the resilience approach 
has often been justified by its ability to overcome challenges of liberal peace, many of the critiques 
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of liberal peace also apply to the resilience approach. That is the case especially for international 
applications of the resilience approach. (Ryan 2015, p. 303, citing Chandler (no year) and Richmond 
2012.) As an interesting addition to the already mentioned critiques of peace operations, Ryan (2015, 
p. 302) cites Duffield (2006, p. 26; 2007, p. 2) who argues that international attempts to build 
resilience in underdeveloped countries actually aim at increasing of security of developed countries: 
resilience building projects are based on an idea that security in Western countries increases when 
the underdeveloped world becomes more resilient, for example the attractivity of terrorist activities 
thus decreasing.  
 
The increased emphasis on the agency and responsibility of local actors has also evoked criticism. 
Dunn Cavelty and others (2015) note that while distributing responsibilities, resilience also shifts 
possibilities of blame, from “government to municipalities, from national to local, from security 
authorities to the citizen” (p. 7). Similarly Chandler (2014) finds problematic the increasing of the 
responsibility of local communities over problems that they encounter. Even though this is the 
resolution offered by resilience thinking to the paradox of liberal peace, it opens a set of new problems 
related to responsibility. (Chandler 2014, p. 48.) 
 
Moreover, resilience thinking has been criticized for false presuppositions. According to Dunn 
Cavelty and others (2015) the resilience thinking has been claimed to presume and even “need” the 
vulnerability of subjects. Consequently, the agency of the resilient subjects becomes deprived, 
resistance and political options being robbed from them and their existence becoming characterized 
by the adaptation to unpredictable forces. (Dunn Cavelty et al. 2015, p. 7.) Related to this, resilience 
has been criticized for tying insecurity with security. According to Dunn Cavelty and others, 
resilience instantiates “a constant struggle of redefining and recreating security” (p. 11). Aligned to 
this, Corry (2014) argues that resilience thinking replicates the problematic utilization of worst-case 
scenarios typical for defence strategies in the Cold War period (pp. 269–270).  
 
Bourbeau (2013) identifies more problematic assumptions in the resilience approach (p. 4). He claims 
that theorization on resilience starts from a false presumption that disturbance is negative and 
resilience positive. Bourbeau claims that "(b)eing resilient might in fact mean being an obstacle to 
positive change": in some events social structures, regimes, norms or systems of exploitation need to 
be transformed and "being resilient to these changes could be considered as negative" (Bourbeau 
2013, p. 8). This piece of critique has a lot in common with the critiques of stabilization approach 
that aimed at maintaining the status quo despite problematic norms or suppressive systems. Bourbeau 
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also criticizes resilience approach for assuming that subjects either have or do not have resilience, 
ignoring types of resilience (p. 8–10). 
 
Heath-Kelly (2015), instead, criticizes the resilience framework for its incapability to address security 
failures that are located in the present, temporally and spatially. As it will be learnt from her study 
that is shortly reviewed in the next chapter, Heath-Kelly argues that resilience is handy in coping with 
security failures that are located in the past or potentially in the future. However, security failures that 
are located in the today cannot be addressed by retrospective or anticipatory attitude of the resilience 
discourse. Heath-Kelly claims resilience to work best in exorcising failures, not in preventing or 
dealing with security issues in the present. (Health-Kelly 2015.) 
 
Finally, some authors point out that implications of the resilience approach are widely unknown. 
Juncos (2018) notes that, the resilience approach was “adopted without a clear assessment in place 
regarding whether it actually improves the effectiveness of international interventions" (p. 565). Also 
Corry (2014) calls for assessing the new framework: he suggests that the resilience approach should 
be evaluated by considering what the implications are if it actually replaces other dominant ideas in 
the field of security, namely the idea of defence (p. 267). It also seems apparent that the resilience 
approach needs assessment from the perspective of peace and conflict studies. Literature appears 
scarce on what role resilience plays in peace and whether the resilience approach could add to peace 
research. Such assessment could benefit from the perspectives of feminist theories, as now such 
perspectives to the theorization of resilience are conspicuous by their absence. 
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Previous research 
In contrast to the broad theoretical literature on resilience, research that applies the resilience 
approach into the study of particular local contexts appears scarce. Especially studies that relate to 
security and peace but that do not concentrate on international intervention are only a few. This 
chapter reviews some examples of how resilient societies have been studied. Attention is not only 
paid to the results of previous research but also to how the resilience approach is applied in these 
works. Literature on societal resilience and policing not existing or being limited to very few pieces, 
the chapter draws from other literature on security provision in the post-Soviet space. The chapter 
commences by reviewing examples of research on resilient societies and then concentrates on 
literature on the CSS in the post-Soviet space and on literature about resilience in Ukraine. 
 
Studying resilient societies 
Most of resilience research concentrates on international attempts to build resilience, whilst much 
less attention has been paid to how resilience is built or performed in local communities (Ryan 2015, 
p. 299). Ryan (2015) argues that "thinking of resilience as primarily a tool used by Western 
interveners overlooks the obvious, that adaptation to shock and finding ways to cope with adversity 
are not the intellectual property of the West, to be employed when intervening elsewhere" (p. 300). 
Such approach ignores that resilience is already performed as an everyday tactic by local communities 
and individuals, without external intervention (ibid., p. 302).  
 
Ryan's research (2015) is one of the rare scholarly works available in English that explores societal 
resilience in a local context and reflects issues of peace and conflict while not concentrating on 
international intervention (p. 304). The research covers "everyday resilience" of Palestinian women 
as a resistance against the Israeli occupation. Ryan focuses on "sumud", an indigenous practice that 
indicates complex and active acts of resistance performed by the Palestinians aiming to maintain 
"dignity, honor, and a physical presence” in the areas experiencing adversity and hardship (pp. 300, 
303, 205). “Sumud” includes adaptation to the Israeli occupation, developing of flexible tactics and 
fostering of relationships amongst the Palestinian community. “Sumud” entails a persistence of 
staying in Palestine and making of life under the occupation more liveable. Furthermore, it involves 
demanding rights to the Palestinian people and maintaining the Palestinian culture and identity. Ryan 
interprets “sumud” as resilience. (Ryan 2015, pp. 303–309.)  
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Ryan’s (2015) main argument is that, in a context of a protracted conflict, being resilient is not about 
“just coping”, but that coping is an active form of resistance to the hostile circumstances (p. 313). 
“Sumud” serves as an opening for a discussion about the relationship between resilience and 
resistance. Positioning herself against some of resilience literature (e. g. Reid 2012), Ryan suggests 
that resilience in general could be understood as a form of resistance. (Ryan 2015, pp. 299–300, 305, 
309.) Such perception of resilience allows more agency to the resilient individuals (p. 309–310). 
Furthermore, Ryan finds “sumud” to demonstrate what resilience literature has overlooked: resilience 
can be built from bottom-up without external interventions. “Sumud” shows that resilience is not 
property of the West. (Ibid., pp. 303–304, 309.)  
 
Ryan’s study (2015) appears interesting to this research also because it concentrates on a society 
under occupation. According to Ryan, the enduring nature of the Israeli occupation has made 
resilience in the Palestinian territories essential (p. 304). Acknowledging the fundamental difference 
between the contexts of Palestine and Ukraine, Ryan’s argument, however, guides this research to 
look whether similar meanings are given to resilience in Ukraine. Furthermore, Ryan’s research 
provides an example of a study in which knowledge about societal resilience is co-produced by the 
researcher and the interviewees, the former knowing the resilience theory, the latter being experts of 
the local context. 
 
Heath-Kelly (2015), instead, utilizes the resilience theory in order to understand coping with the 
bombing of a nightclub in Bali in 2002. Heath-Kelly finds that, in Bali, the resilience discourse has 
been utilized as a tool to turn the disaster into a productive lesson: namely the trauma of the bombing 
has been transformed into future-oriented learning. Victims of the shock have been expected to refrain 
from blame and fear, and instead develop future-oriented trust, aligned with resilience-thinking. 
Heath-Kelly concludes that the resilience framework indeed offers tools to transform past shocks into 
useful lessons for the future. However, her research also finds that the resilience approach fails when 
it comes to dealing with disaster-remnants in the present, such as the concrete bomb-site. Resilience 
functions well in recovering from the past and in anticipating the future, but appears incapable of 
accounting “present-day sites of failure” (p. 80). As a conclusion, she finds resilience suitable for 
exorcising security failures through “discursive manipulation”, but not for actually dealing with or 
preventing insecurities. (Heath-Kelly 2015, pp. 70–74, 76, 80–83.) Heath-Kelly’s study provides this 
research with a good example of connecting abstract characteristics of the resilience approach, 
namely its temporal and spatial dimensions, to the concrete, physical phenomenon, the bombsite, 
while simultaneously testing suitability of the theoretical approach to the particular local context.  
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A number of literature uses the resilience concept by the same definition as Ryan and Heath-Kelly 
but does not utilize it as a theoretical framework. It appears surprising how the resilience concept, 
even how ambiguous it is, suits to be used in research questions and headings like a commonsense 
word that does not require theoretical problematization. For example, Hillman’s book (2014) 
Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China studies 
resilience but does not put effort into defining or theorizing it. Similarly Natali’s article (2017) Syria's 
Spillover on Iraq: State Resilience explores resilience, but does not take advantage of any theoretical 
resilience literature. Natali finds several factors to explain the resilience of Iraq: the regional interest 
in maintaining territorial integrity, the salience of nationalism in Iraq, and the lack of unity inside the 
groups of Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Kurds of Iraq (Natali 2017). Theoretical resilience literature 
is not used to explain how these factors produce resilience, but their significance for resilience is well 
justified with practical descriptions. In both these works, but especially in the latter, the resilience 
concept is used rather synonymously to the stability concept or to maintenance of state sovereignty. 
 
Some resilience literature outside the peace and conflict studies framework also appears interesting 
to this research. For example, Cork’s book (2010) that studies Australia in front of uncertain futures 
offers interesting perspectives. The publication combines analyses that base on different theoretical 
understandings of resilience. The synthesis reveals many “resiliences” that Australia can and should 
perform to cope with identified risks. Two of the articles in Cork’s book, one of Marshall and the 
other of Behm, have special value to this research: 
 
Marshall (2010), focusing on governance in times of uncertainty and unpredictability, suggests that 
more resilience can be achieved by making governance systems more polycentric, and by blending 
civil society structures into governance. What appears most interesting in his article is that Marshall 
uses the concept of “robustness”, instead of that of resilience, to describe the ideal nature of 
governance. Robust governance systems adapt, continue to function and are capable of maintaining 
desired characteristics despite disturbances, internal oscillation and changes in environment. Noting 
the similarity to the concept of resilience, Marshall perceives the concept of robustness to better suit 
into the analysis of governance, especially when assessing to which extent adaptivity should be built 
inside governance systems. According to Marshall, the robustness concept better captures trade-offs 
related to long-term benefits and short-term costs. (Marshall 2010, pp. 49–57.) 
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Behm’s article (2010), instead, comes closer to our topic by studying links between resilience, 
prosperity and security. Behm argues that, today, prosperity and security go hand in hand: security 
does not anymore only include traditional sovereignty issues, but also, issues of prosperity, such as 
clean water, safe food and community well-being. Behm claims that today, security cannot exist 
without prosperity, and vice versa. Based on this, Behm suggests adaptability, resilience, flexibility 
and legality to be new characteristics of security. The change in the meaning of security indicates 
adoption of a “whole of nation” approach to security, and that soft power governance becomes 
integrated in hard power policies. Furthermore, the change in the security thinking leads to holistic 
security policy, in which prosperity factors, such as education, health and social capital are 
understood as parts of national security. (Behm 2010, pp. 59–63.) 
 
Also Foster’s (2006) working paper on regional resilience appears as a useful background for this 
research, especially due to how she problematizes conducting of a case study on resilience. Foster 
identifies several challenges that need to be addressed for such a case study to succeed. Firstly, Foster 
demonstrates a risk of tautology in analysis of resilience, especially if non-performance-based aspects 
are included in the analysis (pp. 12–13). Secondly, she identifies a challenge deriving from the 
fundamental difference between disturbances that have immediate powerful impacts and disturbances 
that manifest as chronic low-intensity trends. The latter disturbances can appear as minimal but, 
cumulatively, have significant negative impacts. Foster suggests that resilience against the two types 
of disturbances can be different. (Foster 2006, p. 13.) Dunn Cavelty and others (2015, p. 9) refer to 
the same phenomena calling those as “chronic emergencies” that require specific responses from the 
resilient subjects. 
 
Furthermore, Foster (2006) offers us a good example of applying a synthesis of resilience theories in 
a case study. Foster creates a definition for regional resilience that she illustrates in a cyclic figure. 
In her figure, the resilience consists of “preparation resilience”, more in specific of assessment and 
readiness, and “performance resilience”, more in specific of response and recovery. These phases of 
resilience Foster describes as overlapping and continual. A region can perform well or poorly in any 
of the phases, for example prepare well but recover poorly. (Foster 2006, 14–17.) Foster creates a 
model of criteria for each phase of the resilience cycle (pp. 17–20) and tests the model by studying 
regional resilience in the Buffalo-Niagara Falls area. In addition, Foster creates a comparative frame 
by adding metropolitan peer regions to the analysis, the outcome being knowledge of relative 
resilience of the regions. (Ibid., pp. 23–26, 35.) Such a comparative framework could have brought 
added value also to this research, but was not created due to lack of resources. Foster’s (2006) 
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conclusions include that both the cyclic case study framework and the comparative approach have 
advantages for research of resilience. She also concludes that analysis of chronic disturbances 
requires specific methodological arrangements. (Foster 2006, pp. 35–37.) 
 
Finally, as already noted, only a few studies have used the resilience framework in studying of 
security sectors or policing. One of the rare examples is the study of Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 
(2012) that utilizes the resilience theory in order to understand the survival of corrupt police networks. 
Studying the operation of a police network “the Joke” in Queensland, Australia, their research views 
resilience as a characteristic of the Joke that manages to continue its corrupt functions despite 
interferences of competing actors and agencies that attempt to fight corruption. The authors identify 
several characteristics and factors that made the corrupt police network “Joke” resilient, including 
suitable size and low centrality of the network, enough resources available (bribes), active and layered 
protection, elimination of means of investigation, alliance with political elite, monopoly of 
corruption, readiness to replace important persons, trust, cultural wall of silence and low visibility of 
the network. (Lauch, Keast & Chamberlain 2012.) This study has a different approach to using 
resilience concept in the research of policing – this research is not interested in the resilience of police. 
Instead, the research explores how police (and other CSS institutions) can build resilience of a society, 
namely the society of Ukraine. 
 
Ukraine in transition 
This section is a short review on what previous research teaches us about the resilience of Ukraine. 
Having to rely on somewhat few sources available, some of those providing more of an eyesight to 
history than today of Ukraine, differences can be expected to emerge between the findings covered 
here and the findings of this research. 
 
Three years after Ukraine gaining independence from the USSR, Richard Rose (1995) wrote about 
the resilience of Ukraine in the journal “Problems of Post-Communism” (11/1995). Resilience being 
articulated in mostly economic terms, both micro and macro level of the society being addressed, 
Rose’s research describes “how people in Ukraine are coping with the problems of transition” (no 
page numbers available). Rose pictures Ukraine in the middle of change that, on one hand, signifies 
a shock against which the society has to show resilience, and which on the other hand, is hoped to 
proceed rapidly, because the outcome, Ukraine closer to the West and further from the Soviet regime 
is interpreted as the desirable end-state. Rose perceives comparison to other societies in transition 
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helpful in indicating resilience of Ukraine. He finds that economic transition (from planned economy 
to market economy) in Ukraine has hardly begun, and the society might even be heading to wrong 
direction, other post-Soviet countries in Central and Eastern Europe having advanced much further 
in their transitions. At the same time he notes that 88 percent of Ukrainians perceive their standards 
of living to have fallen in past five years, namely since the Soviet time. As indicators of slow 
transition, Rose lists that, compared to numbers from other Central and East European states, 
Ukrainians spend more of their time in queueing for goods, work more for public (v. private) 
employers, have a greater risk for temporary layoffs and nonpayment of wages, more likely find their 
wages inadequate, more often work unofficially and extra-legally, more likely earn untaxed and 
unreported money, such as bribes, and are less likely to get by without spending savings or lending 
money. (Rose 1995.)6 
 
In specific, Rose notes that the number of people receiving or paying illegal bribes in Ukraine is more 
than two times more than in the comparison (post-Soviet) countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Rose finds that alternative economies, such as unofficial sources of income of households, serve as 
strategies of surviving with the instability of the larger economy in Ukraine. He notes that even though 
such practices appear rational way for coping with problems in short term, they form an obstacle for 
medium-term development. However, not all micro level strategies appear problematic, in contrary: 
studying how the society survives from lack of resources, Rose finds resilience contained in practices 
of individual Ukrainians: “belt-tightening, stretching, and mend and make do enables these 
households to bounce back”. Noting how Western states struggle with their citizens relying on social 
welfare, such as laying on the dole, Rose finds it a striking feature of Ukraine’s transition that 
Ukrainians appear capable of surviving without relying on government assistance. (Rose 1995.) 
 
Ten years later, Andrian Beck (2005) reflects challenges of Ukraine in coping with the post-
Communist transition. In his article, covering especially the reform of policing in Ukraine, Beck notes 
Ukraine to be a country “almost always on the verge of reform” but at the same time bogged down: 
reflecting attempts of Ukraine to reform its police7, Beck finds Ukraine to have largely stuck to 
structures and traditions originating from the time before gaining independence. Reiterating Rose’s 
finding, Beck notes that many other post-Soviet states have advanced further in their transitions. Beck 
describes Ukraine to be a state that recognizes the necessity to change but does not have the political 
                                                     
6 Rose bases his findings on a secondary analysis of “The New Democracies Barometer”. 
7 The article concerns “police” of Ukraine in general, not specifying institutions of it in specific. Sometimes Beck refers 
to police as “militia”, which usually refers to the main public-order policing agency in Soviet states (see e.g. Light 2019). 
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will to plan and carry out reforms, the legacy of the Soviet Union thus continuing to define policing 
in Ukraine. (Beck 2005, no page numbers.) In the light of the reviewed resilience literature Beck’s 
study seems to convey a rather negative picture about resilience of Ukraine: not using the resilience 
concept in his research, Beck, however, touches the core of the definition of resilience arguing that 
Ukraine has turned out incapable of carrying out a change that it perceives necessary.  
 
Seven years later, Pervyi and Kolisnyk (2012) provide an opposite interpretation arguing that stability 
– not changes – is what people call for in the post-Soviet space, and in Ukraine in specific: people 
are tired and frustrated over the systemic crisis and instability typical for the post-Soviet democracies. 
According to Pervyi and Kolisnyk the post-Soviet instability originates from political modernization, 
balancing between democratic and authoritarian dynamics, and from the changes in the ownership of 
the means of production. Ukraine appears even specifically unstable compared to other post-Soviet 
states: Baltic states joined in the EU, democracy and “soft sustainability” characterizing their 
development. The authoritarian regime in the Central Asia, instead, experiences “stability” of a 
dictatorship in the absence of strong oppositions, their judiciaries and LEAs serving the ruling elites. 
Only Ukraine and Georgia, the two fragile democracies, continue to lack stability. To some degree 
they are capable of resolving conflicts and problems by democratic means, but the highly uneven 
distribution of property causes instability in the societies. In the end, however, Pervyi and Kolisnyk 
conclude that (despite people’s call for stability) instability is positive for Georgia and Ukraine, 
because it enables development of democratic prospects and economic prosperity. Furthermore, they 
note that the continuing instability in Georgia and Ukraine indicates that there exist societal forces 
capable of resisting attempts of establishing “full control” on those societies. (Pervyi & Kolisnyk 
2012, pp. 47–50.) 
 
Defining security systems in the post-Soviet space 
This section delves into the civilian security provision in the post-Soviet states, in Ukraine in 
particular. Before presenting what previous research has concluded on post-Soviet policing, some 
crucial definitions are provided and their use in this research justified. 
 
To start with the umbrella concept, “civilian security sector” is the key concept of this research: 
determining the scope of the analysis it leaves out all other parts of the Ukrainian society. It was 
selected as the key concept for several reasons. Firstly, it was perceived unfruitful to restrict the 
analysis to mere police, because the police works closely with other CSS bodies, and its problems 
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(such as corruption) are closely connected to problems in other CSS areas (such as corruption in the 
courts). Secondly, assessing a suitable analysis frame, it was found necessary to narrow the scope to 
the civilian security sector, and exclude the military part out of the analysis. Including the military 
part in the analysis would have shifted the attention from the societal processes to the violent conflict 
in the East of Ukraine, which was not in the major interest of this research. Finally, the CSS concept 
was chosen, because based on the researcher’s experience, it is commonly used in Ukraine when 
referring to the state institutions in the field of rule of law and law enforcement. The concept 
originates from policy documents of international actors working in Ukraine, especially from the EU. 
However, today, it is not only used by the international actors but also by local agencies, in the 
researcher’s experience. Also previous studies have applied the same or roughly similar framing, 
some calling it the criminal justice chain or criminal justice system, some security sector, nonetheless 
referring to law enforcement agencies, the ministry of internal affairs and the relevant parts of the 
justice system (see e. g. Jackson 2011, Sedra 2010; in the context of post-Soviet area: Beck 2005, 
Light 2019).  
 
Some definitions would suggest counting the civil society as a part of the CSS, because the civil 
society provides oversight on state security agencies. (DCAF, 2015.) However, despite recognizing 
the importance of civil society in security provision, this research uses the concept of CSS only to 
refer to state institutions, as this distinction facilitates analysis of the relationship between state 
institutions and the civil society. Some definitions also suggest including commercial security 
agencies, external actors and even (non-governmental) armed groups to the category of a security 
system. On the other hand, some narrow definitions do not take into account justice institutions linked 
to security provision and security oversight. (DCAF, 2015.) In this study, the civilian security sector, 
the CSS, stands for state security providers, namely the law enforcement and rule of law agencies, 
those parts of justice institutions that closely relate to security provision, and those parts of ministries 
that direct, control and provide oversight on the rule of law and law enforcement agencies. In the 
Ukrainian context this definition refers to the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the Security Service 
of Ukraine (SBU), the Patrol Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), Ministry of Justice, the 
State Border Guard Service, a network of different anti-corruption agencies and bodies, General 
Prosecutor’s Office (GPO), local courts system, and the Supreme Court. (DCAF 2015; EUAM 
Ukraine.) 
 
“Police” forms the core of the CSS. The institution has been defined from two different perspectives. 
In a state-centric perspective, police is considered as a coercive part of state capacity, representing 
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state’s use of force, mandated to making a certain geographical area governable to the state. In a state-
centric view, a police reform would take place as a part of state-building, directed by the ruling 
regime. In a society-centric perspective, the police institution mirrors social organization and 
represents counterweight in social complexity. Police is understood as continuously constructed by 
the society, not by the ruling elite only. In the society-centric view, social order is perceived as 
produced by a network of civic and state actors, police being only one of those. Deriving from the 
society-centric view, Marat (2018) suggests defining police as “a medium for achieving state-society 
consensus on when it is appropriate for the state to employ violence in everyday life”. (Marat 2018, 
pp. 6–7, 11.) This definition appears fruitful basis for this research that does not aim to pre-set strict 
definitions for studied phenomena but look for negotiations and different meanings given for the 
security institutions in Ukraine.  
 
A police reform, instead, can be understood as the process of building a consensus on the basis for 
state’s use of force. Marat (2018) calls such a reform as a democratic police reform, in contrast to a 
non-democratic version of reforming security institutions. A democratic reform indicates that the 
police work is developed according to the needs of the public. In the post-Soviet context, Marat 
suggests understanding a democratic police reform as a shift from a state-centric model to society-
centric approach to policing. In a democratic police reform, the police develops more transparent and 
accountable ways of work as demanded by the society, and citizens’ role in “policing the police” 
grows. In order to carry out such a democratic reform, venues for collaboration of citizens and police 
need to be developed. Furthermore, the government needs to respond to the discussions, and new 
legislation needs to be adopted to reflect the new consensus between the society and the state. As an 
outcome, Marat believes, public grows more accepting towards police, however, only for certain 
period of time, as consensuses are no final, but need to be re-negotiated from time to time. (Marat 
2018, pp. 11–13, 22, 23, 199.) 
 
This theorization on a democratic police reform appears to suit well to de Coning’s (2016) 
theorization about social institutions building and fixing themselves (p. 173). According to de Coning, 
social institutions (read: the CSS) innovate and evolve under stress, the successful adaptation 
resulting in continuity of existence of the system as well as to development and evolution of it (de 
Coning 2016, p. 173 citing Taleb 2012 and Kaufmann 2013). Social institutions are not fixed by 
outside institutions: they cannot be, because the external fixes would not be sustainable. Instead, the 
social institutions, in other words, complex systems, fix themselves through local adaptation. (De 
Coning 2016, p. 173.) 
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According to Beck (2005), the reforms of the law enforcement systems in the post-Soviet states have 
typically aimed at modernization and democratization of those systems, typical projects including 
reform initiatives leaning on international support and the signing of international conventions. (Beck 
2005.) According to Marat, police reforms in the post-Soviet states have typically consisted of 
improving respect for human rights, and of launching or enhancing cooperation between police and 
citizens. Civil societies and state-actors have often disagreed on priorities in the reforms: whereas 
state-actors have emphasized improvement of police capacities to reduce crime, CSOs have 
concentrated on demanding accountability and civic oversight, decreasing the police loyalty to elites, 
increasing the rule of law and the regulation on coercive measures against citizens. (Marat 2018, pp. 
22–23, 199.) Beck (2005) argues that reforming of the law enforcement systems has turned out 
difficult, many post-Soviet countries struggling with transitions in that area. Many of the states have 
failed to de-centralize, de-politize and de-militarize the criminal-justice systems, and non-
transparency, unaccountability and lack of access to justice have prevailed in these societies. (Beck 
2005.)  
 
In 2005, Beck (2005) assessed that Ukraine had shown very little progress in democratization of its 
police–public relations, even though he believed Ukrainian academics and many police practitioners 
to agree that the system should move away from the Soviet model and towards “accepted best practice 
from the rest of the world”. Political declarations, initiatives and even legal amendments had been 
taken to reform the police more transparent and more in line with public needs, but the practice had 
shown mostly examples of “tokenied reform experimentation”, poor funding, political opportunism, 
faint implementation, corruption and negative side-effects, all-in-all the reform remaining partial, 
non-systematic and non-effective. Beck found that the legislation aimed at “reforming” the security 
sector did not offer practical tools for implementation of itself but continued the tradition of artificial 
change. Crime statistic continued to be published to keep up illusion of efficiency, not corresponding 
to reality. Security institutions maintained the Soviet authoritarian model of decision-making and 
control, police remaining militarized, reliant on authoritarian and disciplinarian management models, 
information flowing only up in the organization, the promotion culture remaining nontransparent and 
corrupted. The MoIA remained centralized and unreformed, reports of abuse of power and torture by 
state security bodies continuing. According to Beck, the public perceived law enforcement agencies 
and their staff inefficient, corrupted, rude, non-professional and not willing to help. (Beck 2005.) 
Marat (2018) provides aligned assessment and describes the Ukrainian police before 2014 as “the 
epitome of post-Soviet punitive militarized institutions riven with corruption and nepotism” (p. 111). 
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The research offers varying explanations for why Ukraine faced challenges in reforming its security 
system after gaining independence. Firstly, Marat (2018) views the phenomenon from the perspective 
of internal resistance: being a powerful state body, the post-Soviet police resisted change, even when 
the surrounding societies modernized (p. 4). Secondly, the close links between the corrupt police and 
the corrupt state elites have been suggested to have prevented the reforms. (Marat 2018, pp. 21–22.) 
Thirdly, specifying to Ukraine, Beck (2005) claims that unlike in many other post-Soviet states, in 
Ukraine, the leading elite of the state did not change thoroughly in the event of gaining independence, 
the political change turning out partial, Soviet traditions of decision-making and control remaining. 
According to Beck, this negatively affected the capacity of the state to push reforms. Fourthly, Lebrun 
(2018) argues that the incapacity of the Ukrainian state to implement reforms originates from the 
atomized and dysfunctional administrative structures, a communist legacy, as it was not in the 
interests of the Communist Party to build efficient state in Ukraine (p. 8). Fifthly, Beck (2005) argues 
that the apathy and hostile attitude of Ukrainian citizens towards the police has served as an obstacle 
for reforms. Sixthly, Marat (2018) notes that also international assistance has probably had a negative 
effect: assistance being seldom exposed to parliamentary oversight, reforms based on negotiations 
between the ruling elite and the donors end up working against the democratic transformation. (Marat 
2018, e. g. p. 6.) 
 
Finally, Beck (2005) finds corruption as an obstacle for reforming of police in Ukraine. To Beck, 
corruption appears as a fundamental characteristic of the system of governance in Ukraine. Boulègue 
and others (2018, pp. 10–11) portray roots of corruption to lead to the time after the collapse of the 
USSR, when newly emerged capitalist actors started to seize institutions at the national and regional 
levels. For example political parties, judges at all levels, security services and the PGO were in their 
interests. (Boulègue et al. 2018, 10–11.) According to Beck, corruption includes the state security 
institutions being involved in serving criminal groups and business. Beck believes that such duties of 
the police undermine the attempts to build more democratic policing in Ukraine. (Beck 2005.) Cenușa 
(2019) refers to the same phenomenon finding oligarchs to decrease resilience of Ukraine: he argues 
that “the oligarchic regimes possess a destructive potential for the rule of law and pulverise resilience” 
(p. 2). Also Korostelina (2019) believes corruption to impair the national resilience of Ukraine. 
Indicating severity of the problem yet today, Korostelina notes Ukrainians to perceive the war in the 
East and corruption to be issues of equal importance. (Korostelina 2019.) 
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Finally, the literature finds the civil society and the public to have had a significant role in determining 
the success of police reforms (Beck 2005, Marat 2018). Marat (2018) claims that the more citizens 
have leverage over police functions, the more likely a reform of policing is to succeed (pp. 1–3, 10). 
The role of the CSO in Ukraine has been perceived significant, namely in building national resilience 
(Korostelina 2019) and in the police reform (Marat 2018). Marat finds the CSO in Ukraine very 
advanced, dynamic and active (p. 13). According to Lebrun (2018) the CSO participates in the CSS 
reform in Ukraine by drafting of legislation and lobbying for it, but has little influence on pushing 
implementation and sustainability of reforms (p. 7). Lebrun finds the participation of citizens in civil 
society organizations too low. He also claims that multiplication of the CSO organizations has made 
the scene blurred, and that there are not necessary sources of funding for the CSO in Ukraine, which 
has led to “overdependence” on donors (p. 7). 
 
After the Euromaidan 
The year 2014 reoccurs in the reviewed literature as a landmark after which policing in Ukraine 
changed, or at least some of the identified obstacles of police reform diminished. This section shortly 
covers the events from November 2013 to February 2014 that serve as one reference point in the 
discussions in this research, and then reviews some assessments of the meanings of the Euromaidan 
for the policing in Ukraine. 
 
 The Euromaidan protests commenced in November 21, 2013, soon after the decision of the Ukrainian 
government to reject an association agreement with the European Union. Opposing the government 
and President Viktor Yanukovych, the demonstrations, mostly consisting of students, grew quickly 
in the following days. In November 30, the Berkut special forces attacked the demonstrators, the 
attack being described brutal and violent, protestors suffering severe injuries and many being arrested. 
The filmed attack gained broad attention and reinforced the protest movement that now gathered in 
the Kyiv main square, as well as in several other cities, to object police violence and the brutality of 
the Yanukovych regime in addition to demanding integration with the EU. The following months 
involved several other instances of police violence against demonstrators, Berkut being one 
significant body involved, its tactics including use of water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets, 
chasing of the demonstrators, beating and humiliation of individual protestors and prevention of 
medical personnel from attending the wounded.8 Finally, police used firearms at unarmed civilian 
                                                     
8 Also other means than policing were employed in Yanukovych government’s response to the Euromaidan protests, 
including use of criminal groups “titushki” and attacks at individual activists away from protests. For example, several 
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protestors. Protestors, instead, threw Molotov cocktails and stones, and took police hostages. The 
outcome of police violence was always even more radicalized civic movement growing in Ukraine, 
violence reaching its peak in the middle of February 2014. (OHCHR 2013–20199; Marat 2018, pp. 
45, 63, 109, 117–119, 122–123.) 
 
The demonstrations ended when Yanukovych fled Ukraine, several of his allies following the 
example, and Berkut’s operation in Kyiv was cancelled by the parliament. In the end, more than one 
hundred people were killed and more than a thousand injured in the clashes between police and 
protestors. According to OHCHR reports, 101–10810 of the killed were demonstrators and 13 law 
enforcement officers. Following the period from December 2013 to February 2014, dozens of 
individuals became subjected to lengthy pre-trial detentions, deprived of their right to a fair trial and 
due process, dozens of victims reporting of torture and ill-treatment in these circumstances. (OHCHR 
2013–2019; Marat 2018, pp. 45, 63, 109, 117–119, 122–123.) 
 
Marat (2018) has argued that police reforms in post-Soviet states have typically been launched as a 
reaction to violent events between police and citizens – a demonstration or other mass mobilization 
dispersed by excessive use of force by police – that she calls “transformative violence”. Governments 
being concerned about enlarging of mass mobilizations, they rather change politics and commence 
reforms than take the risk of violent protests movement growing. Marat portrays Euromaidan as an 
example of how transformative violence led to a police reform: a violent clampdown on student 
protests was followed by a broad revolutionary movement protesting against police violence, and 
after months of clashes between police and demonstrators, one hundred being shot and hundreds 
injured, President Yanukovych was overthrown, and the parliament of Ukraine launched a police 
reform in Ukraine. (Marat 2018, pp. 22–32, 62, 200.)  
 
Many reform initiatives were launched after Euromaidan, the CSO and a variety of international 
actors (incl. the US, EU, Georgia) and donors taking various roles in the agenda setting. The new 
                                                     
activists that had been taken to hospital due to injuries in demonstrations were abducted from there and later found 
dead in nearby forests.  (Marat 2018, 63, 117–118.) 
9 In March 2019, I systematically went through 25 of the reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine, published by 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. These reports cover the period from November 
2013 until February 2019. Most of the OHCHR reports are available from: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/enacaregion/pages/uareports.aspx 
10 The reports provide varying numbers, e.g. the report “Accountability for killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 
2016” reporting of 108 protestors being killed (p. 3), whereas the report “Report on the human rights situation in 
Ukraine  15 April 2014” reports 101 protesters being killed (p. 3). 
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patrol police, perceived as a symbol of a civil state, was launched in the cities of Ukraine with a high 
popularity amongst citizens (Marat 2018, pp. 122–127). Reflecting the input coming from the CSO, 
new legislation was adopted, including the new Law on National Police (2015) and the Law on 
National Security (2018) that evoked rather broad content (Marat 2018, p. 133; Boulègue et al. 2018, 
p. 14). Requirements for the police to report evidence of torture and use of violence in duty were 
established, in addition to the new requirement to wear identifying badges in duty. Certain coercive 
rights of the police were cancelled, and certain appointment procedures adjusted. (Marat 2018, pp. 
134–135.) A number of new CSO based initiatives and projects followed, concerning a broad area of 
police work. NGO coalitions as well as individual activists had significant roles in drafting the new 
legislation. The CSO played a significant part also in setting the agenda for the reform of the interior 
ministry. (Marat 2018, pp. 45, 51, 62, 109, 110–111, 131–133, 196.) 
 
At the same time, several studies refer to challenges that were met in the reforms after the 
Euromaidan. According to Lebrun (2018, p. 8) a “meaningful change” was pursued by appointing 
young Western educated reformers to administrative positions, but many of the reformers left their 
jobs because the reforms did not succeed as hoped, or due to low wages. Implementation of reforms 
faced obstacles, including the shaking state authority and internal resistance, inefficiency and low 
absorption capacity within the state institutions. (Lebrun 2018, p. 8.) Critiques have also concerned 
the SBU that remained untouched despite the reform movement (Marat 2018, pp. 133–134). As a 
significant report of insufficiency of the reforms are the fears of repetition of the 2013–2014 events. 
For example Lebrun (2018, p. 10) notes that EU actors in Ukraine are concerned that replication of 
the Euromaidan “might not be far away”. This fear is, according to him, based on observations on 
increased social unrest and on the fact that crowd-control police has not changed its mode of 
apparatus, nor its personnel. Also the failure to investigate the violence that took place during 
Euromaidan, suspects (many of whom are staff of CSS) fleeing the country, is believed to increase 
the likelihood of another uprising. (Lebrun 2018.) 
 
Also from a human rights perspective, the reform of the CSS seems incomplete. Based on my 
systematic review of 25 OHCHR reports on the human rights situation in Ukraine, covering the period 
from November 2013 until February 2019, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have continued to 
violate human rights when performing their professional duties, thorough the five-year period. The 
events of Euromaidan appear as the highest pike in violations related to excessive use of force by the 
police, but for example violations related to the arrest and detention increased only after the conflict 
in the East started. According to the OHCHR reports, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly has 
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been continuously violated after Euromaidan, firstly by court decisions limiting peaceful assemblies, 
and secondly by systematic failures of the LEA to protect participants of demonstrations. However, 
in the last 2–3 years, LEA has improved its performance in protecting peaceful assemblies. Instead, 
social, religious and political minorities continue to be attacked, LEA having appeared unable to 
prevent and investigate those attacks. Based on the OHCHR reports, cases of torture and ill-treatment 
by LEA, often linked to other violations such as arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, secret 
detention or enforced disappearance, increased in 2014, and continued systematic during the heated 
years of the conflict. After 2015, ill-treatment and torture by LEA decreased, but did not disappear. 
SBU has allegedly been involved in most of the reported cases. Moreover, the judicial system is 
reported to still face challenges in protecting fair trial rights and independence of the judiciary. 
Violations on rights of defendants, such as protracted proceedings, lengthy pre-trial detentions and 
use of forced confessions appear continuous. Finally, the OHCHR reports highlight that impunity for 
human rights violations committed by the Ukrainian CSS has prevailed. (OHCHR 2013–2019.) 
 
Ukraine today 
To conclude this review of resilience and policing in Ukraine, a few final notes about the current 
circumstances in Ukraine should be made, foreseeing some of the most important topics that could 
raise up in the analysis. 
 
Firstly, there is an active war going on in the East of Ukraine, namely in Donbass, in addition to parts 
of Ukraine being under occupation. The attack against Ukraine begun in February 2014, when 
unidentified military men seized the main Crimean administration buildings. As a result that has 
lasted till today, the Crimean Peninsula became occupied by Russia, and, in the internationally 
questioned referendum, the people of Crimea voted to join the Russian Federation. The unrest spread 
to the Eastern parts of Ukraine, namely the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Despite the many peace 
mediation efforts, such as the Geneva talks, the Normandy format, and later political efforts, fighting 
in the East has not ceased. More than three-thousand civilians have died and more than seven-
thousand injured in the conflict, more than 50 000 homes being damaged or destroyed. Civils near 
the contact line continue to experience the negative effects of the conflict in their daily lives: an 
OHCHR report covering the period from August 16 to November 15, 2019, reports about 42 new 
civilian casualties related to the conflict (six killed and 36 injured). Reports of illegal executions, 
arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment have continued thorough the conflict, both sides being 
accused. Finally, effects of the conflict are not restricted to the contact line, but after five years of the 
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conflict, the Ukrainian society and the citizens continue to experience negative impacts of the conflict 
in their daily lives, economic hardship, insecurity, increased level of crime, trafficking and killings 
also outside the conflict-zone being some of those. Consequences of the war to resilience are 
perceived mixed: on one hand the conflict has been found to increase Ukrainians’ national identity, 
to foster the idea of the Ukrainian nationhood and to evoke mutual solidarity among Ukrainians, but 
on the other hand, the society suffers from multifaceted effects of insecurity. (OHCHR 2013–2019; 
OHCHR 2019; The BBC 2018; Boulègue et al. 2018.) 
 
Secondly, as already found, a large number of international actors operates in Ukraine today. 
International actors that have activities related to the CSS in Ukraine include, among others, the 
NATO, the OSCE, the UN HRMMU and several foreign states, such as the USA, Canada, the UK 
and Georgia. There are several EU projects in Ukraine whose objective is to support reform of the 
law-enforcement sector of Ukraine, including the European Union Advisory Mission EUAM Ukraine 
and the Support for Police Reform in Ukraine project (SPRU) (Lebrun 2018, p. 4). According to 
Lebrun (2018) Ukrainians have been dissatisfied with many of the projects, such as the EUAM, the 
prioritization of civilian security sector reform during an active conflict being one of the perceived 
problems (p. 2). 
 
Finally, In March and April 2019, presidential elections took place in Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky 
was elected as the President, and he announced early parliamentary elections that then took place in 
the summer 2019. Both these elections took place after the data gathering for this research, which 
must be taken into account in the analysis: it is the time just before elections that serves as the 
reference point in the interviews. Beforehand, the election time was perceived as a “test of Ukraine’s 
resilience”, the fears including Russian influence on the election process (Boulègue et al. 2018, p. 
11).  
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Methodology and conducting the research 
This chapter establishes the research approach, methodology and the data of this study. Also the 
limitations and ethical issues related to the research are discussed. The chapter explains, how 
particular methods and data are applied in order to answer the research questions:  
 
What meanings are given to the Ukrainian Civilian Security Sector from a resilience perspective? In 
particular, how is the CSS perceived to contribute to resilience in Ukraine, learning from the expert 
interviews and the literature review? In addition, what can be learnt about the theoretical resilience 
approach by applying it to the Ukrainian security framework? 
 
This study represents qualitative research that investigates a phenomenon in the setting where it is 
found, gathers data to incorporate the views of research subjects, and perceives the researcher as a 
co-creator of knowledge (Finley & Cooper 2014, p. 95 citing Jacob 1988). Thus, the research pursues 
results that are a co-product of interpretation of the researcher and the interviewees (Finley & Cooper 
2014), that also base on previous research that the researcher uses to support her interpretation. The 
research is interested in the meanings that interviewees give to events, institutions and practices, 
based on their experiences. The research allows multiple interpretations of reality to co-exist. “Truth” 
is perceived fluid and based on the “creation of meaning by humans” (Finley & Cooper 2014, p. 93).  
 
Data collection: semi-structured expert interviews 
The expert interview has long been a popular method in social scientific research (Bogner et al. 
2009, p. 1; Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 17), and it has also been used before in the research of 
resilience11. The expert interview is often not considered as a distinct method, though experts as 
interviewees form a special group and interviewing experts entails special characteristics (Alastalo et 
al. 2017, p. 214; Bogner & Menz 2009, p. 43). Usually, and also in this research, experts are 
interviewed because the researcher pursues knowledge on societal developments, dynamics of 
complex interactions or chains of historical events, and aims to constitute or test interpretations. 
(Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 218.) The interviewing experts is believed to have special value when 
researching topics that are new or poorly defined (Bogner & Menz 2009, p. 46): the role of CSS in 
resilience being under-researched and the concept of resilience being ambiguous, the approach 
                                                     
11 For example: Boyer, Eric (2019) Unpacking the influence of public–private partnerships on disaster resilience: a 
comparison of expert perspectives.  
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appears defendable. The interviewing experts is often also justified by noting that it produces results 
of “good quality” relatively quickly, the experts being perceived as crystallization points of 
knowledge (Bogner, Littig & Menz 2009, p. 1). 
 
However, as already noted, this research does not perceive experts as possessors of knowledge in the 
sense of “truth”. Instead, expert knowledge is pursued as a particular type of interpretation of the 
world. What is meant by calling the interviewees “experts”? Alasatlo, Åkerman and Vaittinen (2017, 
p. 216) propose a rule of thumb by which experts have special knowledge about the subject of 
research that many others do not possess (Pfadenhauer (2009, p. 83) argues similarly). Meuser and 
Nagel (2009, p. 18) suggest judging who is an expert by differentiating between expert knowledge 
and common-sense knowledge. Pfadenhauer, instead, differentiates between expert knowledge and 
specialist knowledge: whereas a specialist possesses differentiated, task-related knowledge, an expert 
knows in general what individual specialists know and how specialists’ different types of knowledge 
are related to each other. Expert knowledge is more than specific, and it is fundamentally linked to 
the capability to identify the causes of problems and the principles of problem-solving. (Pfadenhauer 
2009, p. 82, citing Hitzler 1994, pp. 25–26.) Expert knowledge has also been defined to be linked to 
“the power of defining the situation” (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 18), the expert thus possessing 
“institutional authority to construct reality” (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 19 citing Hitzler et al. 1994). 
All these definitions guide the selection of interviewees for this research, as well as how their “expert 
knowledge” is interpreted. 
 
Though expertise could be understood as a product of division of labour, being an expert does not 
have to be tied to occupational status or profession (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 25; Alastalo et al. 2017, 
p. 215), and it is not in this research. Instead, the selection of experts as interviewees in this research 
builds on the idea of Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 24) about expertise originating from active 
participation of a person in dealing with common affairs. By this definition, expert knowledge is 
gained through participating in an activity aimed at a particular problem in a community: in this 
research, expertise indicates participating, in a way or another, to developing the CSS in Ukraine. By 
Meuser’s and Nagel’s definition, both professionals and volunteers can be experts when being active 
members of their groups and working on a specific problem, their activity and participation attaching 
knowledge to them. (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 24.) However, the expertise constructed through active 
participation makes a person an expert only in that context (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 24). Thus 
knowledge gained through an expert interview is situational and context related (Alastalo et al. 2017, 
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p. 214). This characteristic of expertise is a limitation of this study: our experts are experts only in 
the context of the CSS of Ukraine, and our results thus only apply to the context of the CSS in Ukraine.  
 
The experts of this research were identified by using a snowball sampling technique12. Snowball 
sampling, commonly used when interviewing experts, refers to new interviewees being found by the 
help of the first interviewees (Finley & Cooper 2014, p. 102, Bogner, Littig & Menz 2009, p. 1; 
Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 222; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 86). The first interviewees were found with 
the help of the researcher’s Ukrainian colleagues at the crisis management operation, EUAM 
Ukraine13. The first interviewees mentioned other experts or organizations that could be contacted. 
The organizations were often asked to name the interviewees, assuming they had the best knowledge 
on the expertise of their staff (as suggested by Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 222). All experts meet the above 
discussed definition of expertise, the emphasis being in their active participation in problem-solving 
of common affairs related to the CSS, their special and general knowledge and good position for 
analyzing the CSS from a resilience perspective. Attention was paid to diversity amongst the 
interviewees. Approximately half of the experts work for intergovernmental organizations, the rest 
being employed by small or medium size Ukrainian NGOs. Both old and famous and newly founded 
NGOs are represented, as well as some of the most significant international actors operating in 
Ukraine. The interviewees represent at least four nationalities, Ukrainian being the most frequent. 
Education was not inquired, but it turned out that at least lawyers, police and academic researchers 
were represented. Both young and old experts were interviewed and both women and men were 
represented. 
 
The initial plan was to conduct four to six interviews. Six organizations answered positively. In total 
nine persons agreeing in time to be interviewed, it was decided that all of them should be interviewed, 
as judging who to leave out appeared problematic. Assessing the interview data size from the 
perspective of saturation, namely estimating when new interviews would no more bring new 
information but repeat what was already known (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 87), the number of 
interviewees appears appropriate. After nine interviews, the data seemed consistent when concerning 
major topics, even though new minor things came up in every interview. 
 
                                                     
12 Learning from the example of Boyer’s expert interviews on disaster resilience (2019). 
13 These colleagues were also working on the reform of the civilian security sector of Ukraine and thus knew the expert 
organizations on the field. 
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Expert interviews are in general suggested to be conducted as open interviews, guided by selected 
topics, not a strict list of questions (Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 30–31). The semi-structured 
interview method was chosen to be applied because, in addition to suiting to interviewing experts, 
the method was found to fit the interest of the research in exploring meanings given to a complex 
phenomenon. A semi-structured interview, sometimes called an open interview in English literature 
(Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 221) suits pursuing knowledge of complex and less known topics (Saaranen-
Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006). It emphasizes interpretation, given meanings and the construction 
of meanings in interaction. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006, Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 
75; Eskola & Suoranta 1998 (no page numbers in the online publication, probably pp. 86–87).) The 
interview bases on pre-defined general topics but also allows experts to freely talk about their 
activities, provide narratives about events in their fields, reflect, give examples and extemporize, 
revealing the maximum of relevant information to the researcher (Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 31, 32). 
The semi-structured interview requires good background knowledge from the interviewer (Saaranen-
Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 85–86). In this research, the interviewer 
built on the literature review and working-experience on the topic. Good background knowledge 
enables a successful design of the topic-guide, ensures quality of the data and allows showing 
competence during the interview, which is perceived to increase the readiness of the interviewees to 
share their knowledge (Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 31–32; Alastalo et al. 2017, p. 221). Open ended 
questions are favored, but also specifying questions are asked. The conversation is organized to be 
free-form and allowed to shift between topics. The same topics are covered in every interview, nearly 
in the same order. (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006, Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 75; Eskola 
& Suoranta 1998.) 
Each interview commenced with a formal introduction of the nature and purpose of the interview and 
with the informing of the interviewees about responsibilities and role of the researcher (as suggested 
e. g. by Marshall and Rossman 2006, p. 79) as well as about the rights of the interviewee. The topic 
of the interview was summarized (though being shared already when agreeing on the interview), and 
two mutually supplementing definitions14 for the concept of resilience presented, even though all 
interviewees indicated to already know the concept.  
                                                     
14 The definitions were: “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and 
external crisis” and “the capacity to cope with and positively adapt to crises and threats”. The first definition is based on 
the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (2016). Using a definition that originates from the field of building 
societal resilience in EU neighbours appeared suitable for this study, the particular definition from the Global Strategy 
being assessed to correspond “with the current use of the term more widely” (The European Partnership for Democracy, 
EPD 2017) and thus being expected to be roughly shared by the interviewees. The second part of the definition was 
 49 
 
I topic General view on CSS and the resilience of Ukraine 
II topic Risks and threats to the Ukrainian society 
III topic Resilience factors: How risks or threats are, will be and could be coped with 
IV topic Civilian Security Sector building resilience: role and challenges 
Extra Specifying questions and triangulation 
Table 1. The interview structure.  
 
The first topic of each interview was the general view on the civilian security sector and the resilience 
of Ukraine. The interviewees were asked (approximately): “what is the first impression or what first 
comes to your mind when thinking of resilience and the civilian security sector of Ukraine?” The 
vague question attempted to minimize the influence of the researcher on immediately directing the 
discussion to certain issues, taking into account the ambiguity of the resilience concept (Juncos 2018, 
p. 566, Bourbeau 2013, p. 8), different schools on emphasizing either bottom-up or central approach 
to resilience (e. g. Juncos 2018, p. 568), respecting the specific context of Ukraine regarding resilience 
(e. g. Bourbeau 2013, p. 10), and also learning from similar choices in the previous research on 
resilience (e. g. Ryan 2015, p. 305). Following Meuser and Nagel (2009), it was presumed that experts 
bring up issues that are worth talking, that the issues emerge because they are relevant for the study. 
 
The second topic concerned the main risks or threats to the Ukrainian society, as perceived by the 
interviewees. Based on the resilience literature that emphasizes the context-specific nature of 
resilience (e. g. Bourbeau 2013), the topic was chosen to serve as a tool for learning about the specific 
context of resilience in Ukraine. The topic was expected to reveal the disturbances from which the 
society is perceived to need to "bounce back", namely the risks for which the “Ukrainian resilience” 
is perceived exist for. Resilience literature suggests that different risks require different resilience (e. 
g. Cork 2010; Foster 2006), and thus learning about the specific risks was expected reveal something 
about the specific resiliences in Ukraine. Secondly, it was expected that discussing risks would lead 
to discussing adaptation and coping with those risks specifically. Specifying questions were asked 
for example about novelty and expected development of the risks. 
 
The third topic was addressed by the researcher asking about how the mentioned risks or threats are, 
will be, or could be coped with or adapted to. The objective was to reveal “resilience factors”, namely 
                                                     
combined by the researcher from several definitions introduced in the theory chapter, the definition of Chandler (2012) 
calling for “capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems or threats” playing a central role, the more 
everyday word “cope”, often repeated in resilience literature, being added. 
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the “everyday”  (Chandler 2014), unique pieces of resilience embedded in local institutions, systems 
and processes (Manyena & Gordon 2015, pp. 47–49). The topic was considered as the most important 
with regard to the research question of the study, and discussing it took time. The discussion was let 
to shift between the second and the third topic, and the researcher often asked how specific risks are, 
will or could be coped with or adapted to. This third topic also served as a contextualization for the 
fourth topic of the interview, which concentrated on the role of the CSS: within the third topic the 
researcher did not mention the CSS as "the coper" or as the "answer" to the risks but enabled also 
other solutions, maybe on a more general level, to emerge. This openness was considered important 
so that also new ideas, outside the traditional institutions and processes could appear. 
 
The fourth topic focused on the civilian security sector of Ukraine and its role in building (or not 
building) resilience in Ukraine. The objective of this topic was to ensure the obtaining of information 
exactly on the CSS of Ukraine, the focus of this research. Most often the interviewees had already 
covered the topics of rule of law and law enforcement before the interview reached this topic. 
However, asking about the topic gave another opportunity to the interviewees to bring up issues 
related to the CSS in specific and to return to issues that had been left with little attention.  
 
After covering the four major topics the researcher asked other questions if it seemed that there was 
time. The additional questions elaborated on what had been said by the interviewees (specifying 
questions), or were based on the idea of triangulation – using several sources and combining sources 
to increase the reliability of data (Höglund & Öberg 2011, p. 7; Silverman 2000, p. 177). In practice, 
the researcher asked about issues that had emerged in other interviews but had not yet been covered 
in the particular interview. At this point, the researcher had a major influence on the discussion: by 
asking about a specific actor she suggested that that the actor might have relevance for the resilience 
of Ukraine. For this reason, it was important that these specific questions were asked only in the end 
of the interview, so that their influence would be minimal. The interviews lasted from approximately 
30 minutes to 100 minutes. Seven of the nine interviews were recorded (audio). The rest (2) were 
documented by writing notes, as the interviewees asked not to be recorded. Eight of the nine 
interviews were conducted in English, and one using another language comfortable for both the 
interviewer and the interviewee. 
 
The seven 30–100 minutes audio records were transcribed into text. The audiotapes were of good 
quality, but the transcription still consumed a large amount of time, the transcribing being made by 
one researcher. The accuracy of the transcription was fixed based on the research interests, also 
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typical for any expert interview data: prosodic or paralinguistic elements were not notated to 
significant extent (Meuser & Nagel 2009, p. 35). No transcription program was used, because the use 
of commercial transcript programs was considered unethical, taking into account the sensitivity of 
the data. The two interviews that were not recorded were re-written from short hand notes into full 
sentences. The interview data totaled up to approximately 70 pages of text that would be analyzed 
using the qualitative content analysis method. One of the nine interviews was translated into English 
from another language. Methodological literature offers several views to whether the translator and 
the researcher should be the same person (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 111). In this dissertation 
research, I considered myself to be competent enough to perform the translation. 
 
Data analysis: qualitative content analysis 
Qualitative content analysis was chosen as the method for analyzing the gathered data. Being a 
traditional, basic method of analysis, content analysis is commonly used in all traditions of qualitative 
research (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 91). The method is used to extract meanings from a text, and 
to  increase the informativeness of the data by drawing meaningful, clear and solid information out 
of the scattered data (ibid. pp. 103–104, 108 citing several sources). By general definition, content 
analysis refers to the process of condensing data and making it systematically comparable by coding 
it (Berg 1989, p. 105). The analysis is systematic in the sense that it examines all of the gathered 
material, involves a determined sequence of steps (discussed on below) and pursues consistency in a 
sense that the logic of examination does not change over time. Another specialty of content analysis 
is that it focuses on one selected aspect of the material, and instead of pursuing a holistic picture, 
shows the material from a chosen angle defined by the research question: in this case, the role of the 
CSS in producing resilience. (Schreier 2012, pp. 3–7; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 104.) 
 
Strengths of the qualitative content analysis method, that also apply to this study, include cost-
effectiveness (Berg 1989, p. 125) and flexibility: the frame is always tailored to the research material 
(Schreier 2012, p. 7). Qualitative content analysis is considered suitable to material that requires 
interpretation: material with obvious meanings could be analyzed through quantitative content 
analysis. (Schreier 2012, pp. 2–3.) Furthermore, qualitative content analysis appears especially 
suitable for analyzing the expert interview material. According to Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 35), 
the analysis of expert interview data should namely concentrate on thematic units in the interviews. 
Not calling it a qualitative content analysis, Meuser’s and Nagel’s model for analysis of expert 
interview data roughly follows the method used in this study, the process proceeding from 
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paraphrasing and coding to thematic comparison, conceptualization and theoretical generalization 
(2009, pp. 35–36). A limitation of the qualitative content analysis method is that it does not produce 
results but only reorganizes the data into a more usable, clear and solid form. The defining of results 
and conclusions is left to the researcher. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 103, 108, Hämäläinen 1987, 
pp. 35, 40.)  
 
Fitting well to the general research approach of this study, qualitative content analysis focuses on 
given meanings. (Schreier 2012, pp. 3–7; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, p. 104.) The method is used to 
process unstandardized, symbolic material that requires interpretation. It acknowledges possibility of 
different interpretations on the material and perceives meanings to be context-specific, guiding us to 
pursue particular instead of general conclusions. (Schreier 2012, pp. 29–31; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 
p. 108; Hämäläinen 1987, pp. 34, 39.) The approach suits well to the already discussed conception of 
expert knowledge as fundamentally tied to experts’ experience and interpretation, that are further 
interpreted by the researcher, also the resilience literature supporting the idea of not pursuing general 
conclusions. 
 
The qualitative content analysis method starts from splitting the data into pieces, continues with 
conceptualizing it, and leads to the re-organizing of the pieces of information into a new logical order. 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 103–104 (2018 ed. p. 122), 108; Hämäläinen 1987, pp. 33–39.) The 
coding frame, also known as the analysis body or analysis structure, consists of main categories and 
sub-categories (two levels in this research) that define relevant aspects of the data. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 
2009, pp. 110–111; Schreier 2012 pp. 59, 61, 90.) Learning from Schreier (2012) the categories are 
designed to be as unidimensional as possible (capturing one aspect of the material at a time), mutually 
exclusive (data fitting one sub-category at time), and exhaustive in a sense that all relevant material 
will be captured by the categories (pp. 71–76, 146–147). Our application of the method, however, 
differs from Schreier (2012) in that the categories are not created as result-like variables eventually 
compiled into a data matrix conveying all information of the data. Instead, following another tradition 
of conducting qualitative content analysis (Häikiö 2019; Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 105–107, 121, 
124)15, the coding frame is created only to squeeze the main findings of each category, results being 
presented in a fully qualitative format. Choosing the loose, thoroughly qualitative version of the 
method suits the data that is rich in meaning and does not do itself justice if quantified or presented 
                                                     
15 This tradition is popular amongst dissertation studies in the faculty of social science in my university. See for example: 
Heikkilä, Laura (2015) Oil, conflict and media. Study of oil-related statements of the South Sudanese conflict parties or 
Laukka, Maija (2018) Women, War and Peace – A feminist content analysis. University of Tampere, Tampere. 
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in a closed format. The version corresponds to how Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 36) suggest to analyze 
data gathered through expert interviewing. The chosen version also supports the overall research 
approach of the study as it enables a plurality of interpretations to arise from the interview material. 
 
Some literature differentiates between theory-led and data-led content analysis. In the former version, 
a theory and predefined concepts are used in the analysis of the data, whereas the latter version starts 
from the empirical data and only then, based on findings rising from the data, proceeds towards 
applying theoretical conceptualizations. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 108–117.) Having a pre-
determined conceptual framework, namely that of resilience, but at the same time leaving it up to the 
data to define what resilience is and adjusting the analysis body according to the data, this study 
combines elements of both theory-led and data-led content analysis. Based on resilience literature, 
the analysis body presupposes resilience as something that can exist in Ukraine in relation to 
particular risks and that can be constructed by institutions. On the other hand, the analysis body was 
adjusted after being tested against the interview material. 
 
Now follows a description of the application of the qualitative content-analysis in this study. The 
process starts with the designing of a loose analysis body based on the research interests and resilience 
literature. As the topic guide for the interviews was created on the same basis, the categories are 
approximately the same (justifications for each covered in the previous section). The analysis 
structure is tested to a part of the data and adjusted accordingly. The theme “role of the civilian 
security sector” is deleted, now to be covered in all other categories. A couple of sub-categories are 
created based on the found characteristics and reoccurring topics in the data. The category formation 
and their names mirror the language of the data and at this point avoid too much theoretical 
abstraction, as suggested by Meuser and Nagel (2009, p. 36). After the creation of the analysis body, 
the data is segmented and coded by the categories of the body. Some parts of the data are coded as 
“irrelevant”, not fitting to any of the categories. All parts of the data are coded, the level of accuracy 
of coding varying between sentences, phrases and paragraphs (thematic coding). After completing 
the coding, two small parts of the data are coded again to ensure the coherency and the accuracy of 
coding. Finally, all the coded data is reorganized under the categories of the analysis body. When 
reorganization is completed, similarities, namely the major trends and characteristics of the data are 
visible, enabling the interpretation of findings by the researcher. Also irregularities and contradicting 
elements are observed and recorded. 
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General view on CSS and resilience of Ukraine 
Risks and threats to the Ukrainian society 
external  
internal (to the society and to the CSS) 
Resilience factors 
Other relevant 
related to international actors 
Table 2. The analysis body. 
 
Assessing the research, the researcher’s position and ethics 
Validity, namely the quality of the study (Schreier 2012, p. 27) or the extent to which it represents 
the phenomenon to which it is referring to (Silverman 2000, p. 175 citing Hammersley 1990), is a 
key criterion for evaluating qualitative research, also in this study. Learning from Silverman (2000), 
validity is pursued by avoiding anecdotalism and short interpretations, and by tolerating ambiguity 
(p. 176). Following Marshall and Rossman (2006, p. 206), alternative explanations are continuously 
searched and negative instances (to “good examples”) checked. Furthermore, validity is pursued by 
checking that the methods capture what they are supposed to capture, the major factor in this research 
being that the coding frame captures what it is supposed to capture and that it suits the material and 
the research question. The test round conducted on the analysis body was supposed to address these 
issues. (Schreier 2012, pp. 7, 186–187.) Reliability of the research, instead, is pursued through careful 
documentation and explanation of the analysis process (Silverman 2000, p.188) in this chapter. 
Consistency, referring to the analysis not changing over time, is addressed by creating an analysis 
body as clear and explicit as possible, testing it, and coding a part of the data again to reveal any 
inconsistencies. (Schreier 2012, pp. 6, 26, 34.) A type of triangulation was used to increase the 
reliability of the data, as suggested by, for example, Höglund and Öberg (2011, p. 7) and Silverman 
(2000, p. 177). Not aimed at finding the “truth” but at revealing the variety of perspectives (Marshall 
& Rossman 2006, p. 204), it meant cross checking information and asking interviewees to reflect on 
the topics brought up by other interviewees.  
 
Moreover, the position and subjectivity of the researcher should be addressed as impacting the quality 
of the research (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 204). I wore two hats in Kyiv: in addition to conducting 
the research, I worked as an intern at the European Union Advisory Mission, EUAM Ukraine, my 
daily work concerning the CSS reform. Despite measures taken (already discussed) to minimize the 
researcher’s influence, my previous knowledge inevitably impacted how I acted during the interviews 
and interpreted the data (e. g. Abels & Behrens 2009, p. 141). In addition, my position possibly had 
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an effect on what the interviewees spoke. I found it ethical to be open about my work, and a few of 
the interviewees had already met me in duty. This should not be interpreted too negatively: often and 
also in this research, participation of the researcher in the research environment enabled building 
relationships needed for the study (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 73) and acquiring enough 
background knowledge for designing a good interview (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006; 
Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, pp. 85–86; Meuser & Nagel 2009, pp. 31–32). It was always emphasized 
that I am conducting the research independent from EUAM, not sharing information or receiving 
guidance from them. Yet it is likely that my position affected the interviews, the “research as a co-
expert” being an issue with multifaceted effects, for example explanations typically being left 
unspoken and the specialization increasing (Bogner & Menz 2009, pp. 58–59; see also Alastalo et al. 
2017, pp. 225–227.) Indeed, during the interviews, some assumptions, especially normative ones, 
appeared to be taken as shared and were not explicitly justified by the interviewees, and on the other 
hand, a massive amount of highly technical information was shared.  
  
As an opposite observation, I was also perceived as a foreigner to the context of Ukraine, as an “expert 
from a different knowledge culture” (Bogner & Menz 2009, p. 60). This set-up realized in several 
delicate ways in the interviews, the most notable impact being positive: many technicalities and 
normative implications were explained in detail, assumably due to the perceived gap in knowledge. 
My perceived foreignness possibly also had a problematic side, at least when covering the role of 
international actors in Ukraine: the interviewees might have felt the pressure to not be too critical 
about ‘internationals’, the researcher being part of them.  
 
Finally, ethical conduct being one of the important parts of the accountability of the research (Finley 
& Cooper 2014, p. 44), a few related issues need to be covered. To begin with, methodological 
literature (e. g. Berg 1989, p. 137; Finley and Cooper 2014, pp. 45-46) emphasizes the importance of 
that the subjects of the research participate in the research of their free, well-informed choice. Taking 
into account the circumstances of the conducting of the research, Kyiv being a peaceful city but cases 
of attacks at CSO still taking place in Ukraine, it was considered especially important that the 
interviewees understand that everything they say could be cited in the final, public research paper, 
openly accessible in English in the internet. This was both discussed and also delivered in a written 
format to each interviewee, the written form indicating “informed consent” and being signed by both 
the interviewee and the researcher.  
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The signed form also referred to researcher’s commitment to protecting anonymity and 
confidentiality of the interviewees. Anonymity referring to the namelessness of the subjects of the 
research (Berg 1989, p. 138), it was agreed that they would stay nameless during the remaining 
process of research, including the audio records, notes and the publication. Furthermore, 
confidentiality indicating that active measures are taken to hide all elements from the data that could 
lead to identification of the interviewees (ibid., p. 138), the data was processed accordingly. Due to 
the identified security issues, also the publication protects anonymity of the interviewees to the 
maximum: the bibliography establishes dates and durations for the interviews, but the data samples 
provided in the following chapters do not include referencing to specific interviews. 
 
Following research ethics, attention was also paid to building of an interview situation as ‘human’ as 
possible. Following Marshall and Rossman (2006, pp. 78, 102), a qualitative researcher should always 
be “an active, patient, and thoughtful listener […] having an empathetic understanding of and a 
profound respect for the perspectives of others”: the researcher should not develop an “academic 
armor” that would prevent emphatic reaction (ibid., p. 78). In practice this meant that the conversation 
was not forced to proceed effectively at the expense of any sentiment or out of respect towards the 
interviewee. These practical considerations were perceived important also from the perspective of 
reciprocity – the interviewer offering something back to the interviewees who donate their time, effort 
and knowledge to the interviewer (Marshall and Rossman 2006, p. 81). 
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How resilient is Ukraine? The general view 
Aiming to describe some of the context in which the civilian security sector operates in the Ukrainian 
society, this short introductory chapter presents and discusses the general-level assessments of the 
interviewees on the resilience of Ukraine, and establishes the starting point for our analysis. 
 
One of the strongest and most frequently recurring messages of the data, a key finding of this study, 
is that the ability of Ukraine to carry out reforms despite the armed conflict on its territory is a sign 
of resilience. The success of reforms is perceived to show that Ukraine is capable of positively 
adapting to international and national pressures and to resist the stagnating effect of the conflict. The 
reform movement is perceived to signal resilience at least in two senses: what has been reformed, 
appears both as an indicator as well as as a building block of resilience. Where reforms have not taken 
place or succeeded, gaps of resilience are identified: the unreformed institutions and processes are 
feared to decrease resilience, and they also signal inability to adapt. Following this logic, the civilian 
security sector is found to support the resilience of the society especially through those security 
structures and practices that have been reformed. Many of its unreformed parts, instead, are found to 
not support the resilience of the society.  
 
At the same time, the interviewees attach uncertainty to the resilience of Ukraine: even though 
resilience is built and demonstrated throughout the society, it appears unsure, erratic, ambiguous and 
difficult to predict. The CSS has not been reformed thoroughly, and signals of reverse developments, 
return of old problematic practices are reported. Some are concerned whether the society is running 
out of absorption capacity, so many changes having taken place in a short time, too fast a reform 
movement being perceived damaging for resilience. Furthermore, the overall “situation” in Ukraine 
is described unstable and dynamic. There is uncertainty over whether “resilience factors” of the 
society, structures and practices that keep up resilience, continue to develop and exist. A lot is 
perceived to depend on the result of the presidential and the parliamentary elections, namely the 
political leadership of the state.  
 
Moreover, the risks to which Ukraine should be ready to respond are found ambiguous by many 
interviewees, the assessment of sufficient level of resilience thus being experienced difficult. 
Sufficiency of resilience depends on how the circumstances change, the interviewees argue. How the 
conflict continues, is perceived as a fundamental question for all parts of the Ukrainian society: the 
conflict consumes a great amount of resources, and makes any planning difficult. Some interviewees 
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are worried of the worsening of the internal situation in Ukraine. In their experience, divisions 
between language groups and religious groups have polarized and politicized. Deeper divisions are 
also found to have developed with regard to economic wealth, decreasing cohesion of the society. 
Similarly, political divisions are perceived to have grown more significant, extreme ends appearing 
more influential. Interviewees’ worries also include the possibility of the repetition of the 2013–2014 
events, proliferation of arms, extreme groups, and the possibility of external influences gaining more 
foothold in politics, and mixture of these risks.  
 
Some interviewees perceive uncertainty over the overall (geo)political direction of Ukraine to hinder 
the capability of the society to strategically develop its institutions, and to plan and implement 
reforms. Questions about “the place of Ukraine”, whether Ukraine develops towards the East or the 
West, whether it chooses European values or the “Eastern approach” are perceived vital, also for 
development of the CSS. The “Ukrainian way”, a unique combination of Western and Eastern 
traditions, is perceived to entail problems, some interviewees noting that democracy, rule of law and 
human rights cannot be compromised or implemented just partly. Some portray uncertainty over the 
direction of the society as a cause of the current armed conflict. At the same time, the conflict is 
perceived to reinforce uncertainty, long-term planning appearing difficult in war-time. 
 
On the other hand, many interviewees argue that Ukraine has chosen the “Western” approach, pursues 
implementation of “Western” democracy, rule of law and human rights, this choice manifesting in 
the reform of the CSS. Security systems of states of the “West” construct the yardstick against which 
the security system of Ukraine is assessed, “European standards” being the standards that are pursued 
throughout the CSS. Many compare the CSS in Ukraine to CSSs in other post-Soviet states, in 
particular in Poland. The two states sharing similar histories, Poland is perceived to be much more 
“advanced” than Ukraine, its CSS development “flying 20 years ahead”, as one interviewee phrased 
it. Reasons for the differentiated development are sought from history and geography; Ukraine is 
perceived to have absorbed more of the “Soviet influence”, and Poland is noted to be located “closer 
to Europe”. 
 
Comparisons are made also inside Ukraine, the difference between Kyiv and other parts of Ukraine 
appearing prominent to the interviewees. CSS in Kyiv is perceived adaptable and capable of 
performing according to the new “Western” norms, whereas rural areas, smaller cities and towns are 
associated with conservatism of old traditions, non-transparency, corruption, issues with 
independency of courts and challenges for the civil society to engage in the public sphere. Secondly, 
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many interviewees do not find areas controlled by separatist groups to be analyzable together with 
other (government-controlled) areas of Ukraine, capabilities of the Ukrainian CSS to function in those 
areas and risks faced by residents of those areas appearing different from other parts of Ukraine. 
Indeed, the interviewees portray risks, vulnerabilities and resilience factors geographically located to 
specific places of Ukraine. On the other hand, local and regional challenges are perceived to have 
impacts that spread around Ukraine and also outside of it, nation-wide security impacts of the armed 
conflict appearing as the most prominent example.  
 
Finally, the interviewees build a multifarious picture with regard to relevant actors of resilience. 
Importance of grass-root level actors is emphasized. The civil society is portrayed as a major player, 
and the importance of cooperation between the CSS and the CSO for resilience of the society is 
highlighted. Individual CSS staff members, such as police officers and judges, as well as “ordinary 
citizens” are also seen as significant actors for resilience, and they are in general demanded to take 
more responsibility over building resilience through their daily practices: the interviews suggest that 
if individual CSS officers and citizens were more pro-active, communicated more constructively and 
respected the law, resilience of the society would increase. On the other hand, contrary to this 
perspective, many interviewees note that changing the society from below is inefficient and unlikely 
to succeed. The importance of centrally led, top-down projects, as well as the responsibility of leaders 
making strategic-level decisions are highlighted.  
 
Civilian security sector16 is portrayed as one of the centrally-led structures having a major 
responsibility for the resilience of the Ukrainian society. The interviewees find the CSS to have 
potential for both great negative and positive effect on resilience. Thus, the issue of CSS is found 
relevant and topical when speaking of the resilience of Ukraine. Euromaidan events having 
demonstrated the problematic role that CSS can take in the society, reforming the CSS is perceived 
crucial for resilience in the long term.  
 
Discussion 
Now, to shortly put these tentative, general findings into a context of the previous research, both 
similarities and dissimilarities appear. As Rose (1995) found 25 years ago, the findings of this 
research re-discover that Ukraine is again, or still, in a transition period. The Ukrainian society in 
                                                     
16 Some interviewees call it CSS, some refer to LEA, many speaking of “police” while referring to several CSS institutions. 
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general and the civilian security sector in particular are found to be in the midst of changes that are 
interpreted to count to more than regular development, and the thorough change of structures and 
practices is given principally a positive meaning. Whereas Beck (2005) found Ukraine incapable of 
designing and carrying out a necessary change in its security institutions, this study finds that a broad 
reform movement is taking place on the CSS of Ukraine, and that the reforms are interpreted both as 
an indicator and as a building block of societal resilience. However, as Rose’s study (1995) did, also 
the data of this research compares Ukraine’s development to other post-Soviet states, and the results 
show similarities: Ukraine is perceived to drag behind in its post-Soviet reference group. Indeed, the 
findings portray the CSS in Ukraine en route, not yet in the desired end-state, according to the 
interviewees’ experience. This introductory chapter will now not delve deeper into reflection of the 
findings with previous literature, but leave that for when more detailed and research-question specific 
results have first been presented, commencing with risks to the Ukrainian society. 
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Risks to the Ukrainian society 
This chapter presents perceptions of the interviewees about risks to the Ukrainian society. The chapter 
commences with external risks, continues with the risks inside the society and concludes with the 
risks inside the civilian security sector. Discussion with literature is divided into two parts: the chapter 
first discusses the external and after that internal risks. It should be noted that the division between 
external and internal risks bases on interviewees’ perceptions, namely on the identified trend in the 
interview data to portray certain risks as external or internal. As it will be noted along the chapter, 
those categorizations can also be problematized. 
 
Russia and the armed conflict 
With regard to externalities against which to be resilient, the interviews build a clear picture of Russia 
representing the most significant external risk to the Ukrainian society, the continuing, multifaceted 
risk now being actualized as the armed conflict in Donbass and in the occupation of Crimea. Also 
many non-actualized risks are associated with the current conflict, including the risk of further 
escalation, the risk of new negative impacts emerging, as well the risk of the conflict continuing as a 
frozen conflict for a long period of time. The interviewees frame the current conflict as an external 
(actualized) threat. However, several interviewees mention that minimization of the actualized threat, 
namely the resolution of the conflict, is not only dependent on external but also internal factors.  
 
The interviewees explain meaning of the conflict to Ukraine by describing the many negative effects 
of it. The armed conflict is found to realize itself as casualties, injuries and the halting of normal life 
near the contact line. A great number of Ukrainian families are reported to be directly affected. 
According to the interviewees, near eight million of Ukrainians live in the territories of Donetsk, 
Lugansk and Crimea, and counting the soldiers and families of the persons involved in active security 
operations, the number of persons affected is estimated to total up to near ten million people. The 
impact of the conflict is highlighted to not only be restricted to the East of Ukraine, but it is found to 
have various effects, including uncertainty, insecurity, stress, the loss of resources and operational 
challenges throughout the society in all parts of Ukraine.  
 
Several interviewees argue that the conflict is not frozen, but after five years of active conflict, it 
remains on the daily agenda of the society. The unpredictability of the situation is perceived to have 
a deep negative impact on the development of the society, including the CSS. Developing long-term 
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plans appears unreasonable as future operational circumstances remain unclear. Furthermore, the 
coercion of Russia in Ukraine is not found to be limited to the armed operation, but several 
interviewees refer to “other means” of intervention by Russia, including, for example, attempts to 
influence the elections. There is a fear that a candidate supported by Russia would opt for improving 
the relationship with Russia with a deal not acceptable to many Ukrainian citizens that could lead to 
the escalation of internal tensions. 
 
The interviewees find the conflict to pose specific challenges to the CSS of Ukraine. The maintenance 
of full functionality of the CSS is considered crucial but unsure. Normal, peace-time operations have 
to be conducted in abnormal circumstances. Also direct attacks are aimed at the CSS specifically. 
Secondly, specific measures and resources are required from the CSS to mitigate the negative impacts 
of the conflict, including, for example, counter-intelligence. According to one interviewee, due to the 
fact that there is no officially declared war between Ukraine and Russia, LEA has to operate according 
to peace-time legislation (general criminal procedure code) and thus use peace-time tools in war-like 
conditions.17 On the other hand, several interviewees assess the situation to have improved since 
2015, the LEA now mostly working in peace-time conditions. 
 
The armed conflict is also found to increase risks related to crime targeting the Ukrainian society. 
According to some interviewees, the territories that are not under the control of the Ukrainian 
government pose specific challenges to the Ukrainian police: crime originating from these areas is 
considered significant, while investigating and preventing it appears particularly challenging. 
According to the interviewees, Ukrainian LEA has to content itself with working on symptoms, the 
roots of crime, such as heads of criminal groups, remaining unreachable in the non-government 
controlled areas. Secondly, the interviews indicate that risks are associated with persons affected by 
the armed conflict, especially with persons personally involved in active security operations. The 
number of Ukrainians that have or are participating in the security operation in the East is assessed 
significant; one interviewee estimated half a million of persons being involved in the conflict in the 
front line. Several interviewees note that soldiers returning home face challenges in adapting to a 
peaceful life with their families. Two risks are specifically associated with the veterans: the risk of 
them bringing small arms from the conflict zone to other parts of Ukraine, and the risk of these 
persons joining radical groups. The interviewees noted also other, new challenges to be waiting for 
                                                     
17 LEA’s limited rights and facilities for arrest were mentioned as one particular issue, the current state of affairs having 
led to use of unofficial (illegal) detentions and keeping of arrested persons (such as foreign soldiers) in unofficial 
facilities. 
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the CSS when the war ends and the Donbass area returns to government control, including the issue 
of weapons, and that of prosecution of persons suspected of crimes committed during the conflict. 
 
Finally, the geopolitical and historical context of Ukraine is often raised by the interviewees, when 
they explain the significance of the current armed conflict to Ukraine. Many refer to the Soviet history 
of Ukraine as a past destabilizing factor, though also stabilizing effects in the Soviet time are 
identified.18 Poland, Turkey and Germany are often mentioned as past external threats to Ukraine, yet 
not posing risks to the society today. Both the past risks and the current conflict are linked to the 
geographical location of Ukraine, to “geopolitical issues” that take different forms over time and 
contain certain specific risks to the society. The “geopolitical issues” are perceived to constantly exist, 
because of the location of Ukraine “on the crossroads from East to West and from North to South”, 
as one interviewee described.19 The many external risks that have actualized in the past seem to form 
a major storyline in the history of Ukraine: Ukraine being affected and then recovering from 
disturbances is a narrative reiterated in the interviews. Negative emotions and elements of 
commemoration are attached to these descriptions, many interviewees raising up the high number of 
Ukrainians that have died due those events.  
 
Many Ukrainians have died, always, through these historical events to which I just made reference. I think 
that always the attitude of Moscow that Ukrainians are spendable, the Ukrainians can, you know, can be 
sacrificed. (Data sample 1.) 
 
Organized crime 
Another topic that arises from the category of external risks is organized crime, which the 
interviewees portray as the second severe external risk to the Ukrainian society. There are many 
reasons why organized crime could be discussed also under the category of internal risks. However, 
the interviewees were rather unanimous in bringing up the issue of organized crime as an external 
risk or threat to the Ukrainian society, and thus it is presented accordingly. 
 
According to the interviewees, organized crime targeting Ukraine contains, among other things, 
cyber-crime, trafficking of humans and drugs, arms trade, and money laundering. Being primarily 
framed as an externality to the society, many note that organized crime has origins also inside of 
                                                     
18 For example, one interviewee said that “in Soviet time, it was stable at least”. 
19 On the other hand, the geographical location was found to protect Ukraine from certain risks, one interviewee 
perceiving Ukraine rather safe from terrorism, human trafficking and drug trafficking, this point of view being, however, 
contested by other interviewees. 
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Ukraine. Two types of organized crime were especially addressed by the interviewees: cyber-crime 
and human trafficking. Cyber-crime is described as an international phenomenon having both roots 
and targets inside of Ukraine. The negative effects of it are mentioned to include losses and damages 
of property and the consumption of resources of police. Cyber-attacks are portrayed to pose risks to 
the overall operability of state structures. Cyber-crime is found to be linked to human trafficking, at 
least in forms of recruiting, money change and money laundering. With regard to the resilience of 
Ukraine against cyber-crime, moderate estimations are made: the CSS is said to have bodies that 
possess relatively good expertise on cyber-crimes.  
 
With regard to human trafficking, the interviewees share partly contradictory knowledge. Several 
interviewees argue Ukraine to be a remarkable origin and transit country. Organizing trafficking of 
sex workers is described as a visible phenomenon, openly taking place in Kyiv. Trafficking of sex 
workers is assessed to be headed to Western Europe, Canada, America, Middle East and Caucasia.  
However, one interviewee assesses that there is no major human trafficking problem in Ukraine, 
mostly because of Ukraine’s geographical position. Many interviewees describe a culture tolerant 
towards sex labor to prevail in Ukraine, whereas risks related to sex work and trafficking of sex 
workers are described poorly managed. The police is described unwilling or unable to investigate 
crimes related. One interviewee gave an example from police training, during which a participating 
police had explained that sex work or commercial marriages are often the only way for a widow or 
single mother to provide income to her parents and children. This attitude amongst police is perceived 
as a factor decreasing the likeliness that crimes related would be effectively investigated. One 
interviewee perceived the war in the East being used as an excuse for not investigating organized 
crime, such as human trafficking: crimes related to sex labor are not considered as “real crimes” when 
compared to the crimes related to the conflict.  
 
Finally, despite being perceived as an external risk, the negative potential of organized crime is 
primarily associated with internal vulnerabilities: organized crime is perceived as a risk by the 
interviewees if and because it is not recognized, prevented and investigated by the Ukrainian CSS. 
Thus, increasing police capacities is set in the core of decreasing the risk of organized crime. Many 
interviewees utilize the concept of resilience to describe what is needed: Ukraine can cope with 
organized crime, if it is resilient, resilience indicating for example more effective preventative and 
investigative operations by the CSS. 
 
 65 
External risks: Discussion 
Having presented all findings on external risks rising from the interviews, it is now time to discuss 
those in the light of literature.  
 
To begin with, it is worth noting that even though this chapter aimed at covering only external risks 
arising from the interviews, the analysis of those separately from internal vulnerabilities and risks 
turned out challenging. The resilience literature offers some explanation for the inherent connection. 
Taking the discourse on human trafficking as an example, it seems that even though the phenomenon 
is perceived as external to the society, the risk is suggested to be addressed by focusing on the 
internalities of the society, in this case, the culture tolerant towards sex work, and the knowledge and 
capabilities of the CSS. This logic appears to follow what literature identifies as the neoliberalist shift 
of responsibility to local, internal and individual levels, the local communities, individuals and their 
capabilities being targeted instead of the risk-posing externalities (e. g. Chandler & Reid 2016). The 
same discourse reoccurs with regard to all types of organized crime: the outcome is not framed 
dependent on how organized crime develops and targets Ukraine but rather on the capabilities of the 
CSS of Ukraine, this logic representing the neoliberalist way of thought in resilience thinking. 
 
The threat coming from Russia is also perceived external and at the same time linked to internal risks 
such as the proliferation of arms and the failing of rehabilitation of soldiers. Here the neoliberal logic 
of addressing internalities in order to mitigate the external risk does not, however, seem to apply: 
none of the interviewees suggest that the Ukrainian society could decrease the negative effect of 
Russian aggression to the society. Instead, some emphasize that Ukraine cannot or should not adapt 
to the (actualized) risk of Russia occupying parts of Ukraine. Only the side-effects of the armed 
conflict are perceived internally manageable. It seems that when reflecting the risks related to Russia, 
instead of neoliberalist resilience thinking, stability or defence approaches are rather applied. This 
finding will be addressed again in the chapter that presents “resilience factors” of the Ukrainian 
society, some of those factors appearing more as tools for stability or defence, for example when 
military capacities are being emphasized.  
 
At this point it should already be noted that the challenges of applying resilience thinking to the armed 
conflict are not surprising. For example Heath-Kelly (2015) found resilience inapplicable to 
manifestations of crises in the present, and more suitable to be applied as an orientation towards past 
or future shocks. Emergence of stability- or defence-oriented discourses would neither appear 
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surprising in the light of how Corry (2014) explains why defence thinking was abandoned in the first 
place: it was the lack of clear adversaries and the ambiguity over security threats located in the future 
that made the defence approach unsuitable, and led to emerging of the resilience approach. The 
external threat of Russia is not found ambiguous, neither located in the future as it actualizes itself 
today in Crimea and Donbass. 
 
Finally, what appears striking about the identified external risks, is that it was exactly these two risks 
(or sets of risks), Russia and organized crime, that sprang up from the analysis. That most of the 
interviewees named these risks and not any other risks certainly indicates the significance of these 
risks to Ukraine. The mentioned risks should most likely be understood as risks that are especially 
relevant or topical from a resilience perspective, not excluding the possibility of also other important 
risks existing. Indeed, most likely, there are also other external risks, such as environmental, medical 
and economic risks, against which the Ukrainian society should show resilience. Why those risks 
were not brought up in the interviews could also relate to the area of expertise of the interviewees or 
that, knowing the topic of the research, they concentrated on risks that they found related to the CSS. 
This partiality of the assessment of external risks constitutes a definite limitation for this research: 
naturally, this study refrains itself from analyzing and cannot conclude anything about the role of 
CSS in building resilience against risks that were not identified or brought up by the interviewees. 
 
 
Extreme groups, state leadership, crime and emigration 
Now that risks that the interviewees brought up as “external” have been covered, the chapter moves 
on to risks that the interviewees portray as “internal” to the society of Ukraine. Thus, following what 
rose up during the interviews, this section covers extreme groups, risks related to state leadership and 
regime changes, emigration and crime.  
 
Firstly, almost all interviewees raise the issue of extreme right wing groups as a risk to the Ukrainian 
society. The interviewees describe the groups to be large in quantity and effective in communication 
and coordination. Extreme right wing ideology is perceived popular. According to the interviewees, 
the extreme right wing existed already before 2014, but Euromaidan events radicalized the groups, 
as many of those actively participated and created networks during the revolution. People who 
participate in extreme right wing group operations and events are said to include a significant number 
of under-aged persons, football hooligans, as well as veterans returning from the East front. Voluntary 
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battalions are mentioned as one example of places of networking and recruitment. The extreme right 
wing groups are said to cooperate nationwide, Kyiv being the centre but having close relations to 
groups in the Western parts of Ukraine, as well as in Kharkiv. Risks of severe crimes are associated 
with the groups. CSO, courts, minorities, the press and politicians are found targeted, often with 
impunity. The interviewees describe the extreme right wing operations to risk the freedoms of speech, 
peaceful assembly and religion, and to threaten the non-dependency of courts. Some note the groups 
to have links to politicians and state bodies. Many note a risk of the groups being instrumentalized 
by “high players”. 
 
Secondly, the interviewees associate multifaceted risks with the top leadership of the state and with 
the changing of the ruling regime in Ukraine. The results of elections are in general found to be crucial 
determinants for risks that will emerge and for the capabilities that the CSS will have for addressing 
the risks. According to the interviewees, fears include the new regime pausing reforms, or initiating 
policies unacceptable to the society, and the emerging of “too weak” a regime that allows foreign 
influences to gain foothold. What links the selected candidates actually have to oligarchs, and how 
the oligarchs’ political projects can influence the new leadership are found crucial questions to the 
society. Several interviewees argue that Ukrainians should vote wiser. Some interviewees believe 
that some Ukrainians sell their votes, increasing the risk of the “wrong” persons being elected. 
Moreover, risks are associated with the period of appointment of a new regime after election. Several 
interviewees note that the process of change of regime paralyzes the state for several months, as the 
heads of institutions are changed, new heads appoint new subordinate heads, and so on. Depending 
on the new leadership and the following appointments, past priorities and projects could be 
abandoned and replaced.20 
 
Thirdly, crime is brought up as an internal risk causing instability in the society of Ukraine. The 
interviewees assess that in addition to crimes that have long been typical for the society, such as 
economic crimes, frauds and robberies, new types of crime have emerged alongside the armed 
conflict, causing further uncertainty and instability in the society. Change in the structure of crime is 
considered notable by the interviewees, the role of organized crime and crimes which involve a 
                                                     
20 One example of a shift of regime paralyzing the system was given from the 2014 revolution, when the President Viktor 
Yanukovych fled Ukraine, and a significant number of high state officials and chiefs and commanders of security agencies 
also left Ukraine. The decision making system, also of the security system, was left hollow, paralyzed. The situation turned 
severe when Russia started its intervention in Ukraine. The situation was challenging with regard to military (whose 
examination is outside of the scope of this study), but it also concerned the civilian parts of the security system, the 
minister of interior and the chief of security service also having left Ukraine.  
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weapon rising. Some interviewees refer to the emerging of a black market for weapons. Several 
interviewees argue that crime is changing more difficult to address by the police, and therefore the 
specialization of police forces is considered necessary. Some old types of crime are found related to 
the Soviet past, such as crimes related to land ownership. With regard to the development of the level 
of crime, the interviewees consider comparing statistics challenging, because the data originating 
from past regimes can be considered to be manipulated.  
 
Fourthly, some interviewees note emigration posing risks to the society of Ukraine. According to 
them, Ukrainians move abroad to seek for better opportunities, such as work, and because of the 
perceived instability and uncertainty, and the armed conflict. For many Ukrainians, moving abroad 
is a temporary decision, the objective being to return back, the interviewees estimate. Some 
interviewees find emigration problematic, referring to the need for skilled and educated Ukrainians 
in building the state. It is perceived unfair that not all Ukrainians participate in the development and 
reform of the country. However, some interviewees indicate that they themselves also have lived 
abroad, and some also attach positive descriptions to the phenomenon: one mentions that Ukrainians 
abroad go to embassies to vote in the Ukrainian elections, which marks an act of responsibility 
towards the country. 
 
It’s very interesting that I’m go to the Poland or to Spain, and you guys should build the state here and 
meantime I’ll be in Spain, live normal life, you know, you will do this dirty job, you will clean the house, and 
the house will be cleaned, new and renovated, all good systems inside, I will return back, because this is our 
joint house. (Data sample 2.) 
 
 
Corruption and other vulnerabilities inside the Civilian Security Sector 
Now that risks internal to the society have been covered, this section presents risks that the 
interviewees perceive as internal to the civilian security sector of Ukraine. Commencing with 
corruption, one of the key topics that rose up in the interviews, the analysis then moves on to other 
risks or vulnerabilities identified by the interviewees. Finally, this section also covers human rights 
violations committed by the CSS, as those were also brought up by the interviewees as a vulnerability 
or a risk that is located inside the CSS of Ukraine. Yet again it is worth noting that some risks could 
have been categorized also differently: for example, corruption could have been discussed also as a 
part of risks internal to the society, but it is covered here because the interviewees primarily discussed 
it as a risk inside the CSS. 
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Corruption 
The interviewees are coherent in portraying corruption as one of the most relevant internal risks to 
the society of Ukraine. Within the CSS, corruption is perceived rampant. The interviewees portray 
corruption both as a risk against which the society should show resilience (the ability to change) and 
as a risk risking resilience, it being a barrier to progress. Corruption is perceived to directly weaken 
the society by decreasing the rule of law in the society. Corruption is also found to decrease the ability 
of Ukraine and its CSS to develop and implement reforms. Moreover, the interviewees believe 
corruption to make analyzing and managing of other risks ineffective. Consequently, the question of 
corruption is perceived crucial with regard to resilience: the interviews suggest that corruption does 
not only pose a threat to the society that could be tackled by being resilient, but that it also cripples 
the resilience of the society. 
 
It [corruption] is ingrained in every part of society. […] We could perhaps say that it's a form of governance. 
Or system within a system. […] Perhaps, a corrupt system can also be stable. […] But in the end, a corrupt 
system of governance can never be as stable as one that is transparent and accountable. (Data sample 3.) 
 
As the data sample illustrates, corruption in Ukraine is perceived as an extensive phenomenon having 
a broad negative effect on the society. It is perceived to constitute a system parallel to the legal system, 
a system that follows the logic of corruption instead of the rule of law. Transparency and 
accountability are found as opposites to corruption: a system that is corrupted is not transparent and 
does not support accountability. Furthermore, corruption is perceived to have a negative effect on the 
stability of a system. Why it is so, is explained by the interviewees by the inability of a corrupt system 
to reform and adapt, as well as by the inability of a corrupt system to fulfill the demands of the citizens 
in the long term. What appears important in the interview data, a corrupt system is found incapable 
of holding government officials accountable for the violations of the citizens’ rights. Several 
interviewees argue that the lack of trust on state officials is a result of corruption: due to corruption, 
citizens cannot trust to be protected, neither to get justice. 
 
The types or manifestations of corruption rising from the interviews include, among others, bribing 
in various forms and at all levels of the society, state officials making decisions based on personal 
benefit or other illegal basis, state officials favoring relatives or other persons on illegal and non-
transparent grounds, illegal reasons behind performing or not performing operations such as arrests 
and investigations, illegal influencers in legal procedures, and the appointments of state officials on 
illegal or non-transparent basis. The interviewees identify three major reasons behind the corruption 
in the CSS. Firstly, corruption within the CSS is perceived to originate from the salary level of the 
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police officers: the salary, many referring it being approximately three hundred US Dollars per month, 
is perceived insufficient for a decent standard of living, especially in Kyiv. The lack of good quality 
public services, such as health and social care, are found to reinforce the negative effect of low level 
salaries. Secondly, “culture” is brought up as a reason for corruption to prevail. Several interviewees 
describe how new police officers learn the tradition of corruption from older officers, a cycle that 
appears difficult to stop. Similar culture is found to prevail outside the CSS: citizens also are used to 
the corruption, official matters proceeding with more success by a bribe. Also “Soviet heritage” is 
referred to as an explanation of corruption. Thirdly, some interviewees note corruption to explain 
corruption: the corruption in the judicial system is found to protect the corruption within LEA, and 
the corruption within the judicial system is believed to continue due to the corruption in the anti-
corruption bodies and on the political level. 
 
The interviewees have varying views on how corruption should be addressed. Some argue that it is 
the high level political corruption that endangers the society the most and should be tackled first, 
whereas others suggest focusing efforts at the grass roots, to the daily encounters of the citizens and 
the police, as that is more likely to succeed. It is criticized that citizens blame the state officials for 
being corrupted, but do not take the responsibility for fighting corruption in their daily lives rather 
continuing to bribe the police and other state officials to personal gain. Similarly, the police officers 
are demanded to take more responsibility over the anti-corruption agenda. In general, the fight against 
corruption evokes frustration amongst the interviewees, many finding the results disappointing. 
Efforts to root off political level corruption are found especially unsuccessful, and that failure is 
strongly condemned by many interviewees: having corrupted state-tops after the Euromaidan appears 
intolerable to them. 
 
Finally, as one of the negative impacts of corruption, the interviewees asses citizens’ lack of trust in 
the corrupt CSS to be a severe threat to the society. Lack of trust in the security system is feared to 
lead to the developing of alternative systems of security, such a scenario appearing risky. Citizens 
leaning on alternatives to state provided security is also perceived as a “death blow” to the legal 
system. Thus, a risk of a negative cycle is identified.  
 
The whole rule of law chain is fully, fully a bluff. And when no-one trusts it, no-one uses it. When no-one 
uses it, it will never become sustainable, so it’s all fluff. They know how to say the right words, they got 
human rights and this and that, but the […] letter of the law never comes true in practical acts. […] It goes 
to every place, it goes to courts, so even if that one police officer did his job well, even took the papers to the 
prosecutor, so still, the cases just disappear. (Data sample 4.) 
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Other vulnerabilities inside the CSS 
The analysis now dives into other risks and vulnerabilities that the interviewees brought up as internal 
to the CSS and decreasing its capability to build resilience in the Ukrainian society.  
 
To begin with, inadequate training is identified by several interviewees as one major negative factor 
decreasing the capabilities of the CSS to positively support the resilience of the society. In general, 
the education of police officers is found to be too short, too impractical and lacking important parts, 
such as practical training on human rights and means of interrogation. The interviewees believe 
inadequate training to make the rooting off old, problematic traditions difficult. On the other hand, 
the old traditions are found to decrease the impact of training. The lack of proper training is also 
believed to increase the use of illegal means by the police in order to patch the lack of capabilities: if 
the police are not taught how to collect evidence by legal means, they use illegal means, such as 
torture, the interviewees note. The insufficient training of new police officers is perceived particularly 
negatively: the interviewees argue that new officers stepping in duty should represent the potential 
for change, but inadequate training decreases their ability to support the reform. Some interviewees 
find the two parallel systems of education21 to create problems, such as incoherence, clashes of 
interest and a fight for funds. 
 
Secondly, many interviewees identify the working conditions of LEA problematic, decreasing their 
capabilities to support the resilience of the society. According to the interviewees, the police 
institution is based on an old system of benefits and punishments, which makes it lucrative for officers 
to stay passive, only follow direct orders, and not to show resistance against traditions, such as 
corruption. Police officers are portrayed “powerless” under the pressure of leaders, the hierarchic 
structure and the corrupted culture. Moreover, several interviewees raise the issue of a lacking social 
safety-net for the police: insurances and public services, such as social security and health care 
remaining non-existent, police officers cannot afford taking risks, such as getting injured or fired. 
Instead, the conditions that are marked with uncertainty over security, income, or health of self and 
family, decrease the capacity of the police officers to initiate action and perform operations that are 
difficult or include risk, the interviewees explain. Uncertainty over economic survival is also found 
to explain why the police accept bribes, why they use illegal means to gain or maintain professional 
positions, why problematic traditions are not collectively fought against inside the institution, and 
                                                     
21 The interviewees explain that police training in Ukraine is organized through two channels: MoIA has managed 
university training for police officers for decades, but a couple of years ago, an alternative channel of police education, 
the Police Academy, was established to offer shorter and more practical training of police officers. 
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also why the police is seen to use excessive force. Some note that during the Soviet time, there was a 
social safety net to a certain degree, but it now has disappeared. One interviewee said that before, 
police officers were entitled to certain benefits such as flats, cars and a better pension, but now that 
many of these benefits have been withdrawn, motivation to work for the institution has decreased. 
 
No one can rely on the safety net of the society, the police neither, [...] they kind of cannot afford getting 
injured. There are no workers unions, no insurances, no social welfare to count on. (Data sample 5.) 
 
Thirdly, the general understanding22 of the main objective of the police is considered outdated and 
harmful to the society. According to many interviewees, the police is perceived as the “force” or the 
representative of state that primarily has to execute control over the society and citizens – whereas it 
should rather be considered representing the society and to protect the citizens and their rights.  
 
In Ukraine, people are often denied their basic rights […] And it has often to do with the perception of the 
state. […] Here the state in itself is perceived as something valuable, and that the citizens, should protect the 
state, and that the rights of the citizens can be sacrified to protect the state. (Data sample 6.) 
 
Some interviewees note that the CSS lacks “client oriented approach”: citizens are perceived as 
potential criminals that are in need of control and supervision. Some change in attitudes is perceived 
to have realized in the reforms: for example, the establishment of service centers of MoIA is 
considered as an indicator of a more “client oriented approach”.  
 
The interviewees also point to problems concerning the role of police within the rule of law or 
criminal justice chain. Police is perceived to too often take the role of a judge, which is actualized, 
for example, in the excessive use of force against arrested persons that the police treats as convicted 
criminals. The interviewees note police passivity in some cases being a part of the same phenomenon, 
the police deciding that certain crimes do not need to be investigated and certain persons not 
protected. The role taken by individual policemen is also perceived problematic by some 
interviewees. Police officers are perceived to “just” wait for orders and take little responsibility 
themselves. This is considered to lead to a harmful passivity in the protection of the citizens and to 
hinder the reform of the police institution. One interviewee referred to these problems as the police 
not understanding what role it should play with regard to resilience. Legislation is found to partly 
explain the passivity of the officers: its design is so detailed that it does not encourage or even enable 
taking responsibility, some interviewees note. 
                                                     
22 Mostly the interviewees refer to police staff having these perceptions of the institution, but some also say it is the 
general attitude or understanding in the society about the CSS. 
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Fourthly, the interviewees describe a set of problems related to internal conflicts, politicization, lack 
of coordination and the delineation of powers within the CSS to decrease its operability. According 
to the interviewees, there is severe lack of trust between some CSS institutions, cases of open mistrust 
and conflicts being reported, concerning, for example the MoIA, PO, SBU, NPU, anti-corruption 
bodies and the police education institutions. Conflicts inside the AC-structure are found to torpedo 
the common goal of fighting against corruption. Many interviewees refer to the instrumentalization 
of state bodies for political competition. 
 
Fifthly, structural, systematic impunity is found to decrease the capability of the CSS to positively 
support the resilience of the society. Several interviewees report an unacceptable degree of impunity 
to prevail both for the crimes committed by the CSS and for the crimes of citizens. Impunity is found 
to result from intertwined problems in several parts of the criminal justice chain, problems being 
identified in criminal investigations, prosecution, courts and in the execution of penalties. Many 
interviewees note the criminal investigation function of the police to be outdated and in the need of 
reforms.23 Bringing perpetrators accountable is found especially difficult in “high profile cases” and 
if the perpetrators are state officials, such as the police obeying a command originating from the 
political level. According to the interviewees, typical victims that lack justice are civil activists, 
members of minorities, such as the Roma people, or journalists. Implications of impunity are believed 
to be various, including the decreasing trust of the citizens in the state, the risk of alternative systems 
of justice emerging, societal tensions increasing and other states condemning the government of 
Ukraine. One interviewee argued that impunity on journalist attacks has led to a decreased interest in 
journalist reporting on certain issues, such as crimes committed by the SBU. 
 
Sixthly, lack of trust between citizens and the CSS is found to prevent the effective operation of the 
CSS. Many interviewees note trust of Ukrainians in state institutions, the CSS in specific, to be 
lacking. In the interviewees’ experience, this is demonstrated, for example, in the continuing protests, 
Ukrainians moving out of Ukraine and the general advise of Ukrainians to “always run away from 
the police”. Many interviewees portray the trust of citizens in the state institutions, the police in 
specific, vital for the state and the society to function effectively. Trust is found linked to social 
cohesion and long-term stability. Especially the CSS and the CSO should trust more on each other in 
                                                     
23 As a specific problem was mentioned the failure to categorize crimes. Several interviewees referred to inability of police 
to differentiate between hate crimes and other crimes. One interviewee argued that also differentiation between 
intended and not intended crimes is insufficient, as well as identification of conflict related cases and discrimination cases. 
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order to cooperate effectively, the interviewees suggest. However, continuing of the problematic 
traditions in the CSS is found to make gaining more trust difficult, the vigorous cycle of losing trust 
being reinforced. 
 
Seventhly, particular challenges are associated with the judicial part of the CSS, decreasing 
operability of the CSS in general. According to the interviewees, Ukrainians have a low level of trust 
in their justice system. The lowest levels of courts, to which most citizens apply to, have not been 
reformed, though the reform is considered necessary, the interviewees report. Corruption and bribing 
are found prevalent, and practitioners such as judges and prosecutors non-independent and 
unprofessional. Prosecution is found to suffer from corruption, political biases and the lack of 
competence. Judges are described to work under intense pressure and influencing coming from the 
political sphere, such as members of the parliament, and from the prosecutor. The interviewees 
mention also extreme right wing groups to participate in court hearings, increasing the pressure on 
judges. Procedural violations are found typical, delineation of power not functioning in practice, the 
appealing system being “fake”, and illegal tactics popular, including purposeful expiration of appeal 
times and prosecutors not showing up in proceedings in which decisions cannot be made without their 
presence. Several interviewees raise the issue of a wide use of pre-trial detentions, courts accepting 
requests on those without consideration, and appealing against the decisions appearing pointless. The 
interviewees being unanimous in that problematic, illegal and arbitrary practices prevail, some 
perceive the challenges with courts and prosecution to constitute one of the greatest risk to the CSS 
of Ukraine. The problems are found to foster impunity, to endanger the right to fair trial and effective 
remedy, and to decrease the trust of citizens in the state. 
 
Finally, several interviewees note risks to increase where the vulnerabilities and threats are 
intertwined. The risks related to new types of crime and the black market for weapons are feared to 
have combined effects with the strengthening of extreme groups and internal tensions, as well as with 
the insufficient standards of investigation by the police. The poor performance of police is feared to 
provoke more crime. Certain political events are perceived to multiply the risks: for example, the year 
2019 with the elections, the increasing critical discourse and societal dialogue, the growing amount 
of public gatherings, the journalistic investigations, the political publications and the accelerating 
tensions on all political levels was interpreted to include a multitude of risks for Ukraine.  
 
Fear of repetition of the 2013–2014 revolution is one example of intertwined risks brought up by 
several interviewees. The mistrust of citizens and the CSO in the police, the inadequate capabilities 
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of the CSS, the strengthening of extreme groups and the rising number of weapons were said to raise 
a concern that next revolution could be even more violent than the Euromaidan. New revolution 
appears as a risk also because the recovery from the past revolution is still found ongoing. The 
interviewees report that, due to the Euromaidan, the relationship between the LEA and the CSO still 
remains cautious, and local authorities still systematically deny permissions to hold assemblies, 
fearing of what could go wrong. LEA, instead, takes too little action to protect the demonstrators, 
fearing of using excessive force, the interviewees describe. 
 
Demonstrations.. for me it's a question. They have war experience, which they didn't have before, maybe half 
a million of people who […] know what weapon is, and taking into account the increasing illegal weapon 
possession in Ukraine, such you know, attempts of the new President to improve relations with Russia could 
cause a new Maidan, and which would be much more, how to say, aggressive, let's say, than it was before. 
(Data sample 7.) 
 
Human rights violations in the Civilian Security Sector 
Related to many of the identified problems within the CSS structure and practices, human rights 
violations constitute one main topic that was brought up by most interviewees as a risk inside the 
CSS that hinders its positive role-taking with regard to resilience in Ukraine. This section delves into 
how human right violations committed by the CSS officials are interpreted by the interviewees.  
 
If once the person go to the hands of the law enforcements, still, you have a very low chance to be protected. 
And that’s why the people don’t trust. (Data sample 8.) 
 
The interviewees appear unanimous in that human rights violations and procedural violations take 
place within the CSS of Ukraine. Remaining partly ambiguous about in which processes the 
violations occur, certain problematic areas are, however, identified more explicitly. Firstly, several 
interviewees note the violations to typically relate to police work in between the arrest of a person 
and official entrance of that person into the criminal justice chain in the form of opening a criminal 
case. Time in between appears often prolonged and dangerous for the arrested person. Secondly, 
“closed places” are in general perceived connected to these violations, closed places including police 
stations, prisons, colonies, psychiatric institutions and other facilities of police custody. Impunity is 
said to prevail for events that take place inside. Thirdly, several interviewees argue that operations 
that involve the Security Service of Ukraine, SBU, typically contain risks. The interviews picture the 
SBU using significant power in the society. The SBU is described to be largely closed from civic 
monitoring, and not reformed as part of the reform movement. The interviewees consider both the 
closeness and the unreformedness of the SBU to entail risks to the society. However, reforming the 
institution is found difficult in the circumstances of the armed conflict. Some interviewees perceive 
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the problems in the SBU so severe that they call it the greatest risk to the Ukrainian society or the 
vulnerability of the CSS.24  
 
As the most severe manifestation of these violations appears to be the ill-treatment and torture 
committed by the CSS officials. These phenomena are mentioned in most of the interviews, 
interviewees describing physical, psychological and “moral” violence to take place under “state 
responsibility”. The extent of the violence appearing difficult to assess, the interviewees appear rather 
unanimous in that ill-treatment and torture take place. Ill-treatment and torture are described to 
typically take place in “closed places” of police custody and detention, often linked to criminal 
investigation, interrogation and the SBU. However, also police interventions in public, such as the 
control of protests and “mundane arrests” are said to sometimes involve elements of ill-treatment, 
such as exaggerated use of force, kicking and beating of suspects, as well as unnecessary use of 
“special equipment”. Some interviewees argue that specific concerns relate to the human rights of 
persons living in the territories occupied by armed groups. Some interviewees note that the Ukrainian 
CSS has particular power on persons coming from the occupied territories, and especially persons 
suspected of terrorism and persons that are believed to have participated in separatist operations are 
found as typical victims of torture and ill-treatment. 
 
Being assessed as lesser crime than the human rights violations, some interviewees also bring up 
violations of procedural rights by the CSS. Such violations include the police not following the 
procedural code for the arrest or detention in a timely manner, and not reporting cases timely to the 
“free legal aid center”. Some also mention failures in the investigation procedures. One interviewee 
goes as far as to argue that if a person is arrested by the police, in eighty percent of the cases, 
procedural rights of that person will be violated.  
 
The interviews provide several explanations for the violations in the CSS. Impunity arises as the 
major explanation: police officers are not held accountable for violating the rights of the citizens, and 
thus the problematic practices can continue. Several interviewees argue violations to continue 
because the personnel of the police was not changed after the revolution, some finding the CSS 
leadership to have failed. The training of the police is said to upkeep the problematic traditions, also 
culture and attitudes within the CSS being found to fuel violations. It is argued that once a police 
                                                     
24 In addition to human rights violations, many other problematic practices are associated with the SBU. The SBU is 
claimed to perform activities that are not legal or related to its mandate, one such area being pressuring businesses, 
especially the IT industry. Concerns relate also to powers that the SBU uses on asylum seekers and immigrants. 
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officer detains a suspect, it is typical for the police as well as for the public to perceive that person as 
the “bad guy” thereafter, lesser human rights and freedoms being attached to that person. Several 
interviewees note the police acting as a judge and thus overstepping its role in the criminal justice 
chain. The culture within the CSS is described to be force oriented, also the surrounding society being 
perceived to respect force and strength. Furthermore, some interviewees refer to the communist past 
of Ukraine as an explanation for human rights violations: the police that got used to operating 
according to the Soviet traditions is explained to face challenges in adopting Western ways of work. 
Several interviewees report the police to insists that it cannot give up torture and ill-treatment, because 
the techniques are needed for example in order to gain information. Such need was, however, 
disagreed by all interviewees. 
 
In addition, the current conflict is offered as an explanation for the CSS violations.25 According to 
some interviewees, unofficial ‘rights’ of the CSS, especially of the SBU, grew when the conflict 
started, a network of state bodies securing the illegal operations. One interviewee noted that no state 
body intervened when allegations of torture by the SBU arose: according to the interviewee, “it was 
fully covered by everyone”. However, several interviewees note that the ill-treatment and torture 
related to the conflict has now decreased as the conflict has cooled down.  
 
Interviewees give various meanings and draw several conclusions with regard to the violations of 
human rights and procedural rights by the CSS. Firstly, the violations committed by the CSS are 
found to decrease the value and the positive impact of the CSS in the Ukrainian society. Violations 
are believed to make the CSS more of a controversial actor and a worse servant to the Ukrainian 
society. Second, the violations are found to damage the relationship of the citizens and the state. Trust 
of citizens in the police is seen to suffer, the mistrust being perceived risky for the society in general. 
Several interviewees find the violations particularly unacceptable after the Euromaidan, as the 
violations are feared to endanger the recovery of the society from the negative experience. Third, 
referring to the “European standards” or the “international standards”, many interviewees note that 
the CSS of Ukraine does not meet the standards that CSSs in many other states do. 
 
In addition to committing violations itself, the CSS is found not to protect citizens from the attacks 
of other citizens effectively enough. According to several interviewees, LEA in Ukraine is passive 
and unsystematic in protecting citizens from attacks that violate their human rights, such as the right 
                                                     
25 Importantly, however, none of the interviewees suggests to accept human rights violations despite the explanation. 
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to protection, right to peaceful assembly and the freedoms of speech, belief and religion. In a typical 
example given by the interviewees, extreme right wing group members attack a demonstration, and 
the police efforts to prevent and investigate the crimes are found inadequate. The interviewees note 
that certain groups are attacked in particular, and are yet poorly protected by the police. Groups that 
are mentioned to be systematically attacked include minorities, certain ethnic and religious groups, 
the LGBT community, the Roma people, civil activists and journalists. “Right wing groups” or 
“extreme groups” are often found as the perpetrators, but many interviewees emphasize the role of 
the police enabling the attacks by not preventing or investigating the crimes. It is a central message 
rising from the interviews that authorities do not do enough to prevent the attacks and to hold the 
perpetrators accountable. 
 
Internal risks: Discussion 
Now that both the risks identified as internal to the society of Ukraine as well as risks identified as 
internal to the CSS have been presented, characteristics of those should be discussed in the light of 
previous research.  
 
To begin with, the analysis demonstrates variety in what are perceived as “internal risks” to the 
Ukrainian society and the CSS. Whereas the strengthening of extreme groups and the emerging of 
new forms of crime represent somewhat archetypal risks against which the CSS could build resilience 
for, corruption, inadequate training and discouraging working conditions of police officers, as well 
as the impunity for human rights violations, instead seem to diversify how a “risk” should be 
understood in this research. This is not surprising in the light of previous resilience literature already 
identifying chronic, possibly cumulative “slow burn” disturbances (Foster 2006, p. 13) and “chronic 
emergencies” (Dunn Cavelty et all. 2015, p. 9).  
 
The category of a risk growing wide, the relationship of a risk and resilience also develops more 
complex in this research. On the one hand, resilience certainly remains as the desirable characteristic 
of a society to adapt to risks, such as new types of crime. On the other hand, resilience is risked by 
risks, such as LEA passivity, that conceal themselves inside the system, and the adaptation to these 
risks require different resilience than against crime. Thus, this research agrees to Foster’s (2006) 
finding that resilience against different types of disturbances, to those with immediate powerful 
effects and to those of a chronic-type, require different kinds of resilience. Adaptation, however, 
seems to remain the key, namely as the common characteristic of resilience that applies to all types 
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of risks. The risk of new types of crime is addressed through the CSS developing new, specialized 
police capacities, and the risk of LEA passivity is addressed through the LEA developing more active. 
With various types of risks the role of the CSS also becomes manifold: the CSS is not only a tool for 
the society to address risks such as crime, but the CSS itself also entails risks that have to be 
addressed. 
 
Whether revolutions or civic uprisings are perceived as risks appears to be a complex issue. To the 
interviewees the Euromaidan certainly represents a shock from which the society is still recovering, 
but as it will be discussed in the next chapter, it is also given a positive meaning as it is believed to 
have led to necessary change inside the security system. In contrast, as was learnt in this chapter, new 
revolution is also feared. It represents a risk that should be diminished through reconstructing a 
positive relationship between the CSS and the CSO, and the police and the citizens. Previous research 
recognizes the fear of revolution in Ukraine: for example Lebrun (2018, p. 10) notes that EU actors 
in Ukraine are concerned that replication of the Euromaidan “might not be far away”, which is 
indicated by the increased social unrest, disappointment on the reform of the crowd-control police 
and impunity over Euromaidan violence. Our analysis adds the issue of proliferation of arms and the 
insufficient rehabilitation of soldiers of the current war to the list of worrisome factors. On the other 
hand, however, Marat (2018) leads us to ask, whether the fear of another revolution could be observed 
as a positive factor from a resilience perspective, as it forces the state to keep on developing policing 
acceptable by the public. Our analysis supports this finding: fear of social unrest at least should 
motivate the CSS to develop a role less contradictory in the society. 
 
Some of the internal risks identified by the interviewees appear particularly complex in how they are 
found to threaten the Ukrainian society. Corruption and impunity serving as examples, they are 
portrayed as self-sustaining problems that reinforce other risks and question the positive role of the 
CSS in building the resilience of the society. Corruption itself is found as an obstacle to anti-
corruption efforts, but also to any other efforts of the society to transform and develop. Similarly, 
impunity is found to enable the CSS to continue illegal practices such as torture and ill-treatment. 
Both corruption and impunity are found to damage the state–society relationship and to make CSS’s 
role as a protector of the resilience of the society complicated. Similarly, the lack of protection of 
citizens is perceived to increase the risk of unofficial security systems being born, citizens having to 
lean on illegal means to secure themselves, the outcome of which is the crumbling of the role of the 
CSS as a positive force in the society. Remaining of the risks is perceived as an indicator of low 
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resilience of the CSS: the Euromaidan demanded the system to change, and yet these problems still 
prevail, which marks the poor capability of the CSS to adapt to needs of the society.  
 
Whereas the lack of equipment would not prevent bringing in new equipment, the lack of 
accountability and legality appears to prevent introducing the latter two into the system. Juncos’ 
(2018) work on complex problems helps with imagining the consequences of the complexity to 
resilience: he argues that the complex problems that demanded the establishing of resilience in the 
first place can undermine the implementation of it, the problems being too complex. Also what 
Manyena and Gordon (2015) write about social capital offers some explanations: if we adopt the 
understanding of social capital as as a two edged sword, corruption and impunity can be seen as the 
negative implication of the "closely knit community" (ibid., p. 46) in Ukraine, kinships, friendships 
and political links on occasions overruling legality and justice. How the interviewees portray the CSS 
resisting change (such as giving up corruption) appears linked to both complexity and tight social 
structures. On the one hand, reforms that are set by legislation are found not to cascade down in the 
CSS structure because the leadership fails to push the reforms through the chain of command. On the 
other hand, reforms that are set through a new kind of police training, for example, or that start to 
grow through police officers initiating new ways of work, die down because of the lack of support 
from above, the vertical channel thus not allowing change to grow from below either.  
 
In general, the complex risks are, however, framed as risks that could be addressed by the CSS or the 
Ukrainian society through being more resilient. Even though the risks like corruption and impunity 
are found to decrease resilience, developing more resilience is suggested: according to the 
interviewees, internal means and measures have been taken and could be taken in order for the system 
to transform and abandon practices that the society cannot accept and that make it more vulnerable. 
Similarly, the proliferation of arms, veterans joining extreme groups and new types of crime, namely 
the side effects of the armed conflict, are framed as risks that can be coped with resilience. It seems 
that “being resilient” functions with the effects of the armed conflict but not with the conflict itself: 
decisions can be made, strategies developed and new capacities learnt and applied in order to mitigate 
these risks. 
 
What are here identified as risks from a resilience perspective, would possibly not be categorized as 
risks from a defence or stability perspective. Police protecting the state, in practice not securing civic 
activists or demonstrations, is perceived as a risk by the interviewees, but would not possibly 
constitute a risk in defence- or stability-oriented research. Police not protecting demonstrators could 
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be interpreted just as prioritizing “stable” over “resilient”: the stabilization approach, typically 
prioritizes formal state institutions over other processes of the system (Manyena & Gordon 2015). In 
resilience thinking securing the work of those who support positive adaptation of the system would 
be considered as a priority. As a major example of this, risks associated with the SBU appear non-
acceptable if viewed from a resilience perspective: the resilience approach does not offer much basis 
for legitimating why the SBU allegedly remains free from civic monitoring and closed off to the CSO, 
or why it is allowed to execute exceptional power in the society despite being associated with illegal 
operations, including violations of human rights. The reform agenda having started to root out such 
practices from other CSS institutions, based on the interviews, the SBU appears as an exception for 
which the idea of CSS supporting societal resilience through protecting citizens still is dominated by 
other principles of survival. That the SBU reportedly remains unreformed and employs means 
forbidden from other CSS institutions is explained by the armed conflict and the acute security threats, 
to which the SBU needs to concentrate instead of reforming. Yet again, it seems that resilience 
thinking appears the weakest when it comes to the acute threats to national sovereignty: a resilience-
oriented reform is ongoing in the CSS in other areas except those that relate to the current armed 
conflict.  
 
There seems to be a temporal element in the emergence of resilience and defence-oriented discourses. 
Though the SBU is found to remain unreformed and closed and to execute operations at the expense 
of human rights, it is perceived as a risk to some degree tolerable because of the short time span 
expected: the interviewees often note that reforms will start when the war ends (some saying those 
could even be started now as the conflict no longer is as active). Defence-motivated practices seem 
to be located on a shorter timeline, whereas the resilience-legitimated processes are believed to bring 
stability in the long term, as the trust between the society and the CSS grows. This corresponds to 
Corry’s (2014) observation that defence and resilience thinking differ in their planning-span, defence-
oriented strategies preferring short-term contingency, resilience thinking evoking more long-term 
planning. What appears interesting in this regard is the finding that long-term planning is perceived 
impossible or difficult because of the acute threat coming from Russia (in the previous chapter). 
Based on this it appears redundant to suggest replacing the short-span defence plans with long-term 
resilience planning, as the threat as acute as it is perceived in Ukraine makes long-term planning 
impossible.  
 
Corry’s (2014) argument that defence thinking often builds on a we–them positioning in comparison 
to the resilience thinking that entails a more complex understanding of risks, appears interesting with 
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regard to the exceptional rights granted to the CSS in conflict related cases. When speaking about 
human rights violations and procedural violations, some interviewees noted that these cases mostly 
occur near to or within the territories not controlled by the government (CSS still operating there), or 
that those violations mostly take place in cases related to terrorism. In other words, the rights of 
ordinary Ukrainians were found rarely violated in these cases. Suspects of terrorism, foreign 
combatants or persons linked to the other side of the conflict were believed to suffer from these 
operations. Such notions could be interpreted in a way that CSS applying the new standards, such as 
respect for the human rights, is not perceived as important when it is “them”, not “us”, in question. 
Such perception was not, however, stated in the interviews; at the most, it was implicitly conveyed 
in certain parts of the data, for example through noting that it was only the terrorism suspects tortured, 
or that certain forced disappearings (by the SBU) only occurred behind the contact line. Importantly, 
also an alternative meaning could be given to these comments: those could be interpreted to convey 
a message that respecting the human rights is extremely difficult in circumstances of an armed 
conflict, and this is why violations take place in conflict related cases. Also, importantly, several 
interviewees emphasize the exactly opposite. They noted, for example, that it is not the duty of CSS 
staff to judge whether human rights violations are needed. 
 
Many of the interviewees’ interpretations on the internal risks and how those should be coped with 
entail elements of the neoliberal version of resilience thinking. Especially the neoliberal idea of 
responsibility shifting from the state to citizens or communities appears common, and the 
interviewees suggest many areas in which Ukrainian citizens should take more responsibility: for 
example, the citizens should not bribe police officers, and they should vote wiser. In these statements, 
corruption turns into an issue of citizen behavior, and the risk of a new regime stopping reforms 
becomes an issue of voter behavior. Interestingly, Rose’s work (1995) offered similar views on the 
responsibility of individual Ukrainians for their society: he found “resilience factors” in practices 
such as citizens “tightening their belts” and consuming less or of poorer quality, these tactics 
representing a positive adaptation to hard times. In the interview data of this research, not so many 
resilience factors at the citizen-level were identified, but they were loudly called for.  
 
Similar logic of responsibilization emerges in statements highlighting the responsibility of the staff 
members of LEA: several interviewees found it crucial that the staff of LEA would take more 
responsibility and show pro-activity in protecting the citizens and constructing good police-citizen 
relations. At the same time, changing risky practices inside the CSS from below is perceived difficult: 
police officers have to follow the law and orders, and their working conditions do not encourage 
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taking risks or challenging traditions of the system. Thus, police are required to take more 
responsibility over the protection of citizens, even though the material conditions do not enable the 
police officers to take more risks – indeed, there is a link between security and prosperity as identified 
by Behm (2010). The problem has been recognized also in previous literature (see e. g. Chandler & 
Reid 2016) on neoliberal responsibilization: neoliberal resilience thinking addresses the societal 
security issues at a level of individual’s capacities, leaving aside the material level. The perceived 
responsibility of professionals of the CSS in constructing the resilience of the society is also visible 
in the critical views of some of the interviewees on emigration: it is perceived important that 
Ukrainian CSS staff and experts stay in Ukraine and participate in pushing the reforms.  
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How the CSS contributes to the resilience of the Ukrainian society 
The previous chapters established the general security framework in which the CSS operates in 
Ukraine, namely the risks that the CSS encounters inside and outside the society and within its own 
structures. This chapter specifically answers the question of how – by which means and to what extent 
– the CSS contributes to resilience of the society in those circumstances, based on the interviewees’ 
experience. The chapter covers processes and factors inside the CSS that the interviewees perceive 
to be positive from a resilience perspective. It also identifies resilience factors on the borderland 
between the CSS and the society, namely presents how resilience is found to be produced in the 
interaction between the CSS and the society, and how the society is believed to support positive role 
taking by the CSS. 
 
To begin the chapter with, a key general finding is presented: the broad CSS reform movement in 
Ukraine is perceived as a building-block, demonstration, and an indicator of resilience. When asked 
about resilience factors, the interviewees almost always answered by telling about reforms, either 
within the CSS or in general in the society. This can be interpreted either that reforms are “resilience” 
or “resilience factors” or that the outcome of the reforms makes Ukraine more resilient. Many reflect 
the reforms as a recovery from the 2013–2014 crisis between the state and the society, some 
perceiving the reforms as the CSS adapting to the new normal set by the demonstrators. However, 
reforming the state is not found new to Ukraine. Instead, the interviewees describe Ukraine to have 
conducted a lot of reforms and experienced deep structural changes also in the past: for example, just 
before the Euromaidan, a set of reforms was carried out, for example, in the MoIA. However, many 
of the past reforms are found artificial or cosmetic. Several interviewees believe the current reform 
agenda to be different: according to them, the CSS is now actually changing for the better of the 
society, and the reforms are hoped to be sustainable.  
 
Institutions and processes that have recently been reformed are in the first place considered to add to 
the resilience of Ukraine, unreformed institutions representing vulnerabilities in the system. As a 
related trend, many interviewees find institutions and processes that represent the European or 
international standards to add to resilience of Ukraine, Soviet traditions in institutions often 
representing challenges or risks to them. However, also opposite examples are given, for example the 
Soviet tradition of detailed law writing being found suitable for Ukraine and positive for the resilience 
of the society. Some interviewees find the Euromaidan to have fueled positive development in the 
society from a resilience perspective. However, not everyone mentions Euromaidan as a relevant 
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event with regard to resilience and the CSS. Those who mention the Euromaidan, usually portray it 
as an impulse or a turning point that launched the positive development within the CSS, as well as as 
a changemaker in attitudes within the society in general.  
 
It’s the most important thing that now, in 2019, to compare with 2013, it huge step forward in law 
enforcement agencies, because, great a lot we made mistakes, but we have this progress that we see. (Data 
sample 9.) 
 
Particular CSS institutions and practices building resilience 
The overall assessment on the development of the role of the CSS in the society being positive, 
particular bodies of the CSS are valued differently with regard to how they contribute to the resilience 
of the society. To review some of the particular assessments of the interviewees, the NPU is found to 
have developed positively in recent reforms and receives in general positive comments. It is 
complimented for opening up for cooperation with the CSO, for the improved crowd control ability 
and for the decreased use of force. Positive development is assessed to be due to training, new 
legislation, changes in leadership, increased number of personnel, improved risk assessment 
capabilities, better internal coordination and the new dialogue with the CSO. New patrol police (unit 
of the NPU) gains particularly positive assessments: it is described well-equipped and well-trained, 
citizens having trust in it.26   
 
The reform came with new patrol police, new suits, new cars, the guys was great. I saw when people made 
selfies with police. I can't imagine this picture before, because everyone knows, if you see police officer, run. 
[…] Citizens says hi to police officers, try to help them. That was the big step forward. (Data sample 10.)27 
 
The SBU does not gain positive assessments from the interviewees, but some express hope that new 
legislation on the SBU would be adopted soon, and that it would pave way for the opening up of the 
institution. Anti-corruption institutions gather varying assessments. In general, having the variety of 
AC-bodies in function is considered positive for the resilience of the society. However, the results of 
their work are assessed disappointing: AC-bodies are found to compete, to sometimes work against 
each other, and to sometimes protect each other from allegations. Also the politicization of the bodies 
is criticized by the interviewees. The new State Bureau of Investigations receives very positive 
                                                     
26 However, also contrasting views were expressed. One interviewee stated that “this reform (of the patrol police) 
failed, because the system ate [… (stammering)] that patrol officers. Now they takes bribes, now they tortures. […] This 
is because the head of police stations they are […] the same.” 
27 The interviewee cited here, however, assessed that negative development has taken place since the first good year 
with the patrol police. According to the them, problematic old practices have returned, gnawing away the new trust of 
citizens on the patrol police. Several other interviewees, however, found the patrol police success to have continued. 
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assessments, many hopes being attached to it with regard to the fight against corruption. Withdrawing 
the investigative function from the Prosecutor’s Office when establishing the SBI is considered 
positive by more than one of the interviewees. Also the National Anti-Corruption Bureau is 
complimented for having succeeded in adopting new ways of work. The Supreme Court receives 
positive assessments, in contrast to the first level of courts, which is reported to remain unreformed. 
New human rights bodies and civic departments inside the CSS institutions, as well as the introducing 
of new positions related to human rights in the police, are considered positive.  
 
Not discussed by all the interviewees, but what was brought up by some is the “operation of joint 
forces” (before the “anti-terroristic operation”, ATO) in the East of Ukraine. In addition to the 
military, the joint forces include parts of the CSS of Ukraine. The interviewees who brought up the 
forces, gave a positive meaning to them from a resilience perspective. The development and 
maintenance of the forces, as well as their experience and equipment, were considered as successes 
of the society in maintaining independence and security in Ukraine. However, as already mentioned, 
also risks were associated with the forces, related to human rights, for example. 
 
The interviewees portray the CSS contribution to resilience to differ also from one area of 
responsibility to another. Many interviewees find the CSS to have developed more effective in 
protecting the right of citizens to freedom of peaceful assembly, which is perceived important for the 
resilience of the society, many referring to the negative experiences of the Euromaidan. According to 
the interviewees, also public knowledge of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly has increased: 
according to the interviewees, many people now consider it a relevant right for the society. Organizing 
assemblies in Kyiv is considered rather safe, more risks being believed to remain in other places. As 
an example of the positive development, several interviewees mention the Kyiv Pride event, which 
has taken place rather peacefully in the past two years. This is found not to be due to the absence of 
potential attackers, but because of good cooperation between the organizers and the police, and 
because of the police putting “real” effort to securing the event. Having the Pride event is considered 
important from a human rights perspective, and it is interpreted as a symbol of the police becoming 
better in protecting citizens and their rights. One interviewee described the meaning of the Pride event 
as follows: “So the police moves, moves to the human rights.” 
 
Important improvement is considered to have taken place also in rooting out torture, ill-treatment and 
excessive use of force in the CSS. Some interviewees consider this to be due to training and changed 
attitudes, some note that it is because of the cooling down of the conflict. Many interviewees mention 
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Ukraine's National Preventive Mechanism as a good project, though it is also being criticized. The 
interviewees also bring up numerous CSO projects that have worked or work together with the CSS 
in order to fight torture, ill-treatment and the excessive use of force by the CSS institutions. The 
projects for example provide training that aims at increasing the effectiveness of the LEA operations 
while at the same time minimizing the risk of human rights violations. Related to the topic, some 
interviewees report on new positive development of cooperation between the SBU and certain CSO 
organizations. One interviewee interpreted the new cooperation with SBU as follows:  
 
When the society of Ukraine will see that even the most closed state authority as Security Service of Ukraine 
became more transparent and more open, the trust of the society to the system, to the Security Service, will 
go up and people will feel them more safety in their life. Not just because of the professionalism […] but also 
because the society will see and know that some of human rights activists and civil society representatives 
controlling and preventing by their presence in this process from violation of human rights. And it will do 
more trust to the state system, […] it will build more stable Ukraine for Ukrainians. (Data sample 11.) 
 
Society building the positive role of the CSS 
Indeed, as illustrated by the previous data sample, some specific resilience factors are identified where 
the society and the CSS encounter, namely in the interaction between the two. This section presents 
interviewees’ perceptions on those. 
 
One of the clearest messages rising from the interviews is that the civil society in Ukraine is important 
in building the resilience of the society, in particular as it participates in reforming and monitoring 
the practices of the CSS. The interviewees describe the CSO to be pro-active, professional, extensive 
and experienced in taking responsibility for the society. The merits of the CSO are found to include 
monitoring and reporting on human rights, launching initiatives and participating in the drafting of 
legislation, producing analysis, providing training, and creating frameworks for the citizens and LEA 
to have dialogue. CSO projects listed by the interviewees that aim to develop the CSS more effective 
and acceptable appear countless. Having such projects is considered positive as is, but the 
interviewees also expect positive outcomes to follow. It is assessed to be the past 10, 15 years during 
which the CSO has strengthened in Ukraine, some interviewees highlighting the year 2014 as the 
turning point. Whether the CSO has strengthened or lost its muscles since the Euromaidan appears 
controversial: one interviewee assesses the hype to have decreased, many others finding the CSO to 
have strengthened in the past five years. Many seem to agree that professionalism of the CSO has 
increased: according to the interviewees, ten years ago there was a gap in the level of education 
between state and CSO representatives, but the gap has disappeared.  
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The role of civil society in Ukraine is monumental. I've never seen […] a country where civil society has 
been so vibrant and so vital. And when it comes to anti-corruption, they very much set the agenda for the 
reform. When it comes to human rights, not so much the agenda setter, but very much monitoring, advocating 
and in general stocking the fires that keep the reform going. (Data sample 12.) 
 
The interviewees offer slightly varying assessments on the quality of cooperation between the CSS 
and the CSO. Dialogue and trust are found to be increasing, but significant obstacles, gaps and 
frictions are reported to remain, communication still needing improvement. Several interviewees 
remind that the CSO and the CSS have a difficult history to cope with. The non-hierarchical nature 
of the CSO is found to function poorly with CSS ways of work: according to some interviewees, 
police is not used to taking comments from the outside, only orders from above. It is assessed that 
the CSS has only recently noted the potential in the CSO, and that much of CSO resources are still 
not in full use. Some interviewees note that certain dialogue forums have existed for a long time 
already, but those have been artificial. Some interviewees find the frictions between the CSO and the 
CSS still concerning and believe the CSO to have only artificial power with regard to the CSS. 
However, the interviewees appear unanimous in that opening of the CSS for cooperation has started, 
and the difference to pre-Euromaidan time is significant.  
 
The interviewees also seem to agree that the better the cooperation develops, the better the chances 
are that the CSS can positively contribute to the resilience of the society. The value of CSO 
engagement is found to relate to different competencies of the CSO and state institutions: for example, 
one interviewee found the CSS to often know the national legislation, the CSO instead having 
knowledge on international standards. Furthermore, the dialogue is believed to prevent escalations of 
society–state-relations: many note that in 2014, there were severe problems in communication, one 
interviewee claiming poor communication between LEA and CSO as one of the reasons for the 
Euromaidan violence. How exhaustive the cooperation should develop appears a controversy: some 
interviewees demand thorough civic monitoring on all CSS activities, whereas some believe that for 
example the SBU and the CSO need to maintain certain distance. Furthermore, some interviewees 
note that the CSO being dependent on its funders, the CSS cannot share all of its information with it. 
 
Finally, many interviewees note that a change in culture and attitudes in the society has supported the 
CSS developing a more positive role in the society. The positive change is reported at many levels 
from the citizens to the top leadership of the state, the change referring to the adoption and spreading 
of ideas that support more modern role taking from the CSS. In specific, the interviewees mention 
the increasing critique at the culture of impunity, spreading calls for the respect of human rights, the 
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strengthening of a more inclusive understanding of how decisions should be made related to CSS, 
stricter attitudes towards corruption, such as on appointing relatives to official positions, and the 
increasing demands for the transparency of state institutions. Many interviewees emphasize the 
importance of new attitudes and ideas on policing, but some are, however, cautious whether the 
changes in attitudes are sustainable or lead to concrete changes in the CSS. Also the leadership of the 
state and CSS are found to play an important role in changing the culture: according to the 
interviewees, what leaders state publicly and non-publicly is reflected on many levels in the society 
and the CSS.  
 
Legislation building the positive role of the CSS 
Legislation appears as another important tool in building the CSS more supportive towards the 
resilience of the society, in the interviewees’ experience. Serving as the basis for operation of the 
CSS, and also limiting its operation, legislation is considered as the platform on which changes can 
be launched. By changing the legislation, problematic practices can be changed, new institutions and 
processes established, and principles adjusted, the interviewees believe. Sometimes being considered 
to create problems, most often interviewees portray legislation on CSS as a tool that creates safety 
and constructs resilience. The tool is in active use: new legislation is said to be drafted continuously 
in today’s Ukraine. Also the CSO participates in the drafting of legislation, because being involved 
opens doors for influence, the interviewees argue. 
 
Many pieces of legislation are mentioned in specific to contribute to the functionality of the CSS and 
to the role it serves in the society. Several interviewees mention the new regulation on the police use 
of force as an example of the meaning of legislation for the society: the regulation is considered to 
have had in practice a great impact, as well as a symbolic meaning for Ukrainians – lack of regulation 
was perceived to partly explain why the police used too much force during the Euromaidan protests. 
Similarly the outdated legislation on SBU is considered to explain why it does not serve the society 
in ways acceptable to the society. Several interviewees note that the new law on the SBU should be  
quickly adopted. According to the interviewees, examples of good new legislation include the law on 
National Police, 2015, the law on Prosecutor’s Office, 2014, and the law on the State Bureau of 
Investigations, 2016. Also the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, adopted in 2012, gained positive 
assessments. The interviewees appear consistent in indicating that the newer the law, the better it is. 
The Euromaidan appears as an important benchmark, “after Maidan legislation” being assessed 
especially positively. In addition, the more European, the better the legislation seems to appear to the 
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interviewees. Several interviewees support the Ukrainian tradition of detailed law writing. Drafting 
detailed legislation is perceived to decrease the likelihood of misusing the legislation. One 
interviewee explained that CSO also supports detailed law writing, because otherwise there would be 
a risk of “under laws” being provided fully against the idea of the original law. 
 
All these law, they adopted after Euromaidan, with some exception like State Security, but it’s a matter of 
time. And in context of some European standards and some obligations that we have, Council of Europe, this 
convention for protection of human rights and so on, they all are on the good level. (Data sample 13.) 
 
On the other hand, the continuous changing of legislation is perceived to endanger the work of the 
CSS. More than one of the interviewees argue that neither the police nor the prosecutors or judges 
are able to keep up with the continuously changing legislation. One interviewee argued some judges 
to make decisions according to the old legislation and the police officers to submit cases taking into 
account the work shifts of judges, knowing the difference in the legislation they follow.  
 
Again we have another amendment to the code of criminal procedure, and at the book stores, the book 
keepers joke that we cannot publish the codes, because the amendments so many times! (Data sample 14.) 
 
Discussion 
Finally it is time to discuss the resilience factors identified in the analysis. The interviews appear 
consistent in which factors are found to construct the ability of the CSS to produce resilience in 
Ukraine. The significance of the large reform agenda, new legislation and the new cooperation with 
the CSO, as well as the importance of the new focus of the CSS on protecting the rights of citizens 
provoke little disagreement. Carefully positive assessments are also broadly made of certain new 
institutions and of the changing of attitudes in the society and the CSS. The opening up of the 
traditionally closed institutions for public monitoring and dialogue with the society are found to 
strengthen the positive position of the CSS in the society. New norms of the police, on the use of 
force and human rights protection are found to signal the changing of the CSS to a direction more 
acceptable to the society.  
 
In general, these findings are not surprising: that reforms are perceived to increase resilience appears 
self-evident in light of resilience literature that emphasizes positive adaptation (e. g. Chandler 2012) 
as a key feature of resilience. Similarly, the emphasis on the inclusion of non-state actors in building 
the CSS appears aligned with resilience literature that emphasizes the replacing of vertical, state-
centric approaches with society-focused and horizontal perspectives (e. g. Manyena & Gordon 2015). 
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Indeed, resilience thinking, as defined by Chandler (2014) appears prominent where the interview 
data concentrates on improving the relationship between the society and the state through the CSS 
and in developing the processes of new cooperation. The findings of this research also resonate well 
with what Corry and Chandler (Corry 2014; Chandler 2013) write about resilience approach having 
the tendency to recruit the whole society into security practices, which previously had belonged to 
the responsibility area of the state. As it is learnt in this and the the previous chapter, not only the 
CSO but also individual citizens are called for to take more responsibility over fighting against 
corruption and other problematic practices in the CSS.  
 
On the other hand, reviewing findings of this and the previous chapter in the light of resilience 
literature, also some surprising elements emerge. Namely, when combining some of the identified 
risks and resilience factors, it appears characteristic to the interview data to emphasize the role of the 
formal state structures, the leadership of the CSS and the state, and the legislation, in enabling 
resilience to grow. The heads of state and the CSS are found to be in a key position in determining 
whether reforms continue and spread, and in how the CSS practices develop in relation to the hopes 
of the citizens. The emphasis on legislation is one example of the perspective atypical for resilience 
literature: the interviewees find the creation of new laws as a key tool in making the CSS more 
effective and acceptable in the eyes of the society. Engagement of the CSO and the activization of 
individual police officers being found important, many still doubt whether solid improvement of state 
structures can be achieved without top-down orders. Much of resilience literature portrays resilience 
approach as a corrective to state-centric views, and emphasizes the importance of everyday practices, 
new actors and informal institutions in creating societal change (e. g. Chandler 2014; Manyena & 
Gordon 2015; Pospisil & Besancenot 2014). This research, however, suggests that for a thorough 
change of the system, official state structures need to participate in pushing the development. This 
kind of state-centric conclusions are not, however, unheard of in the resilience studies (see e. g. 
Pospisil & Besancenot 2014). 
 
Comparing this chapter to the previous one, also internal contradictions appear. Many areas of the 
CSS that are found relevant from the resilience perspective, as “resilience factors”, also represent 
risks or vulnerabilities in the system. For example, the protection of citizens is brought up as a 
resilience factor: the increased interest of LEA to protect peaceful assemblies is perceived to construct 
resilience in Ukraine. At the same time the analysis shows that the protection of citizens is perceived 
inadequate, the police failing to prevent and investigate attacks aimed at CSO activists, for example, 
constituting a risk and decreasing the resilience of the society. The same contradiction appears in 
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many other issues, such as in the improved but still unacceptable level of human rights violations 
committed by the CSS. Similarly, the analysis refers to the improved but yet suppressing culture in 
the CSS, and to the improved but yet insufficient cooperation of the CSS and the CSO.  
 
As a conclusion, the analysis appears consistent in identifying relevant factors in resilience, but in 
many cases fails to determine if these factors are on a good level in Ukraine. In other words, this 
research succeeds in answering how the CSS can build resilience in Ukraine, in the interviewees’ 
understanding, but does not shine in assessing the performance. 
 
One of the rare clear assessments rising from the analysis is one related to reforms: Ukraine is found 
to have succeeded in launching reforms that develop the CSS more competent in building the 
resilience of the society. Reflecting the meanings given to the reform movement in the light of what 
Bourbeau (2013, p. 10) writes about temporal aspects of resilience helps to conceptualize why or how 
the reforms “are” resilience. Firstly, when the reforming of the CSS is perceived important from the 
perspective of recovering from the 2013–2014 revolution, it can be interpreted as retrospective 
resilience. That CSO and CSS develop dialogue, trust and cooperation to overcome their past friction, 
signals resilience in the past tense. Secondly, when reforming the CSS is perceived crucial from the 
perspective of adapting to the new circumstances of today, concurrent resilience can be identified. 
Concurrent resilience occurs when the CSS learns new techniques to fight against new types of crime 
and adopt modern norms of policing, such as the respect for human rights, the analysis suggests. 
Third, prospective resilience is in question when reforming the CSS is perceived essential in order to 
prevent or prepare for future disturbances. For example, risks related to the escalation of internal 
tensions are addressed through prospective resilience, the CSS developing to prevent the escalation 
or secure the society if the risks actualize. Indeed, how reforms are perceived to be resilience seems 
to fundamentally relate to the capability of the CSS to improve its operation in relation to risks that 
are in the past, today and the future. 
 
Meanings given to the Euromaidan or similar disturbances appear as an example of how risks in the 
past and the future become intertwined and how reforms are used as a tool to address both. The 
previous chapter concluded that the reoccurrence of a disturbance like the Euromaidan is perceived 
as a risk to the society, resilience therefore indicating the prevention of such a risk through reforms. 
This chapter, instead, emphasized the positive potential embedded in the past disturbance: 
Euromaidan is found to have fostered positive change in the capability of the CSS to construct the 
resilience of the Ukrainian society. Returning to the state of affairs before the Euromaidan, namely 
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the re-emergence of pre-revolution norms in the CSS, appears unacceptable, and is seen as an 
incapability of the system to adapt to the new norm that was set by the society in the Euromaidan. 
Thus, the success of the consequent reforms is found important. Finally, the analysis also detected a 
discourse emphasizing the recovery from the 2013–2014 crisis, such as the re-establishment of trust 
in the police, which can be pushed through reforms, for example. All these different Euromaidan 
discourses find reforms positive, the shock gaining mixed meanings, as could have been anticipated 
based on the work of Bourbeau (2013) for example. 
 
Often emerging in relation to the perceived risk of revolution, “trust” reoccurs in the analysis as the 
objective and justification for reforms that have taken place or that should take place in the CSS. The 
shift of thought in the CSS in favor for the protection of citizens and the new cooperation with the 
CSO are found important because they increase the trust of citizens in the CSS and the state in general. 
Similarly, more efficient criminal investigations and more independent courts are demanded by the 
interviewees (previous chapter) in order to increase the trust of citizens in the CSS and the state. 
However, what is the link between trust and resilience – why is trust repeated in a study concerning 
resilience – remains ambiguous. “Trust” being one of the trendy words in the context of expert 
discourse on CSS and Ukraine today, it could be one reason explaining the result. Alternatively it 
could be interpreted that the link between trust and resilience is so obvious that the interviewees did 
not find it necessary to elaborate. Third way of interpreting the connection could be based on the risks 
identified in the previous chapter: while not explaining how trust increases the capability of CSS to 
build resilience, the analysis instead offers explanations on how mistrust in CSS decreases that 
capability. 
 
Finally, it is surprising how small a role the security operation and other ways through which the 
armed conflict is addressed play in the analysis. The previous chapter emphasized the activity of the 
conflict, the topicality of the threat and the broad negative impact of the war to the society, but only 
a few assessments on resilience against the threat were made. Only some interviewees brought up 
how Ukraine attempts to prevent the attack by the operation of joint forces. Major part of the operation 
being military could possibly explain the minimal attention. Possibly also the mixed meanings given 
to the operation (e. g. human rights violations related) could explain its absence in the analysis. 
Finally, going back to what was found in the first general view on the resilience of Ukraine, it seems 
difficult to assess resilience against the conflict and the other risks simultaneously, these being so 
different in nature, that it could have led to the dropping of the topic from the interviews.  
 94 
On the other hand, based on Ryan’s (2015) research, all of what has been discussed about the internal 
development of the CSS could be interpreted as resilience against the armed conflict. Namely that 
Ukraine has not abandoned its pursuit for modern, Western or European standards of CSS operations 
in difficult times but yet launched and implemented the large CSS reform agenda, could be interpreted 
as resistance against the armed attack, and thus resilience. Many interviewees emphasizing how 
outstanding and important it is that Ukraine has been capable of reforming its security system during 
the armed conflict supports this interpretation. Furthermore, that the CSS has attempted to develop 
respect for human rights, even though not respecting those rights is perceived more effective in 
answering the conflict in the short term, appears as resistance to the logic of war. Learning from 
Ryan, this indicates resilience. 
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The role of international actors 
Finally, this chapter presents how the interviewees perceive the role of international actors in 
supporting the positive role of the CSS in building resilience in Ukraine. 
 
The analysis conveys a complex picture of the impact of the international community on the CSS and 
the resilience of Ukraine. On the one hand, the interviewees assess international pressure and support 
to have had positive influence on the reform of the CSS, thus adding to the resilience of the society. 
International pressure is believed to have affected positively on effectiveness and thoroughness of the 
reform movement. To a certain degree, CSS agencies are believed to have benefited from the advice 
and training that they have received from foreign experts, and many new pieces of legislation are 
believed to be of good quality because of being designed with international help. Some interviewees 
mention the signing of the association agreement with the EU as a positive development for Ukraine 
in general from a resilience perspective. Western actors are also perceived to have helped Ukraine to 
react to the Russian aggression in the East of Ukraine, material support, for example, being mentioned 
to have helped Ukraine to show resilience against the war. On the other hand, however, the 
interviewees note international actors to have conducted operations that have had harmful, useless, 
or a contradictory effect on the CSS and resilience of Ukraine. Many activities of the international 
community are considered to convey both opportunities and risks to the society.  
 
The problems with international interventions are perceived to include, firstly, the inconsistency and 
incoherency of the international efforts. According to several interviewees, assistance provided and 
advice conveyed by international actors has been polyphonic and contradictory, each international 
actor having their own short projects on issues that they perceive important at a certain time, the focus 
shifting constantly. Instead of a coherent long-term approach, international support is perceived to 
have been “just splashes of this and waves on that”, as one interviewee phrased it. The lack of 
coherency and consistency is believed to result from the large number of international actors in 
Ukraine. Some interviewees note that “sexy topics” for international support rear their head, dozens 
of organizations start their work on those, and after a couple of years, new trendy topics arrive, 
replacing the past projects even though the risks identified in the first projects have not been tackled. 
Another reason for the inconsistency and incoherency is believed to be the short-term employment 
of international staff in Ukraine. Several interviewees note that international projects are conducted 
by foreign staff that only stays a certain amount of years in Ukraine. More than one interviewee 
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pointed out that, sometimes, when an international staff member working in Ukraine leaves their 
position, projects come to a stall or finish. 
 
Second, some interviewees perceive the support from international actors to be uncertain and 
unsustainable, and thus risky for Ukraine. More than one of the interviewees note that there is a risk 
of international supporters suddenly withdrawing, and therefore the CSS should not lean on the help 
received. For example IT tools received might stop working if the international supporters give up 
their maintenance. It was also noted that “Ukraine has to take all possible help” before the 
international interest in Ukraine dies. 
 
The sexy time of Ukraine is soon over, so, the international community will find someone nicer to help. And 
they’re already finding it. So now, it is time to take all possible help, to kind of build the internal skills so 
that Ukraine will survive alone, say, in seven, eight years. (Data sample 15.) 
 
Finally, many interviewees raise the issue of international actors impacting the perceptions of 
Ukrainians about threats and risks and influencing on which reforms are initiated and prioritized in 
the CSS. The prioritizations of international actors are perceived to not always be based on the 
objective analysis of risks to the Ukrainian society, and neither on the objective assessment of the 
best ways to address those risks but on the interests of the international actors themselves. According 
to one interviewee, the result is investment of the CSS in issues determined by the international 
community, not corresponding to the needs of the Ukrainian society. For example, one interviewee 
noted that there is a huge emphasis on empowering the CSO in Ukraine, internationals perceiving the 
CSO “sexy”, and thus the Ukrainian government also having to invest in cooperation with it.  
 
Well I think that international organizations define threats based on their agenda. So what they see as a 
priority, something that they work on. I would not say that there are no threats and they are being named, 
but maybe something is being exaggerated. (Data sample 16.) 
 
Discussion 
Finally, some notions should be made about how the analysis portrays the role of international actors 
in Ukraine. This study having its focus on the local capabilities of resilience production in the 
Ukrainian society, the notion of global connectedness, local systems operating inseparably attached 
to international systems (e. g. Prior & Hagmann 2014) guided us to not exclude international actors 
from the analysis. Now the analysis attaches twofold meanings to international actors in Ukraine. On 
the one hand, international pressure and support are found to have been important for the developing 
of the CSS more capable of creating resilience in Ukraine, and the cessation of the interest of the 
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international community to support Ukraine is feared. On the other hand, international support is 
criticized for its inconsistency and unsustainability, as well as for the overruling the Ukrainian 
assessments on risks and relevant areas for development. The previous chapters showed how 
international and European standards continue to serve as the yardstick against which the CSS and 
the resilience of Ukraine are being assessed; this chapter, instead, indicated that some interviewees 
perceive the use of the external yardstick problematic. Reiterating Marat’s (2018) critique on the 
international assistance in post-Soviet states, the interviews indicate that the international actors in 
Ukraine prioritize projects not based on democratic decision-making in Ukraine but on their own 
interests, the result being a fragmented field of hot projects, abandoned projects and untouched areas. 
 
Corresponding to the critique of de Coning (2016) at international interventions, the interviews 
indicate that international actors may have taken too big a role that prevents the self-organization of 
the society in Ukraine: according to several interviewees, Ukrainians have not had full agency in 
identifying risks and designing responses to crises through their CSS. In the interviewees’ experience, 
Ukraine should be cautious over developing too much dependency on its international supporters and 
maintain the capability to organize on its own. The perception correlates strongly with resilience 
literature that emphasizes local capabilities as the key to long-term development, for example Abel 
and others (2006) finding the capacity to self-organize as the core of resilience.  
 
Furthermore, findings presented in the previous chapters clearly suggest that international actors do 
not need to bring resilience to Ukraine: resilience factors are already embedded in the institutions and 
practices of the society. Namely, it is one of the strongest messages rising from the research that the 
society of Ukraine already is resilient, and it is even outstandingly resilient taken into account the 
disturbances it is experiencing, parts of Ukraine being occupied and the armed conflict continuing on 
its territory. Ukraine has been able to maintain its core functions and even develop its functions in 
the circumstances of an armed conflict: it has kept on reforming the CSS, even though the armed 
conflict would have suggested developing responses foreign to resilience thinking. The post-
Euromaidan reform of the CSS appears as the most recent demonstration of the inbuilt resilience of 
the society, but it should not be interpreted as an isolated incident. As both the literature and the 
interviews indicate, being in transition appears as a permanent characteristic of the society of Ukraine 
that has continued to function and reform its state structures all long its turbulent history.  
 
How the international community could help resilient societies like Ukraine to maintain and develop 
their resilience without robbing or messing that intrinsic capability of those societies appears as a 
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difficult task that needs to be resolved, not least because also cessation of international support was 
perceived as a risky option by many interviewees. The concern of previous research over harmful 
effects of international interventions being reiterated in the interviews, this research, however, took 
only a quick glance at the topic. An apparent need for more extensive research remains, especially as 
long as CSS reforms continue to constitute one pillar for many international interventions around the 
globe: the international community needs find out how they can best support the capabilities of the 
CSSs to build resilience in their local societies. 
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Theoretical implications  
 
The research has come to a point in which some final conclusions should be drawn. This chapter 
presents the most relevant theoretical conclusions based on the analysis and takes some stances in 
relation to the previous theoretical research on resilience. 
 
Firstly, the research suggests that, as a characteristic of the Ukrainian society, and as built through 
the agency of its civilian security sector, “resilience” is primarily a desired feature for a society and 
its sub-units. Disagreeing with Bourbeau’s (2013) insistence that resilience could also be negative, 
this research suggests understanding resilience as a fundamentally positive property of the subjects 
of agency. Thus, obstacles to positive change should not be interpreted as negative examples of 
resilience, as Bourbeau suggests, but as shortages of resilience, or as failures to take full advantage 
of the various resources embedded in “being resilient”: 
 
Namely, the second suggestion of this research is that resilience should not be understood as one all-
purpose tool fit to any types of risks or disturbances. Both the previous research and the study in 
question demonstrate that different versions of resilience are needed, “adaptation” and “bouncing 
back” being the two typical variants discussed (e.g. Milliken 2013; Cork 2010). Indeed, the findings 
of this research demonstrate that different adaptive solutions need to be developed to different types 
of risks. Some past shocks require recovery, such as the re-establishment of mutual trust, whilst some 
risks in the present, especially those inside the system and its sub-units, need to be addressed through 
prioritizing the essential functions of the system while giving up on others (following the definition 
of resilience by Cork 2010, p. 4). 
 
The research suggests that, in the case of the Ukrainian society, “a resilient system” appears to be one 
capable of both returning to equilibrium, and of changing its internal features, the former 
corresponding to “bouncing back” and the latter to adaptation. The research does not insist that other 
ways of being resilient could not be present or emerge, but suggests understanding at least these two 
features as characteristics of the Ukrainian society as a resilient system, to which the CSS forms a 
sub-system. In Ukraine, the capability to return to equilibrium (equilibrium being understood as the 
opposite state to collapsing or being under disturbance) has been demonstrated, for example, in the 
reconstruction of an agreement between the society and the state concerning the grounds for the use 
of force. In this example, the reconstruction required the inclusion of new agents, such as civil 
activists in the processes of making decisions on and monitoring the CSS, which seems typical based 
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on literature on resilience. The reconstruction also leaned on the use of formal state structures, such 
as legislation, which appears surprising in the light of previous literature on resilience. The other 
feature of the society of Ukraine as a resilient system, namely the capability of changing its internal 
features, has been demonstrated, for example, in the establishing of a systematic reform in one of the 
sub-units of the system, the CSS, based on the identified friction in its functioning as a part of the 
larger system, the society.  
 
The research positions itself aligned with the idea of de Coning (2016) concerning non-linear, 
complex systems, and also with Manyena’s and Gordon’s (2015) theorization about systems within 
nested adaptive cycles. As the third theoretical conclusion, the research finds the system and its sub-
units, namely the society of Ukraine and the CSS, as separate in their resiliences against disturbances, 
but inherently connected. Meanings given to corruption and impunity in the analysis portray the said 
characteristics: both appear as failures of the society (the larger system) to apply its inbuilt capability 
of changing its internal features. Corruption and impunity manifest the lack of adaptation-type 
resilience of the system, and also cause slow-burn disturbance to it. At the same time, the CSS as the 
sub-unit of the system is found to have experienced equilibrium in the same circumstances. Whereas 
corruption and impunity appear as continuous low-intensity crises to the society that is weakened due 
to its incapability to address those risks, the sub-system, the CSS, instead, experiences an opposite 
phase of transformation, and becomes shaken only when the society starts to push change over the 
sub-system, namely starts the CSS reform. 
 
Where our findings differ from many of the reviewed literature relates to the link of resilience to neo-
liberalism. For example Chandler (2014), Ryan (2015) and Corry (2014) have suggested the 
decoupling of the resilience approach from neoliberalist frameworks, because resilience does not 
necessarily follow the neoliberalist logic but even functions contradictory to it. This research, instead, 
suggests that the neoliberal version of resilience thinking has heuristic power: it conceptualizes the 
call for the resilient subject to take more responsibility and become more active in upkeeping security. 
Combining the neoliberal logic to resilience thinking helps to understand why the interviewees 
believe that citizens should give up bribing and police officers should become more active in their 
duties. Furthermore, the neoliberalist interpretation on resilience thinking captures some of the 
fundamental meanings attached to the CSS reform. Indeed, it is neoliberal to suggest that the CSS 
should be reformed, namely that its internal capabilities should be developed, in order to address 
external risks. This logic applies to risks that are perceived external to the society, like organized 
crime (CSS should become more effective to minimize those), but also to risks external to the CSS 
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but internal to the society, such as a civic uprising: CSS is demanded to develop more acceptable so 
that the risk of an uprising could be avoided. The neoliberal way of thought even seems to explain 
why resilience thinking appears difficult to apply with regard to the external threat of Russia: it is not 
a risk that could be internalized following the neoliberal logic, and thus does not fit to resilience 
thinking. Indeed, the research concludes that resilience, as a characteristic of the Ukrainian society 
and as built through its CSS, seems to exercise neoliberalist logic and consist of what the neoliberal 
version of the resilience approach perceives as features of a resilient subject. 
 
Finally, these theoretical conclusions support the already discussed need for further research on 
effects of international interventions. Taken into account the multiplicity of the different types of 
resiliences that the resilient system of Ukraine continuously needs to develop in order to address risks 
that also need to be continuously re-identified and re-prioritized by the society, the research finds it 
unlikely that an external actor could be able to design solutions to the problems that are locally 
experienced and constantly changing in the complex system. As Juncos (2018) noted, the complexity 
that led to the adoption of the resilience approach in international intervention, is likely to undermine 
its implementation. Furthermore, the research reiterates the concern of theoretical literature (e. g. de 
Coning 2016) that a local system most likely loses (at least some of) its capability to self-organize if 
an external intervention takes place and starts to build resilience of that system on its behalf. On the 
other hand, cessation of international support also appears problematic: several interviewees believe 
Ukraine to benefit from the pressure and support of international actors. The research thus only 
concludes that if an international intervention takes place, it should definitely show interest in 
understanding the resilience factors that are already embedded in the institutions and practices of that 
society, and support responses that the society develops against risks identified by that society. 
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Conclusion 
Six years after the Euromaidan, the civilian security sector in Ukraine seems to be in the midst of 
transition. The transition is given mixed meanings: on the one hand, it entails a shock from which the 
police–citizen relations need to recover, and on the other hand, it signals that the law enforcement 
and rule of law institutions are developing more capable of building resilience in the Ukrainian 
society. After the 2013–2014 demonstrations that violently concretized the crumbling of the social 
contract on the use of force by the state, a large reform movement is found to have developed the 
CSS more acceptable to the society, new norms on the protection of citizens and the cooperation with 
the civil society marking the positive adaptation. The reforms of the security provision represent 
resilience in two senses: as an indicator of the capability to adapt, and because they construct more 
of that capability. Marking a difference to the findings of previous studies, the CSS is seen to have 
developed more capable of carrying out necessary changes in the way it secures the society, and that 
change is believed to make it more effective in responding and adapting to further risks emerging in 
its national and regional environment. Despite this value given to the outcome of the Euromaidan, 
the reoccurring of such violent confrontation is perceived as a risk, not least because of the 
polarization, the strengthening of extreme groups and the spreading of small arms in Ukraine. As a 
positive result, the fear of another civic uprising is perceived to keep up the standards for the state-
provided security. 
 
At the same time, the reform of the civilian security sector is not ready, and the sufficiency of the 
CSS capability to construct a resilient Ukraine seems to depend on what disturbances it is to 
encounter. Resilience against internal risks appears mostly dependent on the capability of the CSS to 
absorb more changes demanded by the society, in particular to develop practices more effective, 
transparent and accountable, and to break free from corruption. Resilience against external risks, 
instead, appears more difficult to assess. The actualized threat of Russia attacking against the 
sovereignty of Ukraine is perceived negating to any attempts to construct resilience through the 
development of the CSS: principles of defence, required in war-time, seem to both contradict and 
overrule the principles of supporting resilient society in CSS operations. This contradiction being 
manifested in the failure of the SBU to open up to civic monitoring and to abandon illegal means of 
security production, it remains, however, only one example of the destructive and pervasive effects 
of the war for the resilience of Ukraine, whose capability to function, plan in long-term and develop 
as a society are reduced due to the conflict. The research suggests that as long as the armed conflict 
continues, the CSS has to work according to two parallel systems of principles: defence approach is 
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applied when developing CSS operations related to the armed conflict, whereas the resilience thinking 
suits to be applied to many other risks, especially those that are ambiguous, blurry or located in the 
future. 
 
One of the major messages developing from this study is the discontent of the interviewees with the 
society being only stable, and the call for it to be resilient instead, the demand having major 
implications on how the CSS is expected to position itself in the society. The traditional, closed 
monopoly of the rule of law and law enforcement that has brought stability to the society is being 
questioned and demanded to be replaced by an open system that allows the civic monitoring of the 
security provision and the reforming of the security system when considered necessary by its new 
democratic steering. The rule of law and law enforcement structures are demanded to abandon their 
role as the protector of the state (from the citizens) and to take the protection of citizens as their new 
fundamental principle. For example, the police is demanded to support societal change by protecting 
demonstrators. The preservation of the ruling regime as the goal of the rule of law and law 
enforcement thus becomes replaced by the new principle of the CSS securing the adaption of the 
system to new circumstances. 
 
Finally, the suitability of the resilience concept in studying the civilian security sector in post-Soviet 
Ukraine appears complex, possibilities embedded in its rich theoretical basement compensating for 
the limitations of the framework. On the one hand, the resilience approach recognizes many of the 
meanings attached to the processes ongoing in Ukraine today: most importantly, the concept provides 
support to understanding why reforming the CSS is perceived important for the society. On the other 
hand, especially with regard to the violent conflict in the East of Ukraine, the analysis found the 
resilience concept somewhat problematic, attaching contradictory meanings and offering impossible 
solutions to the situation of the society of Ukraine. With this regard, it seems that the older 
frameworks of stability and defence better conceptualize the understanding on how the particular 
threat can be coped with. The idea of resilience as resistance, however, defends the suitability of the 
resilience framework in research of contexts of violent conflict. It suggests the recognition of 
resistance where, for example, the protection of human rights has been developed and social justice 
enhanced in war-time. Indeed, it leads us to conclude that through being resilient, carrying out a 
robust reform agenda in front of and despite the armed conflict, Ukraine has demonstrated its 
resistance against the devastating effects and logic of war.  
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